SA equity returns shine

January 5 2011 at 06:02am By Ayanda Mdluli

Independent Newspapers
JSE CEO Russell Loubser. Photo: Leon Nicholas

Optimism about the prospects for South African corporations helped propel the JSE all share index to a 19 percent rise in 2010, but some analysts are cautious about this year if the economic recovery proves weak.

Although the Reserve Bank has cut interest rates to a 30-year low to foster growth, there remains a concern the recovery may be unsustainable, partly due to rand strength that has weighed on exporting sectors like manufacturing.

Even so, last year’s impressive increase on the all share index is a reflection that South African corporations fared better in 2010 than the rest of Africa. Excluding dividends, the all share index advanced 15.4 percent.

According to a report from JPMorgan on emerging market equities in 2010, South Africa was the eighth-best performing country out of 22 markets.

Michael Power, a strategist at Investec, said the South African economy had a strong resource component, which led to the market doing well.
He said the economy grew by 18 percent in normal dollar terms.

However, he warned that 2011 would not be an easy year and that South Africa would not experience another 11 percent appreciation of the rand against the dollar.
His views were based on an emerging market investor who got a 30 percent-plus return from the South African market in 2010.

He said there was no loss of value showing in the local market, but cautioned that returns would be a lot lower.
He also forecast that there would be no strong recovery for consumers and predicted that the chances of further rate cuts were slim.

“We may experience one more interest rate cut, however chances of more rate cuts are small and we must guard against rising input costs of food, oil and coal,” he said.

According to Russell Global Indexes, which covers 98 percent of investable international markets, the JSE was +35.4 percent in dollar returns in December, compared with other Bric nations such as Brazil, which stood at +11.2 percent.
India was at +20.1 percent, Russia at +25.6 percent and China at +9.3 percent.

The markets are almost back at levels seen prior to the global economic meltdown, a welcome development, according to JSE chief executive Russell Loubser.
Loubser said the run-up meant that South Africa was not a basket case and was punching well above its weight, suggesting this achievement had improved the image and perception of the country among investors.

“If we were a basket case as a country then we would be a basket case as a stock exchange, generally speaking we made a good impression and the image and perception of the country has improved.”

He said a significant factor which enticed foreign investment towards the local market was the country’s rating in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report.
According to the report, South Africa was rated first in the category of the regulation of security exchanges.

This rating, according to Loubser, ensured that investors were comfortable with the South African market and resulted in foreigners becoming net buyers of local equities.
He noted that the financial markets formed a small part of the economy.

“There are tens of thousands of companies that are not listed and the 400 in the JSE are not a true representation of the total economy.”

Coronation Fund Managers portfolio manager Gavin Joubert said there was no clear answer on how the strong rand, which was bid at R6.702 to the dollar at 5pm yesterday, had impacted on the all share index because it varied depending on the individual stock concerned.

“Some companies benefit from a strong rand whilst others are negatively impacted,” Joubert said.

He added that individual share prices might have no relationship to the rand’s movements and how it affected the earnings of a particular firm.

“For example, a strong rand is negative for the earnings of resources companies, but most resource share prices were up in 2010. This was partly due to the fact that commodity prices had been very strong, which could have partly offset the negative impact of the strong rand,” Joubert said.

He said over the next five years it could be expected that the returns from local equities would be much lower than in the past five years.

He said he could not say which sectors would underpin the market in 2011 because Coronation bought individual stocks that the company believed were undervalued and that over a period of time would reflect that value.

“Our largest holdings at the moment are MTN, Naspers, SABMiller, BAT, Standard Bank, Sasol and Anglo American. While there are two resource stocks among our largest positions, there are a number of resource stocks that we think are expensive and hold none of.” - Business Report

Struggling black farmers get help

Hundreds of black farmers who have received loans and land through the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform since 1994 have failed to pay back their start-up loans to the Land Bank.

This has prompted the department to take the land back as part of a multimillion-rand bailout programme.
A curatorship model has been developed which entails babysitting the farmers until they can farm profitably under the new Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (Plas).
The programme is the result of a team effort by the Land Bank, the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the National Treasury.

So far the scheme has reportedly forked out R232.4 million to bail out all 222 of the struggling black farmers but attempts to verify these figures from the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform have been unsuccessful.
Thirty-six of the farmers are from the Eastern Cape, 32 from the Free State, one from Gauteng, 23 from KwaZulu-Natal, 56 from Limpopo, 14 from Mpumalanga, 11 from the Northern Cape, 18 from North West and 31 from the Western Cape.

Under the scheme the department will take back the land and lease it out to the erstwhile owners, only giving it back when the farmers prove they can farm profitably.
The department will also no longer issue grants for the outright purchase of farms by land reform beneficiaries, but will lease the land out to them.
About R900 million has been set aside for a period of three years to recapitalise all the failed and ailing projects through Plas.

This would make it possible for the state to intervene should an emerging farmer experience financial troubles, Eddie Mohoebi, the head of communications at the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, said on Wednesday.
Mohoebi said the department had realised it was set to lose millions of rands as the Land Bank was going to repossess the farms of farmers who could not repay loans.
“The situation was that if we had bought the farm for R7 million, and the farmer took out a production loan of R250 000 from the Land Bank, due to the lengthy process of acquiring the farm it would be operational at a time when it was too late to grow crops and the farmer would have been burdened by operational costs.
“The Land Bank would then have to repossess the farm, which meant that the department was making a loss. That is why we had to bail them out and protect the interests of the department,” he explained.

The beneficiaries would pay 6 percent of the purchase price as a rental fee over three years as part of the loan agreement.
Musa Mchunu, the head of communications at the Land Bank, said the curatorship would ensure that the government provided guarantees and the Land Bank would provide production loans to the leasing farmers.

Mchunu said the farmers would be given a grace period of three to five years to turn things around and, if they succeeded, the lease would be extended as the farmer would be able to service the debt. However, if they failed, the government would look for alternative black farmers to take on the responsibility.

According to the department’s 2009/10 annual report, a further R250 million was allocated for the recapitalisation and development of the struggling Plas farms.
Mchunu said figures for farmers who qualified for the 2011/12 budget were still being calculated and the Land Bank would provide assistance in “negotiating an off-take agreement and resources for after care with the primary mandate being financial products”.

The president of AgriSA, Johannes Moller, said it was a positive sign that the government was bailing out struggling farmers but he stressed that it had to establish new farms if its initiative was to succeed.
He added that the current approach was treating the symptoms and not the problem because there was no proper plan to produce new farmers.

He said the government should encourage joint ventures where established commercial farmers with expertise worked closely with it and emergent farmers. - Ayanda Mdluli

Child Soldiers (Liberia as a case Study)

Introduction

The use of child soldiers in armed conflict has met much international criticism and condemnation across the globe. The use of child soldiers, particularly in Africa, has received much attention from many individuals, scholars and academics that have made attempts to shed some light and enlighten on this critical, emotional and morally complex issue.

When examining the role of the child soldier in the Liberian civil war, one must take into account the causal factors that play a major role in understanding the relationship between children and warfare in Africa. The causal factors that need to be taken into account when examining why the use of child soldiers was so prevalent in the Liberian conflict, are that of poverty, greed and the changing nature of wars and light weaponry that was used by children as young as twelve years old. The purpose of this essay is to identify the role that the child soldier played in the conflict; by role we mean the activities and actions required or expected of a person in a group. In order to identify that particular role and responsibility required of a child soldier, causal factors need to be taken into consideration. The use of child soldiers has inspired the emergence of important and interesting questions such as: What is a child and what is a child soldier? Why do some children decide or volunteer to become child soldiers? Why do rebel movements and organizations abduct and recruit child soldiers? And how are they recruited?

The traditional African and the European social and cultural perceptions of Childhood play a major role in helping one understand the definition of childhood. This essay will look at the two world views and will aim to criticize and digest the relevant literature and ultimately give a logical and consistent definition of child soldiers and childhood. The literature written by authors knowledgeable on the subject, such as Alcinda Honwana’s Child Soldiers in Africa and T. W Bennet’s Using Children in Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African Tradition? The above mentioned books will help discuss the arguments of how we define a child soldier. One argument is that conventional definitions contend that child soldiers are combatants or military recruits under the age 18. The Geneva Convention upholds this age qualification, so does the United Nations General Assembly and the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court. Alternatively, the opposing argument is that the definition of childhood in African cultures has little to do with age, although people sometimes refer to age limits. Rather, the positions of children are defined through social roles, expectations and responsibilities.

The literature on the subject provides interesting and helpful information on defining the child soldier but tends to be repetitive on other issues such as recruitment and the role child soldiers play within the military movement. However, information on casual factors and the treatment of female soldiers in conflict is much to be admired. The only problem is that one cannot pin point exactly where the root cause of why the use of child soldiers is so prevalent in Africa. Therefore, in order for one to try and have a clear understanding, the essay will begin by presenting the definition of the term child soldier. Additionally, this essay will provide examples and cases from the Liberian civil war from 1989 to 2003.

Background on the Liberian Civil War

From December 1989 to 2003, Liberia had been devastated by a civil war that has killed tens of thousands of Liberians and caused an estimated one-third of its population to flee the country as refugees.[1] The war had been marked by mass killings along ethnic lines and horrifying atrocities. Indeed, a characteristic of the Liberian civil war was that civilians suffered the most, they were deliberately targeted by all the warring factions often because of their ethnicity and that as a consequence far more civilians than combatants were killed.[2] The lack of protection and respect for the lives of civilians by all sides and the profound distrust among the warring factions were obstacles in achieving peace.[3] The roots of Liberia's civil war go far back in Liberian history. However, the immediate precursor dates from 1985: after President Samuel Doe, an ethnic Krahn who came to power in a 1980 coup, stole the presidential elections, he brutally suppressed a coup attempt led by Thomas Qwiwonkpa, an ethnic Gio. Doe's soldiers, the Krahn-dominated AFL, engaged in bloody reprisals against real and suspected opponents and their home communities as well targeting mostly Gios and Manos; hundreds were killed and hundreds more were detained without charge or trial.[4] This violence and the subsequent repression set the stage for the country's ethnic conflict and civil war.

On December 24, 1989, Charles Taylor and his NPFL launched an incursion from the Ivory Coast into Nimba County.[5] The AFL responded with a ruthless counterinsurgency campaign, indiscriminately killing civilians, burning villages, raping women and looting.[6] The brutality served to swell the ranks of NPFL recruits, many of whom were Gio and Mano boys orphaned by the fighting and the random and reprisal killings that accompanied it, or enraged by the AFL's conduct. The AFL went on the rampage outside Nimba as well. In one of the most egregious abuses of the war, on the night of July 29-30, 1990, AFL soldiers massacred some 600 people mostly Gios and Manos, many of them women with children who had taken refuge at St. Peter's Church in Monrovia.[7] Civilians also suffered at the hands of the NPFL. The NPFL targeted suspected supporters of the Doe regime, particularly members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups. Throughout NPFL territory, civilians suffered the capricious actions of an occupying army, arbitrary arrest, physical abuse, confiscation and destruction of property and restrictions on freedom of movement and freedom of expression.[8]


In August 1990, without any prospect for intervention by the United Nations or the United States, a peacekeeping force under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ecowas) arrived in Monrovia to separate the warring factions and to stop the bloodshed.[9] The role assigned to the force, known as the Economic Community Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), was to impose a cease-fire and to help form an interim government that would hold elections within twelve months.[10] With NPFL attacks continuing, there was no peace to keep, and ECOMOG itself engaged in combat to push the NPFL out of Monrovia. This situation was aggravated in October 1992, when the NPFL attacked Monrovia.[11] ECOMOG then accepted the assistance of other Liberian factions in fighting the NPFL, and in so doing dropped much of its appearance of neutrality. The human rights records of these factions ULIMO and the AFL ranged from suspect to abysmal.[12] The AFL was thoroughly discredited by its horrific abuses during the 1980s and especially during the war in 1990, when it massacred civilians and devastated Monrovia.[13]

ULIMO is an offshoot of the AFL, and its conduct in the areas it captured in 1992 included extensive human rights abuses.[14] Because of its conduct in the conflict, questions have been raised about ECOMOG's commitment to human rights and its ability to act as a neutral arbiter of the conflict.[15] The chief warring factions currently involved in the conflict are Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which controls about 60 percent of the country; and the United Liberian Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), made up primarily of soldiers from former President Samuel K. Doe's army, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), which controls at least two western counties.[16] ULIMO split along ethnic lines, pitting Krahns against Mandingos, causing serious casualties. Since late 1993, the NPFL had also been challenged by the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), a new armed faction made up largely of former AFL soldiers, most of whom are members of the Krahn ethnic group.[17] The LPC claims to control significant territory in the southeast. The remaining troops of the Armed Forces of Liberia do not control territory per se, but are armed and deployed around Monrovia. In addition, the Lofa Defense Force (LDF) is fighting ULIMO in Lofa County. In June 1993, in one of the worst atrocities to be documented during the war, 547 civilians, mostly women and children, were massacred in a displaced persons camp outside of Harbel.[18]

The victims were shot, beaten or hacked to death. A United Nations investigation concluded that the massacre had been carried out by the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). U.N. Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali condemned the Harbel massacre, and a new round of peace talks was initiated. The U.N. joined with ecowas and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to sponsor peace negotiations in Geneva that included representatives of all factions.[19] On July 25, 1993, a peace agreement was signed in Cotonou, Benin, by the NPFL, ULIMO, and the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU).[20] The peace accord stipulated that concomitant with disarmament, a five-person Council of State elected by all the factions would take power from the interim government until elections were held.[21] A thirty-five-member transitional parliament would include thirteen members from the NPFL and the interim government, and nine from ULIMO.[22] Between August 1993 and February 1994, political wrangling prevented the lntg from being seated. In February 1994, it was agreed that David Kpomakpor, a lawyer representing IGNU, would chair the lntg; with Dexter Tahyor of ULIMO, and Issac Mussah of the NPFL as vice chairs.[23]

Finally, in mid-May, Dorothy Musuleng Cooper was named Foreign Minister. An important element of the plan involved the creation of a U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to help supervise and monitor the agreement, in conjunction with ECOMOG.[24] The plan also provided for an expanded ECOMOG force, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to be composed of African troops from outside the West African region. By early 1994, some 800 Tanzanians were deployed in Kakata, and 900 Ugandans were in Buchanan.[25]


Defining the Child Soldier and Childhood

As Honwana claims, the term child soldier is an oxymoron that signifies the violence that this position does to establish.[26] A clarification of the specific meaning of the term soldier in theses civil wars, especially when preceded by the term child is necessary.[27] The soldier in theses contexts was often not a regular soldier of the sort who serves in state – sponsored, centrally controlled, and well – disciplined armed forces. Rather, the term refers to the type of fighter who often fills the ranks of guerrilla and rebel groups, inadequately trained and outfitted, often operating under the influence of drugs. Such soldiers harass loot and kill defenceless civilians indiscriminately.[28] The child soldier is characterized by its intrinsic aspect, minor, someone who needs to be looked after and nurtured in the right way, which explains the reckless behaviour once the guardian and the values have been removed and the status of soldier is given to the child. The child soldier is therefore considered to have an undeveloped sense of morality which is worsened by the horrid values indoctrinated by wicked warlords.

According to Honwana, the boundaries between adulthood and childhood in African societies have traditionally been more fluid than in European societies.[29] Of necessity children are actively involved in economic activities. The transition to adulthood is gradual, variable, and responsive to the particular situations of young people, their families and communities. Universalizing definitions are not applicable in many African conditions.[30] The problems that are facing the African continent, particularly poverty stricken Liberia indicate that what is considered a child or childhood behaviour in Liberia will not necessarily be considered childhood behaviour in England. There are cases of fourteen year old bread winners in African house holds, while that situation in European states is almost non existent. Unlike the western view point, childhood in the African context is not necessarily a stage of incompetence.[31]

It is an undisputable fact that there are more children participating as combatants today than there was in the past. The question posed by Bennet of did or did not African traditions involve children being conscripted into military service?[32] Provides one with a stepping stone in ensuring a clear and logical understanding of whether child conscription was as prevalent in the past as it is today. Many of those currently bearing arms in Africa are ten years old and some are even younger.[33] Were children as young as this conscripted in the pre – colonial age set? Bennet answers this question by claiming that we first need to understand what is meant by child. Children were never conscripted into the military service in African societies.[34] They were not recruited into regiments, nor did they bear arms, men were drafted into regiments three or four years after puberty.[35] The warrior was a mature and able bodied man. Armies needed men who could fight more effectively.[36] An example of this would be the Zulu society in the pre – colonial period during the peak of their military prowess. Children played non – military roles in society, before and even during puberty. Marriage was delayed because men had to participate in combat, which created a generation gap within the Zulu society.

The African traditional rules for regulating attainment of childhood have been transformed as a result of the socio – economic changes that came in the wake of colonialism.[37] Throughout Africa, urbanisation has fragmented extended families. Breakdown of the family has in turn, resulted in an ever increasing number of illegitimate births, runaway children and single parent families.[38] Every society withholds some, if not all, powers and responsibilities from the young until they behave in a mature and fully rational manner.[39] Bennet claims that in literate societies, adulthood is usually ascribed to individuals when they reach certain predetermined ages.[40] The transition from childhood is therefore fixed at an age when it is presumed that individuals will be capable of conducting themselves as adults. In preliterate societies on the other hand, where it is not possible to keep exact records, movement from one category to another is related to physical processes such as puberty and to social events such as initiation.[41]


Casual Factors
An abundance of light weapons and small arms

The wide availability, accumulation and proliferation of light weapons and small escalates conflicts, undermines peace agreements, intensifies violence, impacts on crime in a negative way, impedes economic and social development and hinder the development of social stability democracy and good governance.[42] The large supply of small arms and light weapons turn the children into soldiers as they are easy to carry and are able to be used effectively. Contemporary warfare is indeed shaped by least costly and simple weapons. These small arms and light weapons include rifles, grenades, light machine guns, light mortars, land mines, and other weapons that are “man portable”.[43] Even though they represent less than two percent of the entire global arms trade in terms of cost, small arms are perhaps the most deadly of all weapons to society. They are weapons most often used in battle and in attacks on civilians and have produced almost ninety percent of casualties in recent wars.[44]

Although no two conflicts are ever exactly alike, it can be said that the wars of the post cold war have generally taken a particular form: one in which the forces involved are predominantly of a paramilitary or irregular nature and the fighting is largely confined to the national territory of the state in question.[45] The conflicts that fit this pattern have for the most part, entailed a struggle over the ethnic composition of a disputed area or the possession of valuable resources. Such conflicts by their very nature tend to be conducted primarily with small arms and light weapons. This is so because the belligerents involved – state security forces, insurgents, organisations, ethnic militias, warlords, death squads, and so on – are normally bared from access to major weapons systems and lack the training and logistical capacity to operate such systems.[46]

As singer states, there has been many improvements in manufacturing, such as the incorporation of plastics. This means that modern weapons, particularly assault rifles, are so light that small children can use them as easily and effectively as adults. They are no longer just man portable, but are child portable as well.[47] Most of theses weapons have been simplified in their use to the extent that they can be stripped, reassembled and, and fired by a child below the age of ten.[48] An example of this would be the Kalashnikov A. K – 47. These weapons are more deadly and have become very easy to use; they have also proliferated, to the extent that there is almost a glut on the market. There are an estimated five hundred million small arms on the global scene, one for every twelve persons on the planet.[49] The consequence, as Singer states, is that the primary weapons of war have also steeply fallen in price over the last few decades. This has made it easier for any willing organisation to obtain them and then turn children into soldiers.[50]

Poverty and the lack of social development

Where development succeeds, states become safer and are less likely to engage in violent intrastate conflicts. Social Development is more commonly know as desirable social progress within a society. It ensures well being of the whole population with the participation of others.
There are various factors that affect social development, such as disease and corruption in government to name but two. Others again define social development as a sustainable process of change in thinking and behavior which embraces all strata of society, the course of which determines the economic, political and social goals just as much as the ways and means of achieving them. When we use the term “social development in the context of our engagement, then we mean precisely this multidimensional process[51] Different ideologies also lead to different policy choices as to what should constitute the primary engine of development[52]

The desperate situation in which poverty stricken Liberia found herself, provided a huge pool of disgruntled and displaced children prior to and during the civil war. Singer states that these children constitute to the labor for the illegal economy, organized crime, and armed conflicts.[53] Poverty is a casual factor because armed conflicts lead to food shortages because they destroy a countries productive capacities and infrastructure. A lack of food or the destruction of productive resources often forces families to volunteer their children to either rebel or government forces as potential combatants.[54] Because both sides characteristically participate in looting of civilian populations, theses children may have the opportunity to reap the benefits for themselves and their families.[55] Armed factions are often motivated by greed and will avoid direct confrontations so that they can concentrate on the lucrative process of looting and undefended and unarmed victims. Children assume the role of bread winners, whether they volunteer or are coerced.[56] The HIV / AIDS pandemic were also contributing factors to social impediment during the Liberian Civil War.

Young men, who are considered psychologically more aggressive, naturally compete for social and material resources in all societies.[57] When outnumbering other generations, however, there are inevitably more losers than winners among the youth in this process.[58] Warlords find it easier to recruit when a large population of angry, listless young men fills the streets.[59]

Greed, Armed Forces that lack support and the changing nature of civil wars

In the majority of conflicts carried out in the developing world, warfare has become messier and criminalized. In many cases the private profit motive has become a central motivator, equal or greater to that of political, ideological or religious inspiration.[60] Actors and groups who lack popular support are the driving force behind the bloody civil wars that plagued Liberia in the early nineties. The reason for this is that the primary driving force behind Africa’s conflict is greed rather than grievance. Collier and Hoeffler define civil war as an internal conflict with at least 1,000 combat-related deaths per year.[61] In order to distinguish wars from massacres, both government forces and an identifiable rebel organization must suffer at least 5% of these casualties. Conflicts in Africa are best explained through an economic perspective. The ability to finance a rebellion for economic and material gain supersedes the argument that civil wars are influenced by colonialism, ethnic and religious differences. Collier and Hoeffler investigate the causes of civil wars from 1966 to 1999, by using a new data set of wars.[62] They examine 161 countries and identify 78 civil wars. These economic accounts explain rebellion in terms of opportunity, it is an undisputable fact that insurgencies cannot survive without a strong financial backing. The only way that these means are achievable is through the availability of natural resources, which are the driving force in the maintenance of the rebel organization, in the form of paying for military equipment to continue the fight against their opponents.[63]

Singer states that the fighting in a number of conflicts around the globe lacks any sort of link to a broader political or religious cause. They are driven by a simple logic of appropriation, from seizing mineral assets and protecting the drug trade, to simple looting and pillaging.[64] He goes on to say that, while many of these wars are fuelled by new conflict entrepreneurs and local warlords that emerged in the 1990’s in their individual countries, the broader end of the cold war also played a part in this shift.[65] When outside superpower patronage ceased, the calculus of many ideological guerilla groups, including those once motivated by Marxism, took a more market orientated dimension, they realized that their economies had to change. The new rule of insurgency, as Singer puts it, is that if conflict groups want to survive, they have to find their own financial resources.[66]

The notion that conflicts throughout Africa are generated by popular support for the rebel movement is flawed and inconsistent, Collier and Hoeffler found that another source of finance for which there is good case study evidence is Diasporas. They have found that Diasporas substantially increase the risk of conflict renewal, and it is hard to find an alternative explanation for this result.[67] In addition, the less educated the young men are in a society, the more likely they are to engage in a conflict. Indra de Soysa also argues that countries with an abundance of mineral wealth are more likely to suffer greed motivated rebellion. There is little evidence to suggest that scarcity of renewable resources is a significant predicator of armed conflict.[68] Mineral wealth plays a major role in the formation of conflict in Africa. In most cases it the rich resource economies that are in heavy conflict. It is abundance that stimulates conflict.

De Soysa tests the competing hypothesis of scarcity versus abundance as a cause of civil war. The first hypothesis that is tested sees conflict as a result of scarce resources and the second hypothesis sees conflict as a result of resources in abundance. De Soysa’s study proves that an abundance of resources is a major catalyst for violence, driven by the desire for loot.[69] De Soysa also gives a good analogy on the discourse of grievance or scarcity arguments. He explains as follows: “Two drunks may come to fisticuffs with each other because they were drunk, but if asked why they fought them are liable to justify their drunken behavior with explanations of grievance about why each of them fought, such as he struck me first. The true cause of conflict, drunkenness, is therefore masked by the discourse of grievance”.[70]
The discourse of grievance in real life or real world politics, whether along economic, ethnic or political lines masks underlying realities about where the origins of conflicts lie.[71] It is only about resources that are exploitable, resources that can be turned into finance. In this regard, greed is conceptualized as the ability to finance a rebellion.

According to De Soysa, poor countries stay poor and suffer armed conflict because resource scarcity acts to prevent socio – economic innovation… To deal with scarcity, a society needs ingenuity – but the very scarcities demanding social ingenuity act as constraints on innovation.[72] Societies are unable to progress because there is nothing to help them progress. This leads to frustration and bitterness and consequently leads to conflict. The idea that conflict is affected by scarcity through perpetuating underdevelopment is a novel one, De Soysa notes that this offers a more clearly testable model than most other analysis of environmental conflict, which tends to be explained through rather complex causual mechanisms.[73] Scarcity motivated rebellion is thus motivated by the availability of renewable resources. Whether or not the resources are in abundance or scarcity, the main motivation behind the conflict is material or economic gain.

De Soysa’s study finds that rapacity encouraged by an abundance of natural resources tends to fuel civil conflict. Paucity of natural resources, on the other hand does not seem to be such a strong factor in determining the likelihood of civil strife.[74] Incentives for profit seekers are provided by mineral resources, these results in the engagement of violence. Rebels are provided by resources and other profit seeking groups and individuals, their activities are sustained through the financial support that they receive. A classic example of the above mentioned arguments is the case of Liberia. William Reno gives a clear account on greed as a motivating factor. He states that Charles Taylor had access from exploitation of natural resources in cooperation with foreigners. Taylor’s income far exceeded the Monrovia enclave’s minimal command of resources and revenues after 1989. This domination of the local economy gave
Recruitment

The recruitment of child soldiers is embedded in two aspects; it is either voluntary or forced. While some child soldiers volunteered to join armed forces, others were forcefully recruited during the capturing of new territory. According to Tony Tate, some children joined particular forces to avenge violations committed against their family members. Conversely, some children joined those same forces that committed abuses and atrocities in their communities to offer protection to themselves and their families.[76] Those who were forcefully recruited were usually street children. Some joined because they didn’t know what to do and had no one to take care of them. Many joined for survival and because of the promises of the warring factions.[77] The inducements to join armed groups often included promises of more than just the basic needs for survival – food, clothing and protection in a dangerous world. The groups depended upon foraging and looting, and the children too were promised a part of the spoils.[78] Children were promised money and whatever they could loot – including houses, cars, clothes and food. This, in turn, encouraged children to abuse civilians in order to take their belongings.[79]

Singer cements the argument that children who are forcibly recruited are usually from special risk groups: street children, the rural poor, refugees, and others displaced. Theses are the most vulnerable to efficient recruiting sweeps. Those who enlist on their own are often from the very same groups, driven by poverty, propaganda and alienation.[80]

Alcinda Honwana claims that there is an intricate connection between voluntary and forced recruitment.[81] Although some young people volunteered for ideological reasons and were aware of the strategic objectives of the war they were waging, many were responding to the more immediate conditions that civil war had created in their communities.[82] However, it also seems that indirect yet coercive mechanisms were used to persuade young people to join the military. Intimidation and social pressure pushed some boys to join.[83]

The recruitment of children was correlated with a dehumanization process. Honwana states that the instruments used in the dehumanizing process of recruitment were that of terror and fear evoked by horrific acts of violence during military training. [84] Often new recruits were both agents and victims of such violence simultaneously. Boys in training received their weapons, not when they had learned simply how to use them, but when they demonstrated their willingness to kill. Singer also corroborates Hanwana’s claim by stating that, recruitment is rapidly followed by cruel but straight forward methods of training and conversion. Brutality and abuses of the worst kind underscore each stage, but these lie in part behind the overall program’s usual effectiveness. The main aim of the process is to forster a child’s dependency on an armed organization and inhibit escape.[85] People under the age of eighteen are deemed to be unable or have little ability to judge for themselves, therefore the issue of voluntary means or consent plays a major role in perceiving the atrocities of child recruitment.


The two aspects of voluntary and forceful recruitment contain more than what meets the eye. The social circumstances can lead the child astray to armed forces but greed itself also comes into play. The promise of money and cars can be very enticing, especially in a time of complete mayhem chaos, where hope is gone and there is no light shining at the end of the tunnel. Understanding why children volunteer to take up arms needs a clear understanding of each casual factor. Some may join because they need the A. K – 47 to protect themselves, while others are just plain trouble makers or are in search of food and shelter. Either way, it would be very difficult to hold the guilty accountable using the African view of defining child because the African view contends that childhood is not necessarily a stage of incompetence.

Roles and Duties of Child Soldiers

The roles and responsibilities of child soldiers within both the opposition and former government ranks were very similar. After completing often arduous training, sometimes for a few days, other times for a month of longer, most children were armed and many served on the front lines. They were often the first to be sent out to fight, occupying dangerous, forward positions.[86] They were also charged with manning road blocks and armed guard duty. Some children interviewed for this report spoke of their fear of death, the killing of other children in fighting, and of those they killed themselves. Others bragged about the killings, proud of their advancement to commander status for their ferocity. Children were also beaten and abused by their superiors and forced to witness abuse and killing.[87]

Lois Whitman also gives a clear account on the roles the child soldier played in the Liberian conflict. She states that children played many roles, ranging from carrying ammunition and cooking to serving at the front in major battles.[88] Other duties included running errands such as acting as spies, carrying out reconnaissance and acting as informants. They were also used as body guards, manning checkpoints, checking documents and packages.[89] Children were also responsible for carrying out ambushes and serving as executioners of suspected enemies. Some children were assigned to individual commanders as bodyguards and personal assistants. In general, younger children served as helpers while older ones fought, but there were exceptions—some boys and girls as young as nine and ten years old bore arms.[90] The intensity of combat might also determine what role a child played, carrying goods one day and needed for the fighting the next. Finally, children spent some of their time stealing from civilians in part because they were either never paid or paid infrequently.[91]

Female Soldiers

The question "Where are the girls?" is seldom raised in discussions about children in armed forces and armed opposition groups, both as combatants and noncombatants.[92] Just as the use of child soldiers had been a largely invisible and unacknowledged international phenomenon, scant attention has been given to girls in armed forces and armed opposition groups, their distinct experiences, the impacts, and gender-specific human rights violations.[93] With the exception of some data compiled by the International Coalition, the majority of reports, international campaigns, and initiatives continue to use the generic term "child soldiers" or "children," almost always meaning boys, and do not identify differential impacts for boys and girls before, during, or after armed conflicts.[94]

Girls served with all three groups in the war as both fighters and helpers although in lesser numbers than boys.[95] Liberian nongovernmental organization employees who work with children believe that more girls were used in the last four years of warfare than in years past but that their exact numbers are unknown.[96] Typically older girls and young women were fighters who served in separate units, while younger girls served as cooks, domestics, porters and cleaners. However, there were cases where young girls fought as well. Some girls were attached to units for short periods and escaped or were released, while others fought for years with the groups.[97]


In addition to the many abuses committed against child soldiers, girls were routinely raped and sexually assaulted. Many were raped at the time of recruitment and continued to be sexually abused during their time with the forces.[98] Collectively known as “wives” whether or not they were attached to a soldier, young girls were often assigned to commanders and provided domestic services to them.[99] Older girls and young women were particularly fierce fighters, commanding respect from their male peers. Some of these women were able to eventually protect themselves from sexual assault but would capture other girls to provide sexual services to boys and men.[100]One of the more severe cases, the plight of Clementine is nevertheless shared by the thousands of girls and women who are survivors of brutal rape and sexual assault by the fighting forces.[101]

Conclusion

The role of the child soldier in the Liberian civil war was examined in this essay. Casual factors such as poverty, greed, the changing nature of civil wars and the high availability of light weapons and small arms were assessed. Two arguments were proposed, the first argument was that conventional definitions contend that child soldiers are combatants or military recruits under the age 18. The Geneva Convention upholds this age qualification, so does the United Nations General Assembly and the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court. The second argument which was the opposing argument stated that the definition of childhood in African cultures has little to do with age, although people sometimes refer to age limits. Rather, the positions of children are defined through social roles, expectations and responsibilities.

The first argument perceived childhood as a matter of age and incompetence, this view can be regarded as inconsistent, in the sense that the definition of childhood cannot be universalized. Individuals who have not suffered under some of the atrocious conditions faced by many African children cannot claim that they are the same as those who are privileged. Singer states that it is important to note that, when growing up in a war zone, children will often experience an essential militarization of their daily life.[102] The prominence of innocence as one of the primary markers childhood is distinctly modern. An understanding of children as sinful beings in need of discipline has been a dominant force in European thought.[103] Eric Greitens states that the reason why this seems preposterous to us today, is because the Romantic Movement fundamentally altered Western perceptions of childhood. Childhood nowadays, is often understood as a time of innocence, purity and naturalness, and is frequently juxtaposed against a view of adulthood as a process, not only of maturation, but also of engagement with a corrupt society.[104] The threat of death becomes a normal occurrence and their regular experiences will be shaped by the omnipresence of combatants around them. It is in this “amoral vacuum” that groups seeking child soldiers offer a voice that can appeal to lost children.[105] In this sense, children are defined by their societies. In some societies, children are required to grow up early and become head of house holds at a very young age.
Most of the literature has claimed that child soldiers joined armed factions voluntarily, because of social pressures, the promise of material gain and the need for protection in a war – zone.

This essay has also tried to give a clear graphic description of the child soldier. The paper has tried to explain why universalizing childhood is a form of unrealistic utopian thinking, by examining the two different world views on the concept of childhood. The use of female soldiers in has also been examined, which is also a prevalent problem because women are subject to some of the most shocking conditions in the military. Issues such as re – integration and demobilisation have been left out because the main purpose of this essay was to examine the role of the child soldier in an African conflict and identify the underlying causes of why children are recruited. The questions proposed in the introduction have been answered based on the literature available on the subject.




References:

1.) Eric Greitens, The treatment of children During conflict in Frances Stewart, Valpy Fitzgerald and Associates (eds.), War and Underdevelopment Volume 1 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001].p. 154

2.) P. W Singer, Children at war, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005.

3.) Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004

4.) Susan McKay, Girls in militaries, Paramilitaries and armed opposition groups

5.) Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994

6.) Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia,

7.) William Reno, Liberia and Sierra Leone: The Competition for patronage in resource rich economies

8.) Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and David M Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,2000):113

9.) Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War

10.) Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich, Why do children “fight”? Explaining the rise of child soldiers

11.) Shraeder, Peter.J, African politics and society (Bedford / St. Martin, Boston, 2000),

12.) http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/0,,contentMDK:20692151~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:244363,00.html

13.) Jeffery Boutwell and Michael. T Klare, Light weapons and civil conflict: Controlling the tools of Violence, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999

14.) T. W Bennet, using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African Tradition? Institute for Security Studies, 1998

15.) Light weapons and small arms OAU report, 1999






[1] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[2] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[3] ibid
[4] ibid
[5] ibid
[6] ibid
[7] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[8] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[9] ibid
[10] ibid
[11] ibid
[12] ibid
[13] ibid
[14] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[15] ibid
[16] ibid
[17] ibid
[18] ibid
[19] ibid
[20] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[21] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[22] ibid
[23] ibid
[24] ibid
[25] ibid
[26] Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006
[27] Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006
[28] ibid
[29] ibid
[30] ibid
[31] ibid
[32] T. W Bennet, using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African Tradition? Institute for Security Studies, 1998.
[33] T. W Bennet, using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African Tradition? Institute for Security Studies, 1998.
[34] ibid
[35] ibid
[36] ibid
[37] ibid
[38] T. W Bennet, using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African Tradition? Institute for Security Studies,
[39] Ibid.
[40] ibid
[41] ibid
[42] Light weapons and small arms OAU report
[43] P. W Singer, children at war, New York, Pantheon books, 2005
[44] ibid
[45] Jeffery Boutwell and Michael. T Klare, Light weapons and civil conflict: Controlling the tools of Violence, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999
[46] Jeffery Boutwell and Michael. T Klare, Light weapons and civil conflict: Controlling the tools of Violence, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999
[47] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[48] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[49] ibid
[50] ibid
[51] http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/0,,contentMDK:20692151~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:244363,00.html
[52] Shraeder, Peter.J, African politics and society (Bedford / St. Martin, Boston, 2000), p. 175.
[53] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[54] Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich, Why do children “fight”? Explaining the rise of child soldiers
[55] ibid
[56] ibid
[57] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[58] ibid
[59] ibid
[60] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon books, 2005
[61] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War
[62] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War
[63] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War
[64] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon books, 2005
[65] ibid
[66] ibid
[67] Ibid.
[68] Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and David M Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,2000):113
[69] Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and David M Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,2000):113
[70] Ibid.p.115
[71] Ibid.p.116
[72] Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and
[73] Ibid. p. 118
[74] Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and
[75] William Reno, Liberia and Sierra Leone: The Competition for patronage in resource rich economies
[76] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights watch. Vol 16, No 2. New York. 2004
[77] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[78] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[79] ibid
[80] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[81] Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006
[82] ibid
[83] ibid
[84] ibid
[85] PW Singer 2005 How Children Are recruited into War in Children at War New York: Pantheon Books

[86] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.
[87] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.
[88] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[89] ibid
[90] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.

[91] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.

[92] Susan McKay, Girls in militaries, Paramilitaries and armed opposition groups
[93] ibid
[94] ibid
[95] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.
[96] ibid
[97] ibid
[98] ibid
[99] ibid
[100] ibid
[101] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004
[102] P. W Singer, Children at war, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005.
[103] Eric Greitens, The treatment of children During conflict in Frances Stewart, Valpy Fitzgerald and Associates (eds.), War and Underdevelopment Volume 1 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001].p. 154
[104] Eric Greitens, The treatment of children During conflict in Frances Stewart, Valpy Fitzgerald and Associates (eds.), War and Underdevelopment Volume 1 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001].p. 154

[105] P. W Singer, Children at war, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005.

Strfucturfal Adjustment Programmes in Ghana

Introduction

During the 1950’s to the 1960’s the African Continent was gradually going through the process of de – colonization. This newly emerging independence era and the outbreak of the cold war, which saw the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as uncontested super powers of the 20th century brought an abundance of challenges and influences in Africa, particularly from the two powerful ideological blocs of the West and the Soviet Union. African states were thrown into the deep end after independence and forced to compete with their developed counterparts on the international economic level, regardless of the various factors that contributed to underdevelopment and poverty in Africa. Newly independent states in Africa “also had no voice in the international system, and this became detrimental to the realisation of their goals” (Van Niekerk: 2001: 287).

The African continent is the poorest and most underdeveloped region in the world, even though it possesses an abundance of material and human resources. Ojo defines underdevelopment as “inadequate social and economic structural changes to give the economy a balanced, integrated and self - sustaining growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). (Ojo: 1985: 53). African states are also involved in the struggle for economic survival and independence in order to preserve their political independence and sovereignty from external and internal forces. One of the main theories associated with underdevelopment in African international relations, is the dependency theory respectively. Each of the above mentioned theories are critical in explaining and understanding the economic and socio – political status of independent Africa during the de – colonization and cold war era.

There are also various ideological factors to take into account, such as Kwame Nkrumah’s Consciencism. This philosophical element of African socialism is critical in understanding the African perception or world view and the meaning of life in the post - colonial independence era especially with the rise of African Nationalism, Pan – Africanism and the principle of self – determination after the Second World War. The above mentioned factors are essential components to the concept of African socialism and from these factors we can understand why Africa is in its current state and why Africa occupies the position it does in the international system. African socialism is derived from a communal form of thought and is best explained in terms of the meaning of life in the African socio – political context.

Africa is the worlds largest supplier of hydro – electric power and according to Ojo “Africa produces approximately 55 percent of the worlds cobalt…47 percent of this mineral is found in Zaire (known today as the Democratic Republic of the Congo –DRC) while the further 8 percent is found in Zambia. About 15 to 20 percent of the worlds copper is produced in Zambia and Zaire and for percent of the worlds tin in Nigeria and Zaire and about the same proportion of the worlds iron ore is mined in Liberia and Mauritania. And of petroleum in Nigeria, Angola, Gabon and Zaire, excluding the North African production” (Ojo: 1985: 52). One must take into account a relevant case study in order to gain a more meaningful insight towards the political and economic upheaval that affect African states during the decolonization, independence and the current state of political and economic affairs. A classic example of this would be Ghana since independence in 1954.

The independence of Ghana is regarded by many scholars as one of the most important events in the political history of Africa. It was an example that freedom can be achieved throughout the whole of Africa. However, with her independence, Ghana had to endure a series of economic and political set backs before the first republic, which was headed by Kwame Nkrumah, was over thrown. Nkrumah seemed to be making rapid progress towards independence after winning the 1954 elections. However, due to the conduct of his government, he encountered unexpected resistance. Ghana appeared to be in danger of breaking up, as it was plagued by bitterness, violence and division even though it was a model colony during colonial rule when it was called the Gold Coast.

“Ghana has a population of 18.4 million people (2000 census). Like most African nations, Ghana’s population is predominantly Black, with enormous ethno-linguistic diversity. The major ethnic groups include Akan (44 per cent), Mole-Dagomba (16 per cent), Ewe (13 per cent), Ga (8 per cent), and others (0.2 per cent); each of these has several subgroups. The Akans are predominant in southern, south-western, and central Ghana; the Ewes and Gas are mostly in the south and southeast; and the Mole-Dagombas are mainly in the north” (Mensah, Koranteng & Yeboa: 2004: 4). The official language of Ghana is English; however, there are more than fifty different dialects and languages that are spoken. “Islam and Christianity are the main non-African religions in the north and the south, respectively. Like many African countries, Ghana’s basic culture, while undergoing some changes now, is still couched in traditional values such as communalism, extended family linkages, reverence for the elderly, patriarchy, and environmental sustainability” (Mensah, Koranteng & Yeboa: 2004: 4).

The rural areas in Ghana consist of the majority of the population; however there has been an increase in urban migration in recent years. “In 1948 the urban share of the nation’s population of 4.4 million was only 13 per cent. By 1960, the urban share of the national population of 6.7 million had reached 23 per cent; today more than a third of Ghanaians live in cities. The main cities include Accra, the national capital, Tema, Kumasi, Cape Coast, and Temale. Accra is a typical primate city with a population of about 1.2 million. It is home to nearly all national government ministries, all the regional administrative offices of the Accra Metropolitan Area, and almost all international organizations and embassies in Ghana” (Mensah, Korantenge & Yeboa: 2004: 4).

Since her independence in 1957, Ghana remains one of the few West African states that have not experienced a civil war or any violent clashes related to ethnic differences. “Not surprising, it has served, and continue to serve, as a regional safe haven for many West African refugees, escaping from conflicts in places such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire” (Mensah, Korantenge & Yeboa: 2004: 4).

International influence on Ghana’s Ideology and African Nationalism

Nkrumah had dreams of leading the first independent West African nation into a Socialist future. Nkrumah also had ambitions of being president for life in that republic in a one party system governed by his CPP (Convention Peoples Party). African socialism is a communal form of thought and political governance. In African societies, to be human was regarded as belonging to the whole community, and to do so involved participating in the beliefs and rituals of that community. African socialism is characterized by the concept of “ubuntu”, which means people – hood, hence the phrase “umuntu umuntu ngabantu” – a person is a person with and through other people. According to kwame Nkrumah “A peoples parliamentary democracy with a one party system is able to express and satisfy the common aspirations of a nation as a whole, than a multi – party parliamentary system, which is in fact only a ruse for participating and covers up, the inherent struggle between the “haves” and the “have – nots” (Nkrumah: 1964: 101).

Nkrumah uses consciencim as a tool to defeat the negative impacts of colonialism in African societies. Consciencim can be seen as a solution towards the problem of Euro – centric and Islamic control and dominance of the African mind. Its aims were to eradicate the uneasy co – existence that conflicts with the African personality, bombarding him with “malignant schizophrenia”. Consciensm is largely based on thought and individual development and at the same time gives an egalitarian surrounding to the individual without losing the egalitarian base in each individuals surrounding. “Practice without thought is blind; thought without practice is empty. The three segments of African society, the traditional, western and the Islamic are often in conflict with one another… capitalism is in conflict with the socialist egalitarianism of the traditional African society” (Nkrumah: 1967: 79).

African politics and society have largely been influenced by the changes in the international system. When Fascist Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia ensured the crushing defeat of Emperor Haile Selassie , a proud symbol of African independence and black achievement had been had been violated. In his autobiography, Nkrumah relates to the disgust and outrage he felt when he learned about the invasion: “At that moment it was as if the whole of London had declared war on me personally. For the next five minutes I could do nothing but glare at each impassive face wondering if those people could possibly realise the wickedness of colonialism, and praying that the day might come when I could play my part in bringing about the downfall of such a system. My nationalism surged to the force; I was ready and willing to go through hell itself, if need be, in order to achieve my objective” (Nkrumah: 1957: 27).

The Second World War significantly influenced the international balance of power and the evolution of African politics and society. The Second World War caused the decline of Europe as the most powerful region in the world, which constituted the rise of the Soviet Union and the United States of America as the uncontested super – powers of the 20th century. “The centre of gravity for African nationalists’ intent upon seeking independence for their respective colonies gradually shifted towards Moscow and Washington” (Shraeder: 1999:131). The Soviet Union had never been a colonial power in Africa, and in many respects the Soviet Union also enjoyed ideological advantages over the U.S and the European powers during the Cold War.

African nationalists often aligned themselves with one of the two major ideological blocs. “Prior to the close of the Cold War, the adverse relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union meant that African states could generate support through client – based relationships. This engendered a certain sense of autonomy and manoeuvrability as both superpowers fought low intensity conflicts or sought support among these peripheral states” (Stephan: 2005: 331). Bidding wars were prompted between the United States and the Soviet Union as each sought to gain favour with particular nationalist movements. “President John F Kennedy noted that; “the perceived stakes of the Cold War contest were tied to whether the emerging leaders of Africa would look West or East – to Moscow or to Washington – for sympathy, help, and guidance in their effort to recapitulate, in a few decades, the entire history of modern Europe and America” (Shraeder: 1999: 132).

Self – Determination has always been a characteristic of African Nationalism. The post – Cold War era is nonetheless unique in that the demands for the self – determination of individual peoples rose intensively. Consciensm stands behind the social revolution, and standing firmly behind it is the intellectual revolution. The African way of thinking and world view is directed towards the redemption of the African society. Philosophical consciensism aims to give a solution by means of categoral conversion instead of Euro – centric parallelism.

Nkrumah claims that society is governed by ethical rules, many societies claim the same or similar ethical principles, however where the principles are effective they may differ in the rules. Nkrumah states that, “God found it necessary to regulate human relations by an ethical rule mentioning them specifically. Though shalt not covet thy neighbour’s ass. If god designed to give us a similar rule today, he would no doubt forbid us to covet thy neighbour’s motor car, hardly his ass. Here God would be giving a new ethical rule, designed at giving effect to an unchanging ethical principle, but taking full account of modern times” (Nkrumah: 1964: 94). The conquest of man is his progress and achieving that progress has a profound effect on the content of ethical rules.

The philosophy of consciencism is characterized by the concept or ideology of African socialism. “The cardinal ethical principle of philosophical consciencism is to treat each man as an end in himself and not merely as a means. This is fundamental to all socialist or humanist conceptions of man” (Nkrumah: 1964: 95). This view is corroborated by the characteristic of egalitarianism.

Dependency and the Road to Political and Economic Crisis

Ghana and many other African states have been placed at the bottom of the economic the global ladder. Due to the dependency theory it has become increasingly difficult for African states to realize economic prosperity. Many African states have been placed in backwardness because of imperialist tendencies and exploitations of dominant countries. As Van Niekerk noted; “Economic dependency is a term used to portray the relationship of inequality between the under developed countries and the advanced” (Van Niekerk: 2001: 287). Many third – world states do not have a place in the inter – country market, while their economies rely heavily on first world societies. African states are in a situation in which their economies are monopolised and conditioned by the development and expansion of first – world countries.

According to Van Niekerk “states in the developing world, found themselves thrown into the international state system expected to compete on an equal base with the industrialised states. These states also had no voice in the international system, and this became detrimental to the realisation of their goals” (Van Niekerk: 2001: 287). Due to domestic social and political issues, it was very difficult for developing states to sustain social and economic development. As Van Niekerk noted; “the more industrial states developed, the further the developing world lagged behind” (Van Niekerk: 2001: 287).

Many African states were exploited by their colonial masters, extracting natural resources without providing any sort of compensation for the state. “As colonial powers withdrew, the developing states found themselves in a difficult situation. Much of the expertise was lost as the colonial powers withdrew. With no considerable industries to sustain economic growth the developing world started to decline to the underdeveloped situation in which it finds itself today. Leaders of the developing world frequently still blame the developed world for their situation” (Van Niekerk: 2001: 287) In the Scramble for Africa in the 21st century, Harry Stephan states that; “whether one takes purely economic indicators as a basis for comparison, the continuation of political failure, civil unrest, famine, and the aids pandemic are surely signs of the increasing problems that face the continent” (Stephan: 2005: 329). These factors are the driving force behind the political and economic upheaval experienced by Africa due to dependency.

In the structural adjustment programmes in Ghana, Kwame Boafo - Arthur notes that, “Nkrumah's rejection of the institutions' pressures shook foreign confidence in the Ghanaian economy” (Boafo: 1992: 120). Sadly however this was very unfortunate because Ghana achieved a lot in developmental terms with limited resources under the Nkrumah government. When the coca price, which was the sole earner of foreign exchange in Ghana, was at a decline, Nkrumah needed support for development programmes in the country. “With the trim resources provided by cocoa he had raised the levels of medical and educational facilities; improved the road and rail network; constructed Tema harbor and the township together with related industrial facilities; and built the Akosombo dam”(Boafo - Arthur: 1999: 2).

These development projects coupled with his financial commitments in the struggle against colonialism naturally led to broad financial expenses. “A strict financial discipline as called for by the two institutions, Nkrumah and the CPP leadership might have thought would not only have affected the momentum of the economic development strategy but could have equally scuttled it. Moreover, accepting such conditions for financial assistance would have meant compromising his transformation of Ghana's economy. It would seem to appear, therefore, that Nkrumah's rejection of IMF package was influenced much more by political dictates than economic prudence” (Boafo – Arthur: 1999: 2).

Olantunde Ojo explains that “economic stagnation and desperate poverty deprive the governing classes of Africa of the chance of maintaining even a veneer of legitimacy…Only their vertical economic links with the bourgeoisie of the capitalist core sustain what little legitimacy they have” (Ojo: 1985: 59 – 60). This explains why foreign powers are so quick to give military and economic aid to African states. It can be regarded as a strategy to keep and maintain puppet regimes in power. If a governing class refuses to play, then there are economic sanctions which will be imposed. “Ojo states that the economic weapons at their disposal include declines in foreign investment…delays in the delivery of new parts or in other areas of trade; snags in licensing or other technology transfers…drying up or outright elimination of credit lines” (Ojo: 1985: 60).

Ghana faced some of the above mentioned sanctions. The result of these sanctions was a military coup de tat against Nkrumah’s regime in the last years of his rule between 1963 and 1965. “It was clear that Nkrumah was not the darling of the West and her financial institutions. He could not have been because of Nkrumah's anti-imperialist attacks and crusades, immense stature in Third World politics, and pragmatic and independent leanings at a time of intense cold war rivalry between the East and the West. In effect, though Nkrumah was dictatorial and should have won the admiration of the IMF and World Bank, his economic philosophy rooted as it was in centralized state planning was at odds with that of the financial institutions” (Boafo – Arthur: 1999: 2).

“Cocoa production in Ghana fell from an estimated 413,000 tons in 1970 to a mere 159,000 tons in 1983, while mineral production fell by 55 per cent between 1975 and 1983 (Anyinam: 2001: 199). Ghana also suffered from a sever brain – drain as a large number of skilled professionals, left the country in pursuit of a better life somewhere else, especially in Nigeria, Code d’Ivoire, and other foreign states such as Canada, Germany, Holland, United States, and Britain. “To aggravate the situation, Ghana’s worst drought of the 20th Century occurred in 1978/79 and again in 1982/83, resulting in high incidence of bush fire, which, in turn, undermined agriculture and food production across the country. Both drought episodes were so intense that the generation capacity of Ghana’s main hydro-electric dam at Akosombo was reduced, resulting in power rations to both industries and residences” (Mensah, Koranteng & Yeboa: 2004: 11).

As if things couldn’t get any worse, “more than one million Ghanaians were repatriated from Nigeria in 1983, putting more pressure on the already fragile national economy” (Mensah, Koranteng & Yeboa: 2004: 11). There are a number of factors that are associated with Ghana. “Exogenous factors, notably the global economic upheaval sparked by the OPEC crises of the 1970s, the repatriation of Ghanaians from Nigeria, and the perennial unfavourable terms of trade for Ghana’s primary export products such as cocoa, timber, and gold were equally responsible for the economic crisis” (Mensah, Koranteng & Yeboa: 2004: 13). After all attempts had to obtain assistance from the states of the Communist bloc, such as Cuba and the former Soviet Union. Rawlings and his socialist revolutionaries were forced to turn to the West for economic aid and poverty alleviation.

Economic and Political Reform in Ghana

“In 1983, Dr Kwesi Botchwey, the then secretary of finance, announced the initiation of the nation’s Structural Adjustment Programmes, locally dubbed Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), designed to last until 1987. In 1987 and again in 1991, ERP2 and EPR3 were announced as part of the national budget” (Mensah, Koranteng & Yeboa: 2004: 5). These timelines were adopted by a number of political analysts who were intent on examining the nation’s reform during the 90’s. These timelines help in explaining the various phases of reform undertaken by Ghana. According to Mensah, Koranteng and Yeboa, “the reform process has continued beyond the mid-1990s, these timelines (i.e., periods coterminous with EPR1, EPR2, and EPR3) necessarily require some alteration, or, at least, extension—if nothing at all, to capture more recent reform policies” (Mensah, Koranteng & Yeboa: 2004: 5).

Ghana’s Structural Adjustment Programme is divided into four Phases. According to Mensah, Koranteng and Yeboa; “the first three phases, which spanned 1983-1986, 1986-1991, and 1992-1996, focused on ‘economic stabilization’, ‘structural changes’, and ‘structural and institutional reforms,’ respectively. And their fourth phase from 1997- 2002 sought to reduce inflation, support a realistic exchange rate, complete the privatization of state enterprises, and promote the efficient allocation of resources for growth; the fourth phase from1997 – 2002 also sought to accelerate real GDP growth. Spanning from 1998 to 2000 was about securing a stable macroeconomic environment and to support economic growth” (Mensah, Koranteng & Yeboa: 2004: 5).

Conclusion

“Since the early 1980s, Ghana has solicited considerable amounts of policy- and non-policy-based loans from the Bretton Woods institutions and other bilateral sources for its structural adjustment. While many factors instigated the nation’s Structural Adjustment Programmes, it was found that by far the leading trigger was the economic crisis that prevailed at the time” (Mensah, Koranteng & Yeboa: 2004: 30). The frame work of Ghanaian politics is structured as a presidential representative democratic republic, whereby the president of Ghana is head of government and head of state at the same time. The government exercises executive power, while legislative power is vested in both parliament and government.

Ghana and the rest of Africa have been subject to economic hardship by imperialist actions from the former colonial powers. The dependency model of international politics is characterized by its intrinsic aspect, which is neo – colonialism. Ghana was among the richest countries in Africa at the time of independence and due to international pressure and resentment of the Nkrumah government, Ghana’s economy dwindled into the depths of crisis over the years.

“The indifference of the institutions to the political excesses of dictators who willingly implemented their sponsored adjustment policies in the 1980s, implied tacit support, either by omission or commission, to rapacious and ruthless dictators who were bent on attaining their political and economic agendas” (Boafo - Arthur: 1999: 14). The economy of Africa has been plundered by many dictatorial puppet regimes. Ghana has experienced a series of military coups which have had a catastrophic effect on her economic development. The inept nature of these dictators and the neo – colonialist attitude of the west leaves an open sore in heart of Africa. The regimes to follow after Nkrumah did little to help Ghana’s development and with the HIV / Aids pandemic, Africa still has a lot of challenges to face.

However as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development gains momentum, one can only hope that Africa has finally found her blueprint for recovery. If Africa’s Human Resources and potential are properly utilized, she could lead to the sustainable growth of the continent. Africa can never win against the powerful force of globalisation, but through constructive engagements and tactful alliances with one another, powerful regional entities can lead to a powerful unified Africa. The only war that Africa can win is the war against dependency. The world is controlled economically and militarily and Africa has the potential to be a global leader. The powerful force of imperialism that sat on a pedestal and watched the progressive de – humanization of Africa and the African, is slowly suffering dethronement.

References:

Anyinam, Charles. “The social cost of the IMF’s adjustment programs for
poverty: The case of health care in Ghana” International Journal of Health
Services, 1989

Boafo-Arthur, Kwame. (1999). Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS) in Ghana: Interogating PNDC's Implementation. West Africa Review: 1, 1

Van Niekerk, D, Van der Waldt, G, and Jonker, A. Governance, Politics, and Policy in South Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Stephan, Harry, “The Scramble for Africa in the 21st Century,” Defence Journal, March 2005.

Shraeder, Peter J, African Politics and Society: A mosaic in transformation, Boston, Macmillan, 1999.

Kwame Nkrumah, Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for De – Colonization, New York and London: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1964.

Olantunde, J, C, B, Ojo, African International Relations, London, New York, Lagos: Longman Inc, 1985

Joseph Mensah, Roger Oppong-Koranteng, and Kwame Frempah-Yeboah,

Understanding Reform: The Case of Ghana, 2004


IMF, 2003. Ghana-Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility: Economic and

Financial Framework Paper, Washington DC: IMF, 1998 - 2000

Tsikata, Yvonne, M. 2001. “Ghana” In Shantayanan Devarajan, David R Dollar, and
Torgny Holmgren (eds.), Aid and Reform in Africa. (Washington D.C.: The
World Bank) p. 45-100.