Child Soldiers (Liberia as a case Study)

Introduction

The use of child soldiers in armed conflict has met much international criticism and condemnation across the globe. The use of child soldiers, particularly in Africa, has received much attention from many individuals, scholars and academics that have made attempts to shed some light and enlighten on this critical, emotional and morally complex issue.

When examining the role of the child soldier in the Liberian civil war, one must take into account the causal factors that play a major role in understanding the relationship between children and warfare in Africa. The causal factors that need to be taken into account when examining why the use of child soldiers was so prevalent in the Liberian conflict, are that of poverty, greed and the changing nature of wars and light weaponry that was used by children as young as twelve years old. The purpose of this essay is to identify the role that the child soldier played in the conflict; by role we mean the activities and actions required or expected of a person in a group. In order to identify that particular role and responsibility required of a child soldier, causal factors need to be taken into consideration. The use of child soldiers has inspired the emergence of important and interesting questions such as: What is a child and what is a child soldier? Why do some children decide or volunteer to become child soldiers? Why do rebel movements and organizations abduct and recruit child soldiers? And how are they recruited?

The traditional African and the European social and cultural perceptions of Childhood play a major role in helping one understand the definition of childhood. This essay will look at the two world views and will aim to criticize and digest the relevant literature and ultimately give a logical and consistent definition of child soldiers and childhood. The literature written by authors knowledgeable on the subject, such as Alcinda Honwana’s Child Soldiers in Africa and T. W Bennet’s Using Children in Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African Tradition? The above mentioned books will help discuss the arguments of how we define a child soldier. One argument is that conventional definitions contend that child soldiers are combatants or military recruits under the age 18. The Geneva Convention upholds this age qualification, so does the United Nations General Assembly and the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court. Alternatively, the opposing argument is that the definition of childhood in African cultures has little to do with age, although people sometimes refer to age limits. Rather, the positions of children are defined through social roles, expectations and responsibilities.

The literature on the subject provides interesting and helpful information on defining the child soldier but tends to be repetitive on other issues such as recruitment and the role child soldiers play within the military movement. However, information on casual factors and the treatment of female soldiers in conflict is much to be admired. The only problem is that one cannot pin point exactly where the root cause of why the use of child soldiers is so prevalent in Africa. Therefore, in order for one to try and have a clear understanding, the essay will begin by presenting the definition of the term child soldier. Additionally, this essay will provide examples and cases from the Liberian civil war from 1989 to 2003.

Background on the Liberian Civil War

From December 1989 to 2003, Liberia had been devastated by a civil war that has killed tens of thousands of Liberians and caused an estimated one-third of its population to flee the country as refugees.[1] The war had been marked by mass killings along ethnic lines and horrifying atrocities. Indeed, a characteristic of the Liberian civil war was that civilians suffered the most, they were deliberately targeted by all the warring factions often because of their ethnicity and that as a consequence far more civilians than combatants were killed.[2] The lack of protection and respect for the lives of civilians by all sides and the profound distrust among the warring factions were obstacles in achieving peace.[3] The roots of Liberia's civil war go far back in Liberian history. However, the immediate precursor dates from 1985: after President Samuel Doe, an ethnic Krahn who came to power in a 1980 coup, stole the presidential elections, he brutally suppressed a coup attempt led by Thomas Qwiwonkpa, an ethnic Gio. Doe's soldiers, the Krahn-dominated AFL, engaged in bloody reprisals against real and suspected opponents and their home communities as well targeting mostly Gios and Manos; hundreds were killed and hundreds more were detained without charge or trial.[4] This violence and the subsequent repression set the stage for the country's ethnic conflict and civil war.

On December 24, 1989, Charles Taylor and his NPFL launched an incursion from the Ivory Coast into Nimba County.[5] The AFL responded with a ruthless counterinsurgency campaign, indiscriminately killing civilians, burning villages, raping women and looting.[6] The brutality served to swell the ranks of NPFL recruits, many of whom were Gio and Mano boys orphaned by the fighting and the random and reprisal killings that accompanied it, or enraged by the AFL's conduct. The AFL went on the rampage outside Nimba as well. In one of the most egregious abuses of the war, on the night of July 29-30, 1990, AFL soldiers massacred some 600 people mostly Gios and Manos, many of them women with children who had taken refuge at St. Peter's Church in Monrovia.[7] Civilians also suffered at the hands of the NPFL. The NPFL targeted suspected supporters of the Doe regime, particularly members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups. Throughout NPFL territory, civilians suffered the capricious actions of an occupying army, arbitrary arrest, physical abuse, confiscation and destruction of property and restrictions on freedom of movement and freedom of expression.[8]


In August 1990, without any prospect for intervention by the United Nations or the United States, a peacekeeping force under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ecowas) arrived in Monrovia to separate the warring factions and to stop the bloodshed.[9] The role assigned to the force, known as the Economic Community Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), was to impose a cease-fire and to help form an interim government that would hold elections within twelve months.[10] With NPFL attacks continuing, there was no peace to keep, and ECOMOG itself engaged in combat to push the NPFL out of Monrovia. This situation was aggravated in October 1992, when the NPFL attacked Monrovia.[11] ECOMOG then accepted the assistance of other Liberian factions in fighting the NPFL, and in so doing dropped much of its appearance of neutrality. The human rights records of these factions ULIMO and the AFL ranged from suspect to abysmal.[12] The AFL was thoroughly discredited by its horrific abuses during the 1980s and especially during the war in 1990, when it massacred civilians and devastated Monrovia.[13]

ULIMO is an offshoot of the AFL, and its conduct in the areas it captured in 1992 included extensive human rights abuses.[14] Because of its conduct in the conflict, questions have been raised about ECOMOG's commitment to human rights and its ability to act as a neutral arbiter of the conflict.[15] The chief warring factions currently involved in the conflict are Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which controls about 60 percent of the country; and the United Liberian Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), made up primarily of soldiers from former President Samuel K. Doe's army, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), which controls at least two western counties.[16] ULIMO split along ethnic lines, pitting Krahns against Mandingos, causing serious casualties. Since late 1993, the NPFL had also been challenged by the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), a new armed faction made up largely of former AFL soldiers, most of whom are members of the Krahn ethnic group.[17] The LPC claims to control significant territory in the southeast. The remaining troops of the Armed Forces of Liberia do not control territory per se, but are armed and deployed around Monrovia. In addition, the Lofa Defense Force (LDF) is fighting ULIMO in Lofa County. In June 1993, in one of the worst atrocities to be documented during the war, 547 civilians, mostly women and children, were massacred in a displaced persons camp outside of Harbel.[18]

The victims were shot, beaten or hacked to death. A United Nations investigation concluded that the massacre had been carried out by the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). U.N. Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali condemned the Harbel massacre, and a new round of peace talks was initiated. The U.N. joined with ecowas and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to sponsor peace negotiations in Geneva that included representatives of all factions.[19] On July 25, 1993, a peace agreement was signed in Cotonou, Benin, by the NPFL, ULIMO, and the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU).[20] The peace accord stipulated that concomitant with disarmament, a five-person Council of State elected by all the factions would take power from the interim government until elections were held.[21] A thirty-five-member transitional parliament would include thirteen members from the NPFL and the interim government, and nine from ULIMO.[22] Between August 1993 and February 1994, political wrangling prevented the lntg from being seated. In February 1994, it was agreed that David Kpomakpor, a lawyer representing IGNU, would chair the lntg; with Dexter Tahyor of ULIMO, and Issac Mussah of the NPFL as vice chairs.[23]

Finally, in mid-May, Dorothy Musuleng Cooper was named Foreign Minister. An important element of the plan involved the creation of a U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to help supervise and monitor the agreement, in conjunction with ECOMOG.[24] The plan also provided for an expanded ECOMOG force, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to be composed of African troops from outside the West African region. By early 1994, some 800 Tanzanians were deployed in Kakata, and 900 Ugandans were in Buchanan.[25]


Defining the Child Soldier and Childhood

As Honwana claims, the term child soldier is an oxymoron that signifies the violence that this position does to establish.[26] A clarification of the specific meaning of the term soldier in theses civil wars, especially when preceded by the term child is necessary.[27] The soldier in theses contexts was often not a regular soldier of the sort who serves in state – sponsored, centrally controlled, and well – disciplined armed forces. Rather, the term refers to the type of fighter who often fills the ranks of guerrilla and rebel groups, inadequately trained and outfitted, often operating under the influence of drugs. Such soldiers harass loot and kill defenceless civilians indiscriminately.[28] The child soldier is characterized by its intrinsic aspect, minor, someone who needs to be looked after and nurtured in the right way, which explains the reckless behaviour once the guardian and the values have been removed and the status of soldier is given to the child. The child soldier is therefore considered to have an undeveloped sense of morality which is worsened by the horrid values indoctrinated by wicked warlords.

According to Honwana, the boundaries between adulthood and childhood in African societies have traditionally been more fluid than in European societies.[29] Of necessity children are actively involved in economic activities. The transition to adulthood is gradual, variable, and responsive to the particular situations of young people, their families and communities. Universalizing definitions are not applicable in many African conditions.[30] The problems that are facing the African continent, particularly poverty stricken Liberia indicate that what is considered a child or childhood behaviour in Liberia will not necessarily be considered childhood behaviour in England. There are cases of fourteen year old bread winners in African house holds, while that situation in European states is almost non existent. Unlike the western view point, childhood in the African context is not necessarily a stage of incompetence.[31]

It is an undisputable fact that there are more children participating as combatants today than there was in the past. The question posed by Bennet of did or did not African traditions involve children being conscripted into military service?[32] Provides one with a stepping stone in ensuring a clear and logical understanding of whether child conscription was as prevalent in the past as it is today. Many of those currently bearing arms in Africa are ten years old and some are even younger.[33] Were children as young as this conscripted in the pre – colonial age set? Bennet answers this question by claiming that we first need to understand what is meant by child. Children were never conscripted into the military service in African societies.[34] They were not recruited into regiments, nor did they bear arms, men were drafted into regiments three or four years after puberty.[35] The warrior was a mature and able bodied man. Armies needed men who could fight more effectively.[36] An example of this would be the Zulu society in the pre – colonial period during the peak of their military prowess. Children played non – military roles in society, before and even during puberty. Marriage was delayed because men had to participate in combat, which created a generation gap within the Zulu society.

The African traditional rules for regulating attainment of childhood have been transformed as a result of the socio – economic changes that came in the wake of colonialism.[37] Throughout Africa, urbanisation has fragmented extended families. Breakdown of the family has in turn, resulted in an ever increasing number of illegitimate births, runaway children and single parent families.[38] Every society withholds some, if not all, powers and responsibilities from the young until they behave in a mature and fully rational manner.[39] Bennet claims that in literate societies, adulthood is usually ascribed to individuals when they reach certain predetermined ages.[40] The transition from childhood is therefore fixed at an age when it is presumed that individuals will be capable of conducting themselves as adults. In preliterate societies on the other hand, where it is not possible to keep exact records, movement from one category to another is related to physical processes such as puberty and to social events such as initiation.[41]


Casual Factors
An abundance of light weapons and small arms

The wide availability, accumulation and proliferation of light weapons and small escalates conflicts, undermines peace agreements, intensifies violence, impacts on crime in a negative way, impedes economic and social development and hinder the development of social stability democracy and good governance.[42] The large supply of small arms and light weapons turn the children into soldiers as they are easy to carry and are able to be used effectively. Contemporary warfare is indeed shaped by least costly and simple weapons. These small arms and light weapons include rifles, grenades, light machine guns, light mortars, land mines, and other weapons that are “man portable”.[43] Even though they represent less than two percent of the entire global arms trade in terms of cost, small arms are perhaps the most deadly of all weapons to society. They are weapons most often used in battle and in attacks on civilians and have produced almost ninety percent of casualties in recent wars.[44]

Although no two conflicts are ever exactly alike, it can be said that the wars of the post cold war have generally taken a particular form: one in which the forces involved are predominantly of a paramilitary or irregular nature and the fighting is largely confined to the national territory of the state in question.[45] The conflicts that fit this pattern have for the most part, entailed a struggle over the ethnic composition of a disputed area or the possession of valuable resources. Such conflicts by their very nature tend to be conducted primarily with small arms and light weapons. This is so because the belligerents involved – state security forces, insurgents, organisations, ethnic militias, warlords, death squads, and so on – are normally bared from access to major weapons systems and lack the training and logistical capacity to operate such systems.[46]

As singer states, there has been many improvements in manufacturing, such as the incorporation of plastics. This means that modern weapons, particularly assault rifles, are so light that small children can use them as easily and effectively as adults. They are no longer just man portable, but are child portable as well.[47] Most of theses weapons have been simplified in their use to the extent that they can be stripped, reassembled and, and fired by a child below the age of ten.[48] An example of this would be the Kalashnikov A. K – 47. These weapons are more deadly and have become very easy to use; they have also proliferated, to the extent that there is almost a glut on the market. There are an estimated five hundred million small arms on the global scene, one for every twelve persons on the planet.[49] The consequence, as Singer states, is that the primary weapons of war have also steeply fallen in price over the last few decades. This has made it easier for any willing organisation to obtain them and then turn children into soldiers.[50]

Poverty and the lack of social development

Where development succeeds, states become safer and are less likely to engage in violent intrastate conflicts. Social Development is more commonly know as desirable social progress within a society. It ensures well being of the whole population with the participation of others.
There are various factors that affect social development, such as disease and corruption in government to name but two. Others again define social development as a sustainable process of change in thinking and behavior which embraces all strata of society, the course of which determines the economic, political and social goals just as much as the ways and means of achieving them. When we use the term “social development in the context of our engagement, then we mean precisely this multidimensional process[51] Different ideologies also lead to different policy choices as to what should constitute the primary engine of development[52]

The desperate situation in which poverty stricken Liberia found herself, provided a huge pool of disgruntled and displaced children prior to and during the civil war. Singer states that these children constitute to the labor for the illegal economy, organized crime, and armed conflicts.[53] Poverty is a casual factor because armed conflicts lead to food shortages because they destroy a countries productive capacities and infrastructure. A lack of food or the destruction of productive resources often forces families to volunteer their children to either rebel or government forces as potential combatants.[54] Because both sides characteristically participate in looting of civilian populations, theses children may have the opportunity to reap the benefits for themselves and their families.[55] Armed factions are often motivated by greed and will avoid direct confrontations so that they can concentrate on the lucrative process of looting and undefended and unarmed victims. Children assume the role of bread winners, whether they volunteer or are coerced.[56] The HIV / AIDS pandemic were also contributing factors to social impediment during the Liberian Civil War.

Young men, who are considered psychologically more aggressive, naturally compete for social and material resources in all societies.[57] When outnumbering other generations, however, there are inevitably more losers than winners among the youth in this process.[58] Warlords find it easier to recruit when a large population of angry, listless young men fills the streets.[59]

Greed, Armed Forces that lack support and the changing nature of civil wars

In the majority of conflicts carried out in the developing world, warfare has become messier and criminalized. In many cases the private profit motive has become a central motivator, equal or greater to that of political, ideological or religious inspiration.[60] Actors and groups who lack popular support are the driving force behind the bloody civil wars that plagued Liberia in the early nineties. The reason for this is that the primary driving force behind Africa’s conflict is greed rather than grievance. Collier and Hoeffler define civil war as an internal conflict with at least 1,000 combat-related deaths per year.[61] In order to distinguish wars from massacres, both government forces and an identifiable rebel organization must suffer at least 5% of these casualties. Conflicts in Africa are best explained through an economic perspective. The ability to finance a rebellion for economic and material gain supersedes the argument that civil wars are influenced by colonialism, ethnic and religious differences. Collier and Hoeffler investigate the causes of civil wars from 1966 to 1999, by using a new data set of wars.[62] They examine 161 countries and identify 78 civil wars. These economic accounts explain rebellion in terms of opportunity, it is an undisputable fact that insurgencies cannot survive without a strong financial backing. The only way that these means are achievable is through the availability of natural resources, which are the driving force in the maintenance of the rebel organization, in the form of paying for military equipment to continue the fight against their opponents.[63]

Singer states that the fighting in a number of conflicts around the globe lacks any sort of link to a broader political or religious cause. They are driven by a simple logic of appropriation, from seizing mineral assets and protecting the drug trade, to simple looting and pillaging.[64] He goes on to say that, while many of these wars are fuelled by new conflict entrepreneurs and local warlords that emerged in the 1990’s in their individual countries, the broader end of the cold war also played a part in this shift.[65] When outside superpower patronage ceased, the calculus of many ideological guerilla groups, including those once motivated by Marxism, took a more market orientated dimension, they realized that their economies had to change. The new rule of insurgency, as Singer puts it, is that if conflict groups want to survive, they have to find their own financial resources.[66]

The notion that conflicts throughout Africa are generated by popular support for the rebel movement is flawed and inconsistent, Collier and Hoeffler found that another source of finance for which there is good case study evidence is Diasporas. They have found that Diasporas substantially increase the risk of conflict renewal, and it is hard to find an alternative explanation for this result.[67] In addition, the less educated the young men are in a society, the more likely they are to engage in a conflict. Indra de Soysa also argues that countries with an abundance of mineral wealth are more likely to suffer greed motivated rebellion. There is little evidence to suggest that scarcity of renewable resources is a significant predicator of armed conflict.[68] Mineral wealth plays a major role in the formation of conflict in Africa. In most cases it the rich resource economies that are in heavy conflict. It is abundance that stimulates conflict.

De Soysa tests the competing hypothesis of scarcity versus abundance as a cause of civil war. The first hypothesis that is tested sees conflict as a result of scarce resources and the second hypothesis sees conflict as a result of resources in abundance. De Soysa’s study proves that an abundance of resources is a major catalyst for violence, driven by the desire for loot.[69] De Soysa also gives a good analogy on the discourse of grievance or scarcity arguments. He explains as follows: “Two drunks may come to fisticuffs with each other because they were drunk, but if asked why they fought them are liable to justify their drunken behavior with explanations of grievance about why each of them fought, such as he struck me first. The true cause of conflict, drunkenness, is therefore masked by the discourse of grievance”.[70]
The discourse of grievance in real life or real world politics, whether along economic, ethnic or political lines masks underlying realities about where the origins of conflicts lie.[71] It is only about resources that are exploitable, resources that can be turned into finance. In this regard, greed is conceptualized as the ability to finance a rebellion.

According to De Soysa, poor countries stay poor and suffer armed conflict because resource scarcity acts to prevent socio – economic innovation… To deal with scarcity, a society needs ingenuity – but the very scarcities demanding social ingenuity act as constraints on innovation.[72] Societies are unable to progress because there is nothing to help them progress. This leads to frustration and bitterness and consequently leads to conflict. The idea that conflict is affected by scarcity through perpetuating underdevelopment is a novel one, De Soysa notes that this offers a more clearly testable model than most other analysis of environmental conflict, which tends to be explained through rather complex causual mechanisms.[73] Scarcity motivated rebellion is thus motivated by the availability of renewable resources. Whether or not the resources are in abundance or scarcity, the main motivation behind the conflict is material or economic gain.

De Soysa’s study finds that rapacity encouraged by an abundance of natural resources tends to fuel civil conflict. Paucity of natural resources, on the other hand does not seem to be such a strong factor in determining the likelihood of civil strife.[74] Incentives for profit seekers are provided by mineral resources, these results in the engagement of violence. Rebels are provided by resources and other profit seeking groups and individuals, their activities are sustained through the financial support that they receive. A classic example of the above mentioned arguments is the case of Liberia. William Reno gives a clear account on greed as a motivating factor. He states that Charles Taylor had access from exploitation of natural resources in cooperation with foreigners. Taylor’s income far exceeded the Monrovia enclave’s minimal command of resources and revenues after 1989. This domination of the local economy gave
Recruitment

The recruitment of child soldiers is embedded in two aspects; it is either voluntary or forced. While some child soldiers volunteered to join armed forces, others were forcefully recruited during the capturing of new territory. According to Tony Tate, some children joined particular forces to avenge violations committed against their family members. Conversely, some children joined those same forces that committed abuses and atrocities in their communities to offer protection to themselves and their families.[76] Those who were forcefully recruited were usually street children. Some joined because they didn’t know what to do and had no one to take care of them. Many joined for survival and because of the promises of the warring factions.[77] The inducements to join armed groups often included promises of more than just the basic needs for survival – food, clothing and protection in a dangerous world. The groups depended upon foraging and looting, and the children too were promised a part of the spoils.[78] Children were promised money and whatever they could loot – including houses, cars, clothes and food. This, in turn, encouraged children to abuse civilians in order to take their belongings.[79]

Singer cements the argument that children who are forcibly recruited are usually from special risk groups: street children, the rural poor, refugees, and others displaced. Theses are the most vulnerable to efficient recruiting sweeps. Those who enlist on their own are often from the very same groups, driven by poverty, propaganda and alienation.[80]

Alcinda Honwana claims that there is an intricate connection between voluntary and forced recruitment.[81] Although some young people volunteered for ideological reasons and were aware of the strategic objectives of the war they were waging, many were responding to the more immediate conditions that civil war had created in their communities.[82] However, it also seems that indirect yet coercive mechanisms were used to persuade young people to join the military. Intimidation and social pressure pushed some boys to join.[83]

The recruitment of children was correlated with a dehumanization process. Honwana states that the instruments used in the dehumanizing process of recruitment were that of terror and fear evoked by horrific acts of violence during military training. [84] Often new recruits were both agents and victims of such violence simultaneously. Boys in training received their weapons, not when they had learned simply how to use them, but when they demonstrated their willingness to kill. Singer also corroborates Hanwana’s claim by stating that, recruitment is rapidly followed by cruel but straight forward methods of training and conversion. Brutality and abuses of the worst kind underscore each stage, but these lie in part behind the overall program’s usual effectiveness. The main aim of the process is to forster a child’s dependency on an armed organization and inhibit escape.[85] People under the age of eighteen are deemed to be unable or have little ability to judge for themselves, therefore the issue of voluntary means or consent plays a major role in perceiving the atrocities of child recruitment.


The two aspects of voluntary and forceful recruitment contain more than what meets the eye. The social circumstances can lead the child astray to armed forces but greed itself also comes into play. The promise of money and cars can be very enticing, especially in a time of complete mayhem chaos, where hope is gone and there is no light shining at the end of the tunnel. Understanding why children volunteer to take up arms needs a clear understanding of each casual factor. Some may join because they need the A. K – 47 to protect themselves, while others are just plain trouble makers or are in search of food and shelter. Either way, it would be very difficult to hold the guilty accountable using the African view of defining child because the African view contends that childhood is not necessarily a stage of incompetence.

Roles and Duties of Child Soldiers

The roles and responsibilities of child soldiers within both the opposition and former government ranks were very similar. After completing often arduous training, sometimes for a few days, other times for a month of longer, most children were armed and many served on the front lines. They were often the first to be sent out to fight, occupying dangerous, forward positions.[86] They were also charged with manning road blocks and armed guard duty. Some children interviewed for this report spoke of their fear of death, the killing of other children in fighting, and of those they killed themselves. Others bragged about the killings, proud of their advancement to commander status for their ferocity. Children were also beaten and abused by their superiors and forced to witness abuse and killing.[87]

Lois Whitman also gives a clear account on the roles the child soldier played in the Liberian conflict. She states that children played many roles, ranging from carrying ammunition and cooking to serving at the front in major battles.[88] Other duties included running errands such as acting as spies, carrying out reconnaissance and acting as informants. They were also used as body guards, manning checkpoints, checking documents and packages.[89] Children were also responsible for carrying out ambushes and serving as executioners of suspected enemies. Some children were assigned to individual commanders as bodyguards and personal assistants. In general, younger children served as helpers while older ones fought, but there were exceptions—some boys and girls as young as nine and ten years old bore arms.[90] The intensity of combat might also determine what role a child played, carrying goods one day and needed for the fighting the next. Finally, children spent some of their time stealing from civilians in part because they were either never paid or paid infrequently.[91]

Female Soldiers

The question "Where are the girls?" is seldom raised in discussions about children in armed forces and armed opposition groups, both as combatants and noncombatants.[92] Just as the use of child soldiers had been a largely invisible and unacknowledged international phenomenon, scant attention has been given to girls in armed forces and armed opposition groups, their distinct experiences, the impacts, and gender-specific human rights violations.[93] With the exception of some data compiled by the International Coalition, the majority of reports, international campaigns, and initiatives continue to use the generic term "child soldiers" or "children," almost always meaning boys, and do not identify differential impacts for boys and girls before, during, or after armed conflicts.[94]

Girls served with all three groups in the war as both fighters and helpers although in lesser numbers than boys.[95] Liberian nongovernmental organization employees who work with children believe that more girls were used in the last four years of warfare than in years past but that their exact numbers are unknown.[96] Typically older girls and young women were fighters who served in separate units, while younger girls served as cooks, domestics, porters and cleaners. However, there were cases where young girls fought as well. Some girls were attached to units for short periods and escaped or were released, while others fought for years with the groups.[97]


In addition to the many abuses committed against child soldiers, girls were routinely raped and sexually assaulted. Many were raped at the time of recruitment and continued to be sexually abused during their time with the forces.[98] Collectively known as “wives” whether or not they were attached to a soldier, young girls were often assigned to commanders and provided domestic services to them.[99] Older girls and young women were particularly fierce fighters, commanding respect from their male peers. Some of these women were able to eventually protect themselves from sexual assault but would capture other girls to provide sexual services to boys and men.[100]One of the more severe cases, the plight of Clementine is nevertheless shared by the thousands of girls and women who are survivors of brutal rape and sexual assault by the fighting forces.[101]

Conclusion

The role of the child soldier in the Liberian civil war was examined in this essay. Casual factors such as poverty, greed, the changing nature of civil wars and the high availability of light weapons and small arms were assessed. Two arguments were proposed, the first argument was that conventional definitions contend that child soldiers are combatants or military recruits under the age 18. The Geneva Convention upholds this age qualification, so does the United Nations General Assembly and the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court. The second argument which was the opposing argument stated that the definition of childhood in African cultures has little to do with age, although people sometimes refer to age limits. Rather, the positions of children are defined through social roles, expectations and responsibilities.

The first argument perceived childhood as a matter of age and incompetence, this view can be regarded as inconsistent, in the sense that the definition of childhood cannot be universalized. Individuals who have not suffered under some of the atrocious conditions faced by many African children cannot claim that they are the same as those who are privileged. Singer states that it is important to note that, when growing up in a war zone, children will often experience an essential militarization of their daily life.[102] The prominence of innocence as one of the primary markers childhood is distinctly modern. An understanding of children as sinful beings in need of discipline has been a dominant force in European thought.[103] Eric Greitens states that the reason why this seems preposterous to us today, is because the Romantic Movement fundamentally altered Western perceptions of childhood. Childhood nowadays, is often understood as a time of innocence, purity and naturalness, and is frequently juxtaposed against a view of adulthood as a process, not only of maturation, but also of engagement with a corrupt society.[104] The threat of death becomes a normal occurrence and their regular experiences will be shaped by the omnipresence of combatants around them. It is in this “amoral vacuum” that groups seeking child soldiers offer a voice that can appeal to lost children.[105] In this sense, children are defined by their societies. In some societies, children are required to grow up early and become head of house holds at a very young age.
Most of the literature has claimed that child soldiers joined armed factions voluntarily, because of social pressures, the promise of material gain and the need for protection in a war – zone.

This essay has also tried to give a clear graphic description of the child soldier. The paper has tried to explain why universalizing childhood is a form of unrealistic utopian thinking, by examining the two different world views on the concept of childhood. The use of female soldiers in has also been examined, which is also a prevalent problem because women are subject to some of the most shocking conditions in the military. Issues such as re – integration and demobilisation have been left out because the main purpose of this essay was to examine the role of the child soldier in an African conflict and identify the underlying causes of why children are recruited. The questions proposed in the introduction have been answered based on the literature available on the subject.




References:

1.) Eric Greitens, The treatment of children During conflict in Frances Stewart, Valpy Fitzgerald and Associates (eds.), War and Underdevelopment Volume 1 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001].p. 154

2.) P. W Singer, Children at war, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005.

3.) Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004

4.) Susan McKay, Girls in militaries, Paramilitaries and armed opposition groups

5.) Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994

6.) Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia,

7.) William Reno, Liberia and Sierra Leone: The Competition for patronage in resource rich economies

8.) Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and David M Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,2000):113

9.) Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War

10.) Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich, Why do children “fight”? Explaining the rise of child soldiers

11.) Shraeder, Peter.J, African politics and society (Bedford / St. Martin, Boston, 2000),

12.) http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/0,,contentMDK:20692151~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:244363,00.html

13.) Jeffery Boutwell and Michael. T Klare, Light weapons and civil conflict: Controlling the tools of Violence, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999

14.) T. W Bennet, using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African Tradition? Institute for Security Studies, 1998

15.) Light weapons and small arms OAU report, 1999






[1] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[2] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[3] ibid
[4] ibid
[5] ibid
[6] ibid
[7] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[8] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[9] ibid
[10] ibid
[11] ibid
[12] ibid
[13] ibid
[14] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[15] ibid
[16] ibid
[17] ibid
[18] ibid
[19] ibid
[20] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[21] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[22] ibid
[23] ibid
[24] ibid
[25] ibid
[26] Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006
[27] Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006
[28] ibid
[29] ibid
[30] ibid
[31] ibid
[32] T. W Bennet, using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African Tradition? Institute for Security Studies, 1998.
[33] T. W Bennet, using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African Tradition? Institute for Security Studies, 1998.
[34] ibid
[35] ibid
[36] ibid
[37] ibid
[38] T. W Bennet, using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African Tradition? Institute for Security Studies,
[39] Ibid.
[40] ibid
[41] ibid
[42] Light weapons and small arms OAU report
[43] P. W Singer, children at war, New York, Pantheon books, 2005
[44] ibid
[45] Jeffery Boutwell and Michael. T Klare, Light weapons and civil conflict: Controlling the tools of Violence, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999
[46] Jeffery Boutwell and Michael. T Klare, Light weapons and civil conflict: Controlling the tools of Violence, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999
[47] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[48] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[49] ibid
[50] ibid
[51] http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/0,,contentMDK:20692151~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:244363,00.html
[52] Shraeder, Peter.J, African politics and society (Bedford / St. Martin, Boston, 2000), p. 175.
[53] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[54] Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich, Why do children “fight”? Explaining the rise of child soldiers
[55] ibid
[56] ibid
[57] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[58] ibid
[59] ibid
[60] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon books, 2005
[61] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War
[62] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War
[63] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War
[64] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon books, 2005
[65] ibid
[66] ibid
[67] Ibid.
[68] Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and David M Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,2000):113
[69] Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and David M Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,2000):113
[70] Ibid.p.115
[71] Ibid.p.116
[72] Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and
[73] Ibid. p. 118
[74] Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and
[75] William Reno, Liberia and Sierra Leone: The Competition for patronage in resource rich economies
[76] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights watch. Vol 16, No 2. New York. 2004
[77] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[78] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[79] ibid
[80] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[81] Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006
[82] ibid
[83] ibid
[84] ibid
[85] PW Singer 2005 How Children Are recruited into War in Children at War New York: Pantheon Books

[86] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.
[87] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.
[88] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[89] ibid
[90] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.

[91] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.

[92] Susan McKay, Girls in militaries, Paramilitaries and armed opposition groups
[93] ibid
[94] ibid
[95] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.
[96] ibid
[97] ibid
[98] ibid
[99] ibid
[100] ibid
[101] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004
[102] P. W Singer, Children at war, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005.
[103] Eric Greitens, The treatment of children During conflict in Frances Stewart, Valpy Fitzgerald and Associates (eds.), War and Underdevelopment Volume 1 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001].p. 154
[104] Eric Greitens, The treatment of children During conflict in Frances Stewart, Valpy Fitzgerald and Associates (eds.), War and Underdevelopment Volume 1 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001].p. 154

[105] P. W Singer, Children at war, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005.