Two JSE-listed companies were interested in bidding for the shuttered assets of liquidated Pamodzi Gold, which were currently undergoing a due diligence inspection by officials of a Chinese state-owned mining company, union officials involved in the mine closure debacle said yesterday.
As many as 5 300 workers at the mines, awarded to Aurora Empowerment Systems in 2009, have been unpaid since March last year.
News of the potential bidders came after a meeting between officials of Solidarity, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the liquidators of the mines at their offices at the Grootvlei gold mine on the East Rand.
A planned meeting with China’s Shandong Gold, which was reportedly considering buying 60 percent of Aurora for $100 million (R702m), was cancelled without explanation.
Key figures in Aurora, Khulubuse Zuma, a nephew of President Jacob Zuma, Michael Hulley, an attorney who defended the ANC president when he faced corruption charges, and Zondwa Mandela, a grandson of former president Nelson Mandela, also stayed away from the meeting, which was arranged to find a solution to ease the plight of the company’s workers who have been left destitute.
A task team involving the labour unions and the liquidators was set up to repair the relationship that had broken down prior to the sacking of lead liquidator Enver Motala by the Master of the High Court in Pretoria last week over disputes about the way the liquidation was being handled.
“The liquidators have taken control and the first step is to keep the workers in the loop.
“Aurora still won’t pay, they refuse to pay and we have reached a dead end,” said Gideon du Plessis, the general secretary of Solidarity.
Du Plessis said the liquidators had indicated that the Chinese delegation sent their apologies for not being able to attend the meeting and that they were not provided with any further details.
According to Du Plessis, it looked as though Shandong had been influenced by Aurora, which appeared to have prevented the delegation from participating in the meeting.
He added that the Labour Department would only be interested if the Chinese made a deal with a recognised mining company and that it would not entertain it if they entered the deal with Aurora.
An NUM official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said “due to the sensitivity of the issue” the meeting also revealed that there were other interested parties who were at an advanced stage of buying out Pamodzi Gold’s assets.
“There are other companies bidding for Pamodzi, although I don’t have the names right now, the liquidators indicated that two are companies listed on the JSE and one is an overseas-based company,” the NUM official said.
He agreed with Du Plessis about the cancellation of the meeting with the Chinese delegation and suggested that Aurora might have been behind it, but was baffled as to what the company stood to gain by pulling such a “stunt”.
Aurora was named the preferred bidder in 2009 for the management of Pamodzi Gold’s assets after lodging R600m funding. However, due to financial difficulties and alleged mismanagement, the company struggled to keep the operations afloat.
One of Grootvlei’s shafts, Number Six, has been stripped of all its equipment by Aurora contractors and desperate workers. It is also alleged that the 400m deep shaft contained the dead bodies of people who had fallen down the shaft as they tried to strip equipment to sell to scrapyards.
Johan Engelbrecht, a liquidator from Icon Insolvency Practitioners, confirmed that a task team had been set up and indicated that labour had been informed about the current situation at Aurora.
Furthermore, discussions would be held between labour movements and liquidators who would issue a joint statement on the way forward regarding the future of Aurora, Shandong’s interests and the mineworkers who have not been paid since March last year.
“We are considering actions and we will put them in place. We will let you know the details next week when we issue a joint official response. But what I can tell you is that organised labour is satisfied with the outcome.”
However, he hinted that a central focus of the task team would be to asses the future of the workers. “We are looking for solutions,” he added. – Business Report
Tuesday, June 14, 2011
Friday, February 4, 2011
Ripple effects of Tunisa and Egypt on the rest of Africa
Ayanda Mdluli
While some analysts have warned that the political and social unrest in Tunisia and Egypt could spread into Sub-Saharan Africa, along with investment and economic implications, others have contended that, the Egyptian and Tunisian contagion is unlikely to spill over into Sub Saharan Africa.
One of the most significant discussions at the Frontier advisory Africa outlook for 2011 at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange recently was the possibility of a knock on effect of the Egyptian and Tunisian crises to the rest of the Sub Sahara.
Some key points to understanding the unrest in Tunisia and Egypt, can be found in the argument that the global financial crisis has had a delayed effect in both countries, with sever economic and political consequences. The revolts were driven by difficult economic circumstances, largely as a result of a massive drop in foreign investments and the cutting of foreign aid by European countries.
Reports from Bloomberg show that Egyptian governments inability to bolster economic growth over the past two decades fuelled the fire of social unrest. Bloomberg notes that the chart of the day shows Egypt as the worst performer among 13 middle eastern, north African and Gulf Countries in terms of per capita gross domestic product growth.
In addition, Bloomberg highlights: “Egypt’s average GDP per capita was a little changes at $2, 160 in 2009, compared with $2, 155 in 1989.”
These figures show that the growing economy is not trickling down to the lower mass of Egyptians, coupled with high unemployment, high inflation and the global financial crisis, says the Bloomberg report.
William Gumede, an associate professor from the graduate school of public development and management at Wits University in Johannesburg said the cutting of foreign aid from the West to some African countries has had a ripple effect on finance for development purposes and NGO’s which are often critical in the fight against poverty.
He explains that both Tunisia and Egypt had good access to Europe during the times of economic prosperity, where trade and investment had ensured economic stability for both African countries. However, now that Europe is struggling, coupled with sever cash shortages to North Africa, the revolts are a direct consequence and a delayed effect of the global economic meltdown.
Gumede argues that this could have a domino effect throughout North Africa and even spread through Sub Saharan, and further claims that the dilapidated structures of the New Partnership for African Development (Nepad) and the African Union could also have a negative impact on Africa’s political and economic standing in the global arena. He says that throughout the continent, many political initiatives are in disarray.
“We have a situation where African leaders in the mid 90’s had developed a new way of doing business with the changing economy by introducing Nepad, today there is no new way of doing things. We have an older generation of political leaders who don’t have the tools to deal with what is going on. There is no new generation of leaders. The world has changed but the leaders have not,” he says.
He continued to argue that people on the ground were looking for leadership which was consistent with the times and modernisation of society and the economy.
African leaders recently appointed the infamous Equatorial Guinea dictator, President Teodoro Obiang as the chairman of the African Union, which has ironically sworn to uphold the values and principles of democracy and human rights on the African continent.
According to some human rights organisations, the president of this oil rich nation has amassed massive wealth for himself, his families and his cronies, while his people live under squalid conditions in the depths of poverty.
The politics of patronage has always been an intrinsic aspect of African politics and economics, where businesses flourish and benefit in times of turmoil, usually at the expense of ordinary citizens and the poor.
Businesses in various sectors such as mining and arms manufacturing have strived on the blood of society, especially in countries such as Sierra Leone, Uganda, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Gumede says businesses should take a more socio economic stance because they can produce African leaders with a modern vision. “ If businesses helped the communities, and provided talented people with opportunities. Then that community will protect the business.”
The head of asset management at Imara, John Legat, dismisses claims that Tunisia and Egypt’s contagion could spread in through Sub Saharan Africa. He bases his argument on the notion that there is relatively low risk of Egyptians contagion affecting equity values in Sub Saharan Africa, even Middle East and North African equity markets fell by 20% due to the unrest in Tunisia and Egypt. In addition, the Egyptian stock exchange was closed on January 30 and the Cairo market fell by 21 percent before share trading was suspended.
He says that this view is based on the Botswana registered Imara, a merchant banking and investment management group that markets several Africa – focused investment funds “while maintaining strong-on the ground representation in African jurisdictions.”
In his observations, he notes that “Sub-Saharan markets, excluding South Africa, generally have low correlation with one another and with the major international economies.”
He continues to add that political risk has always been considered in Egypt, noting that in the past, “this factor may have been under-estimated by some investors. This underlines the advisability of position-taking in a range of markets when creating a general portfolio with an African focus.”
In contrast, George Lwanda, a project economist from the Development Bank of Southern Africa disagrees with Legats views and points out that ripple effects of the crisis in Egypt can be seen on the weakening rand which is sitting uneasily with investors. He says that investors are becoming increasingly risk averse and have a tendency of looking at Africa as one country, which is putting pressure on Sub Saharan Africa.
He also points out that the rising costs of electricity, weaker rand and oil expenses could be linked with the riots, which could also see inflation rising and ultimately an increase in interest rates.
He continues to argue that that Egypt is the main economy in Comesa which consists of 23 different countries. The effect that this could have on Egypt’s trading abilities could be immense, which could have a direct knock on effect to the other member nations which are a part of Comesa.
“Egypt was identified as one of the main countries to invest in, its difficult to see how this could not have a negative economic impact on the rest of Sub Saharan Africa.”
He further contends that an economic problem, transformed into a political problem in Egypt, and pointed out that in comparison to South Africa, unrests of this nature can only happen on local government level because there is no tight dictatorial grip in the country.
He further claims that the shape in which Egypt will emerge from the crisis will have implications on the rest of Africa, especially if there is no visionary leader to steer Egypt into the right direction.
Through the experiences of Egypt and Tunisia, the toppling of the old undemocratic guard is inevitable. A growing number of unemployed youth and frustrated graduates who did not experience the liberation struggle will set the direction and pave the way for political development and modernization of leadership.
Old rhetoric and aid dependency has no place in the age of new media and the quest for freedom. The disorganization and irrelevance of the African Union has all but sealed the fate of “dictator clubs” which have come to characterize political leadership in Africa.
The minimalist approach to democracy in Africa will continue to be an impediment to the continents development. Instead of moving beyond mere electorlaism. These dictators and presidents for life have continued to conduct artificial elections for the benefits of aid ties, while others have suppressed political opponents clinging to power no matter what the consequences.
While some analysts have warned that the political and social unrest in Tunisia and Egypt could spread into Sub-Saharan Africa, along with investment and economic implications, others have contended that, the Egyptian and Tunisian contagion is unlikely to spill over into Sub Saharan Africa.
One of the most significant discussions at the Frontier advisory Africa outlook for 2011 at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange recently was the possibility of a knock on effect of the Egyptian and Tunisian crises to the rest of the Sub Sahara.
Some key points to understanding the unrest in Tunisia and Egypt, can be found in the argument that the global financial crisis has had a delayed effect in both countries, with sever economic and political consequences. The revolts were driven by difficult economic circumstances, largely as a result of a massive drop in foreign investments and the cutting of foreign aid by European countries.
Reports from Bloomberg show that Egyptian governments inability to bolster economic growth over the past two decades fuelled the fire of social unrest. Bloomberg notes that the chart of the day shows Egypt as the worst performer among 13 middle eastern, north African and Gulf Countries in terms of per capita gross domestic product growth.
In addition, Bloomberg highlights: “Egypt’s average GDP per capita was a little changes at $2, 160 in 2009, compared with $2, 155 in 1989.”
These figures show that the growing economy is not trickling down to the lower mass of Egyptians, coupled with high unemployment, high inflation and the global financial crisis, says the Bloomberg report.
William Gumede, an associate professor from the graduate school of public development and management at Wits University in Johannesburg said the cutting of foreign aid from the West to some African countries has had a ripple effect on finance for development purposes and NGO’s which are often critical in the fight against poverty.
He explains that both Tunisia and Egypt had good access to Europe during the times of economic prosperity, where trade and investment had ensured economic stability for both African countries. However, now that Europe is struggling, coupled with sever cash shortages to North Africa, the revolts are a direct consequence and a delayed effect of the global economic meltdown.
Gumede argues that this could have a domino effect throughout North Africa and even spread through Sub Saharan, and further claims that the dilapidated structures of the New Partnership for African Development (Nepad) and the African Union could also have a negative impact on Africa’s political and economic standing in the global arena. He says that throughout the continent, many political initiatives are in disarray.
“We have a situation where African leaders in the mid 90’s had developed a new way of doing business with the changing economy by introducing Nepad, today there is no new way of doing things. We have an older generation of political leaders who don’t have the tools to deal with what is going on. There is no new generation of leaders. The world has changed but the leaders have not,” he says.
He continued to argue that people on the ground were looking for leadership which was consistent with the times and modernisation of society and the economy.
African leaders recently appointed the infamous Equatorial Guinea dictator, President Teodoro Obiang as the chairman of the African Union, which has ironically sworn to uphold the values and principles of democracy and human rights on the African continent.
According to some human rights organisations, the president of this oil rich nation has amassed massive wealth for himself, his families and his cronies, while his people live under squalid conditions in the depths of poverty.
The politics of patronage has always been an intrinsic aspect of African politics and economics, where businesses flourish and benefit in times of turmoil, usually at the expense of ordinary citizens and the poor.
Businesses in various sectors such as mining and arms manufacturing have strived on the blood of society, especially in countries such as Sierra Leone, Uganda, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Gumede says businesses should take a more socio economic stance because they can produce African leaders with a modern vision. “ If businesses helped the communities, and provided talented people with opportunities. Then that community will protect the business.”
The head of asset management at Imara, John Legat, dismisses claims that Tunisia and Egypt’s contagion could spread in through Sub Saharan Africa. He bases his argument on the notion that there is relatively low risk of Egyptians contagion affecting equity values in Sub Saharan Africa, even Middle East and North African equity markets fell by 20% due to the unrest in Tunisia and Egypt. In addition, the Egyptian stock exchange was closed on January 30 and the Cairo market fell by 21 percent before share trading was suspended.
He says that this view is based on the Botswana registered Imara, a merchant banking and investment management group that markets several Africa – focused investment funds “while maintaining strong-on the ground representation in African jurisdictions.”
In his observations, he notes that “Sub-Saharan markets, excluding South Africa, generally have low correlation with one another and with the major international economies.”
He continues to add that political risk has always been considered in Egypt, noting that in the past, “this factor may have been under-estimated by some investors. This underlines the advisability of position-taking in a range of markets when creating a general portfolio with an African focus.”
In contrast, George Lwanda, a project economist from the Development Bank of Southern Africa disagrees with Legats views and points out that ripple effects of the crisis in Egypt can be seen on the weakening rand which is sitting uneasily with investors. He says that investors are becoming increasingly risk averse and have a tendency of looking at Africa as one country, which is putting pressure on Sub Saharan Africa.
He also points out that the rising costs of electricity, weaker rand and oil expenses could be linked with the riots, which could also see inflation rising and ultimately an increase in interest rates.
He continues to argue that that Egypt is the main economy in Comesa which consists of 23 different countries. The effect that this could have on Egypt’s trading abilities could be immense, which could have a direct knock on effect to the other member nations which are a part of Comesa.
“Egypt was identified as one of the main countries to invest in, its difficult to see how this could not have a negative economic impact on the rest of Sub Saharan Africa.”
He further contends that an economic problem, transformed into a political problem in Egypt, and pointed out that in comparison to South Africa, unrests of this nature can only happen on local government level because there is no tight dictatorial grip in the country.
He further claims that the shape in which Egypt will emerge from the crisis will have implications on the rest of Africa, especially if there is no visionary leader to steer Egypt into the right direction.
Through the experiences of Egypt and Tunisia, the toppling of the old undemocratic guard is inevitable. A growing number of unemployed youth and frustrated graduates who did not experience the liberation struggle will set the direction and pave the way for political development and modernization of leadership.
Old rhetoric and aid dependency has no place in the age of new media and the quest for freedom. The disorganization and irrelevance of the African Union has all but sealed the fate of “dictator clubs” which have come to characterize political leadership in Africa.
The minimalist approach to democracy in Africa will continue to be an impediment to the continents development. Instead of moving beyond mere electorlaism. These dictators and presidents for life have continued to conduct artificial elections for the benefits of aid ties, while others have suppressed political opponents clinging to power no matter what the consequences.
Friday, January 14, 2011
Projected maize surplus reaches 6 million tons
Sufficient summer rain has boosted South Africa s maize crop, leading to a 6 million ton surplus that has kept prices down. Farmers may benefit from higher global food prices after droughts and floods.
Plentiful summer rain in the maize triangle has enabled farmers to harvest bumper crops, boosting the surplus of maize stocks, according to Ernst Janovsky, the head of agribusiness at Absa.
As a result, the estimate of this season’s maize surplus has been revised to 6 million tons from a projection of 4 million tons in November last year.
At a recent presentation on the agricultural outlook, Janovsky said 70 percent of local agricultural prices were influenced by world prices.
Andre Jooste, a senior manager for marketing and economic research at the National Agricultural Marketing Council, explained that South Africa was a relatively open market, which meant the current concern over food prices globally would inevitably spill over into the South African market.
He said South Africa was currently a net importer of processed foods, rice and wheat, and an exporter of commodities such as maize and soya beans.
A report from Econometrix said indices of international food prices had risen by an average of 30 percent a year in dollar terms in the recent past.
The head of commodities at PSG Prime, Pieter van Wyk, said US maize prices had risen by 85 percent since July last year and the trend reflected a shortage of grain stocks.
His analysis of the prices was based on Chicago Board of Trade figures, which showed a sharp increase in maize futures from $130 (R886) a ton in July 2010 to $240 a ton this month
.
“International prices have been rising and maize earning stocks are the tightest in 15 years. In contrast our stocks are fairly loose, which will result in a 3 million earning stock, so it looks like its going to be a good season,” he said.
With higher revenues and relatively low input inflation, profits are likely to improve in the long run.
Nico Hawkins, an economist from Grain SA, said farmers stood to benefit from better prices internationally, although prices would stay low on the domestic front.
Hawkins said farmers could not currently make a profit because the costs to cultivate a hectare of maize were higher than the income per hectare. He said farmers could benefit from price increases if the exchange rate weakened.
Hawkins said if current prices increased, traders stood to make a profit in the local market. He noted that if there was going to be a reduced global supply of maize, it would put South African farmers in a better position.
He also maintained that domestic maize prices were currently at their lowest in years because of the surplus and the strength of the rand.
Elizabeth Trudeau, a spokeswoman for the US diplomatic mission to South Africa, said the exporting of South African maize had helped to meet the demand for food in other parts of Africa and across the world.
A report from Econometrix said the rise in international food prices could be attributed to crude oil gains and economic growth on the back of massive global stimulus packages.
Food prices had also surged because floods and droughts had hit crops around the world.
Janovsky explained that although the stronger rand reduced the value of exports, it presented good investment opportunities, especially for imported machinery.
Low interest rates were also helping, he said.. - Ayanda Mdluli
Plentiful summer rain in the maize triangle has enabled farmers to harvest bumper crops, boosting the surplus of maize stocks, according to Ernst Janovsky, the head of agribusiness at Absa.
As a result, the estimate of this season’s maize surplus has been revised to 6 million tons from a projection of 4 million tons in November last year.
At a recent presentation on the agricultural outlook, Janovsky said 70 percent of local agricultural prices were influenced by world prices.
Andre Jooste, a senior manager for marketing and economic research at the National Agricultural Marketing Council, explained that South Africa was a relatively open market, which meant the current concern over food prices globally would inevitably spill over into the South African market.
He said South Africa was currently a net importer of processed foods, rice and wheat, and an exporter of commodities such as maize and soya beans.
A report from Econometrix said indices of international food prices had risen by an average of 30 percent a year in dollar terms in the recent past.
The head of commodities at PSG Prime, Pieter van Wyk, said US maize prices had risen by 85 percent since July last year and the trend reflected a shortage of grain stocks.
His analysis of the prices was based on Chicago Board of Trade figures, which showed a sharp increase in maize futures from $130 (R886) a ton in July 2010 to $240 a ton this month
.
“International prices have been rising and maize earning stocks are the tightest in 15 years. In contrast our stocks are fairly loose, which will result in a 3 million earning stock, so it looks like its going to be a good season,” he said.
With higher revenues and relatively low input inflation, profits are likely to improve in the long run.
Nico Hawkins, an economist from Grain SA, said farmers stood to benefit from better prices internationally, although prices would stay low on the domestic front.
Hawkins said farmers could not currently make a profit because the costs to cultivate a hectare of maize were higher than the income per hectare. He said farmers could benefit from price increases if the exchange rate weakened.
Hawkins said if current prices increased, traders stood to make a profit in the local market. He noted that if there was going to be a reduced global supply of maize, it would put South African farmers in a better position.
He also maintained that domestic maize prices were currently at their lowest in years because of the surplus and the strength of the rand.
Elizabeth Trudeau, a spokeswoman for the US diplomatic mission to South Africa, said the exporting of South African maize had helped to meet the demand for food in other parts of Africa and across the world.
A report from Econometrix said the rise in international food prices could be attributed to crude oil gains and economic growth on the back of massive global stimulus packages.
Food prices had also surged because floods and droughts had hit crops around the world.
Janovsky explained that although the stronger rand reduced the value of exports, it presented good investment opportunities, especially for imported machinery.
Low interest rates were also helping, he said.. - Ayanda Mdluli
Rand forecast to strengthen in 2011
Analysts forecast that the rand will continue to strengthen in 2011 due to the weakening of the US dollar and euro currency.
However, when pitted against the currencies of other developing nations, the rand will not see any significant gains because of rising interest rates, said Ilke Smith, an economics analyst at metropolitan asset managers.
Smith said the strengthening of the rand in 2011 will come as a result of expansive monetary policies in the developed nations as well as government interventions in the form of fiscal policy, coupled with a tighter South African monetary policy when compared to countries such as the US and Britain.
She said smaller companies in the manufacturing sector were likely to bear the brunt of a stronger rand because their competitive advantage would decline in the export markets. However, she added intermediate products would do well because there would be a higher consumer demand, and importers would also benefit.
She added that the high international food and oil prices would benefit SA and would also keep the rand more subdued for a longer period. She argued that unions should embrace the stronger rand because it would keep local food prices lower.
“The notion of a weaker rand is silly, As a developing nation the stronger rand will help us get far, one shouldn't look at it as the bearer of bad news because it would ensure that domestic food prices remained low. Our debt management is also in a better position than other developed countries.
This position will ensure that we keep capital in SA and get more returns on investments.”
However, she pointed out that the stronger rand was not based on SA's economy doing well, but was based on the poor performing US dollar and pound. She added that a negative impact of the stronger rand would a deterrent to foreign direct investment because investors would be giving more of their currency to get one rand.
Annabel Bishop, an economist at Investec, said sovereign debt contagion was the single biggest risk for the rand in 2011. She said the fallout could be larger than before, which meant that the rand could weaken substantially on the sudden outflow of foreign investments due to the heightened levels of risk aversion.
“The March to May period sees the rollover of sovereign debt for many of the advanced economies at risk of bankruptcy, while January tends to see a high degree of bond issuance as governments front load sales.”
She added that second risk scenario for the rand was that the euro would continue to weaken due to the woes on the eurozone, but the rand would strengthen once again once the sovereign debt crunch in the eurozone had been overcome.
Late on Wednesday, the rand was bid 6.83 to the US dollar, 8.92 against the euro and 10.71 versus the British sterling. - Ayanda Mdluli
However, when pitted against the currencies of other developing nations, the rand will not see any significant gains because of rising interest rates, said Ilke Smith, an economics analyst at metropolitan asset managers.
Smith said the strengthening of the rand in 2011 will come as a result of expansive monetary policies in the developed nations as well as government interventions in the form of fiscal policy, coupled with a tighter South African monetary policy when compared to countries such as the US and Britain.
She said smaller companies in the manufacturing sector were likely to bear the brunt of a stronger rand because their competitive advantage would decline in the export markets. However, she added intermediate products would do well because there would be a higher consumer demand, and importers would also benefit.
She added that the high international food and oil prices would benefit SA and would also keep the rand more subdued for a longer period. She argued that unions should embrace the stronger rand because it would keep local food prices lower.
“The notion of a weaker rand is silly, As a developing nation the stronger rand will help us get far, one shouldn't look at it as the bearer of bad news because it would ensure that domestic food prices remained low. Our debt management is also in a better position than other developed countries.
This position will ensure that we keep capital in SA and get more returns on investments.”
However, she pointed out that the stronger rand was not based on SA's economy doing well, but was based on the poor performing US dollar and pound. She added that a negative impact of the stronger rand would a deterrent to foreign direct investment because investors would be giving more of their currency to get one rand.
Annabel Bishop, an economist at Investec, said sovereign debt contagion was the single biggest risk for the rand in 2011. She said the fallout could be larger than before, which meant that the rand could weaken substantially on the sudden outflow of foreign investments due to the heightened levels of risk aversion.
“The March to May period sees the rollover of sovereign debt for many of the advanced economies at risk of bankruptcy, while January tends to see a high degree of bond issuance as governments front load sales.”
She added that second risk scenario for the rand was that the euro would continue to weaken due to the woes on the eurozone, but the rand would strengthen once again once the sovereign debt crunch in the eurozone had been overcome.
Late on Wednesday, the rand was bid 6.83 to the US dollar, 8.92 against the euro and 10.71 versus the British sterling. - Ayanda Mdluli
Sunday, January 9, 2011
A bastard's retaliation to a bitch's brew...he he he
According to the Oxford dictionary, a bastard is defined as a person born of unmarried parents; an illegitimate baby, child or adult. It is also defined as a hybrid, an animal, person or plant born out of two different species or races...especially by accident. Then there is off course my favourite, the more informal meaning of the word, which contends that a bastard is an obnoxious or despicable person. Wow, all these definitions...interesting.
Now I'm not writing this piece to do a comparative analysis between a bastard and a bitch. As far as I'm concerned a woman has every right to be a bitch if she wants to. Just don't bitch when you are around me, and please oh please do not nag me when I'm drinking beer and watching TV, because then I'll just think OK i got me another nagger...Then I'm outta there faster than you can ask: does this look fat on me?
OK sisters, lets get one thing straight, I love you all, I think you are the most beautiful creation God hath made on this planet. I cant even begin to imagine what life would be without you beautiful queens by my side, and besides you were created out of my rib so each and everyone of you out there is a flesh of my flesh, blood of my blood and you shall bear me future princes, warriors and princesses, for you are woman and God is you, because your bodies are just oh so heavenly, so please don't ask me if you look fat in anything, cause chances are you do and I like it that way. Besides, I wouldn't stick around if you didn't look good in anything, and I think you look very sexy in my soccer jersey after a steamy hot session of you know what.
With all that said ladies, with all those feelings of love and sense of belonging when we engage in pillow talk, I am still a bastard. I was born out of wedlock, was raised by a single parent and never had shit. the only thing I have going for me is a supportive mother, sister, daughter and an honours degree which has seen me rise above my peers who had all the wonderful opportunities that life in a free democratic South Africa could offer.
I on the other hand was born black, grew up poor, and now living in my prime, destined for greater things such money...lots and lots of money, which is what motivates me to be the best I can be. You see, what makes me a truly remarkable bastard is that beyond my self centered black-ass bastard persona, I have never forgotten about my roots and the pain my mama suffered to make me what I am today. I'm a lucky bastard, how else would I explain how I came about today? hnm?? Got me thinking again and getting carried away. You see, being a lucky bastard created enemies for me along the way in my short life.
There were and still are people who wanted to see me fail, people who wanted to see me down and out so they could stand on my chest with one foot and do a victory dance. Weight after weight of hate and bickering, gossip and slander, trickery and spit was piled on my shoulders. I was told I would never mount to anything, and would end up as a another figure in the crime statistics. There was a time when I even started to believe it, I would start thinking that maybe the only way out for me was to remain as an insignificant shit pellet, hanging from a pubic hair on the crack of the world's backside. Aah..the Irony, today I can smile when I look at my graduation pictures, the smile on my mama's face is priceless.
When I put money in her hand and tell her to buy whatever she likes, when I buy groceries at home, when I take my grandmother out to Spur on her birthday. When my daughter says she wants a bicycle and gets a bicycle. That's what I have lived for and that is what makes me a truly remarkable bastard, born out of wedlock, never shit but living a life that most in our poverty stricken country could ever dream of.
Now sister girl, my beautiful queen, with all this weight on our shoulders why is it that us good niggas have to pay for all the shit your past boyfriend's did? I have heard it all, men are dogs, men are all the same, I don't need a man to make me happy, he is not good enough for you, do this do that yap yap, yap yap yap fuckidy yap yap. Get over it!...I'm not here to sponge off you, I'm not here to live rent free. I'm here to love you and treat you like the true African princess that you are. I love everything about you, your thick lips, big ass and stretch marks that come with it.
I will never ask you to go and get breast implants or a liposuction, but I will ask you to accompany me to the gym so that we can live a long and sexually pleasant life. It is not about your weight and what you got, it's about who you are and what you want. Just maybe, did you stop to think about the fact that the reason why I'm looking for some nooky outside our home is because you have a headache every night and are concerned that maybe all I want from you is sex and nothing more? Get over it, there are only two tubes that lead to man's heart. One is the Oesophagus which, leads to the stomach and the other is the urinal which excretes a substance associated with pure sexual bliss. So let's get one with straight, before you bitch about niggas who don't do anything except eat, sleep, shit and live for free in your apartment.
Maybe you should actually get out of your cocoon and open your heart to all the good, successful, hard working niggas out there. I like the irony though, when we don't have shit and don't work for a living, its a problem...when we do have shit and work hard for a living...It's another problem. You just gotta love our beautiful sisters emotional, yet irrational complexities at times.
Now, stop the male bashing, get me another beer, feed me and quietly wait in the bedroom for your king to return. Or you can watch the game with me and agree to everything I about the stupid referee.
Now I'm not writing this piece to do a comparative analysis between a bastard and a bitch. As far as I'm concerned a woman has every right to be a bitch if she wants to. Just don't bitch when you are around me, and please oh please do not nag me when I'm drinking beer and watching TV, because then I'll just think OK i got me another nagger...Then I'm outta there faster than you can ask: does this look fat on me?
OK sisters, lets get one thing straight, I love you all, I think you are the most beautiful creation God hath made on this planet. I cant even begin to imagine what life would be without you beautiful queens by my side, and besides you were created out of my rib so each and everyone of you out there is a flesh of my flesh, blood of my blood and you shall bear me future princes, warriors and princesses, for you are woman and God is you, because your bodies are just oh so heavenly, so please don't ask me if you look fat in anything, cause chances are you do and I like it that way. Besides, I wouldn't stick around if you didn't look good in anything, and I think you look very sexy in my soccer jersey after a steamy hot session of you know what.
With all that said ladies, with all those feelings of love and sense of belonging when we engage in pillow talk, I am still a bastard. I was born out of wedlock, was raised by a single parent and never had shit. the only thing I have going for me is a supportive mother, sister, daughter and an honours degree which has seen me rise above my peers who had all the wonderful opportunities that life in a free democratic South Africa could offer.
I on the other hand was born black, grew up poor, and now living in my prime, destined for greater things such money...lots and lots of money, which is what motivates me to be the best I can be. You see, what makes me a truly remarkable bastard is that beyond my self centered black-ass bastard persona, I have never forgotten about my roots and the pain my mama suffered to make me what I am today. I'm a lucky bastard, how else would I explain how I came about today? hnm?? Got me thinking again and getting carried away. You see, being a lucky bastard created enemies for me along the way in my short life.
There were and still are people who wanted to see me fail, people who wanted to see me down and out so they could stand on my chest with one foot and do a victory dance. Weight after weight of hate and bickering, gossip and slander, trickery and spit was piled on my shoulders. I was told I would never mount to anything, and would end up as a another figure in the crime statistics. There was a time when I even started to believe it, I would start thinking that maybe the only way out for me was to remain as an insignificant shit pellet, hanging from a pubic hair on the crack of the world's backside. Aah..the Irony, today I can smile when I look at my graduation pictures, the smile on my mama's face is priceless.
When I put money in her hand and tell her to buy whatever she likes, when I buy groceries at home, when I take my grandmother out to Spur on her birthday. When my daughter says she wants a bicycle and gets a bicycle. That's what I have lived for and that is what makes me a truly remarkable bastard, born out of wedlock, never shit but living a life that most in our poverty stricken country could ever dream of.
Now sister girl, my beautiful queen, with all this weight on our shoulders why is it that us good niggas have to pay for all the shit your past boyfriend's did? I have heard it all, men are dogs, men are all the same, I don't need a man to make me happy, he is not good enough for you, do this do that yap yap, yap yap yap fuckidy yap yap. Get over it!...I'm not here to sponge off you, I'm not here to live rent free. I'm here to love you and treat you like the true African princess that you are. I love everything about you, your thick lips, big ass and stretch marks that come with it.
I will never ask you to go and get breast implants or a liposuction, but I will ask you to accompany me to the gym so that we can live a long and sexually pleasant life. It is not about your weight and what you got, it's about who you are and what you want. Just maybe, did you stop to think about the fact that the reason why I'm looking for some nooky outside our home is because you have a headache every night and are concerned that maybe all I want from you is sex and nothing more? Get over it, there are only two tubes that lead to man's heart. One is the Oesophagus which, leads to the stomach and the other is the urinal which excretes a substance associated with pure sexual bliss. So let's get one with straight, before you bitch about niggas who don't do anything except eat, sleep, shit and live for free in your apartment.
Maybe you should actually get out of your cocoon and open your heart to all the good, successful, hard working niggas out there. I like the irony though, when we don't have shit and don't work for a living, its a problem...when we do have shit and work hard for a living...It's another problem. You just gotta love our beautiful sisters emotional, yet irrational complexities at times.
Now, stop the male bashing, get me another beer, feed me and quietly wait in the bedroom for your king to return. Or you can watch the game with me and agree to everything I about the stupid referee.
Lights may dim, Eskom warns
As many as 500 major users of electricity across the economy may have to face mandatory power cuts if Eskom is forced to ratchet up its bid to plug the gap between supply and demand over the next three years.
Users spanning such critical sectors as mining, transport and manufacturing might be discouraged from increasing employment should these cuts be effected, Tony Twine, a senior economist at Econometrix, said yesterday.
Other businesses such as ferrochrome and aluminium smelters would not be able to expand their businesses should mandatory cuts come into play, he added.
“This could lead to constraints on plans put forward by (Economic Development Minister) Ebrahim Patel to use labour-intensive industries to produce jobs,” Twine said, referring to the government’s New Growth Path, which aims to create 5 million jobs over the next decade.
“Even a threat of mandatory cuts could see a deterrence in industries and job creation.”
Eskom chief executive Brian Dames yesterday warned that South Africa could face critical shortfalls as early as March because almost a quarter of its generating capacity, including half of the Koeberg nuclear plant, was undergoing maintenance because of equipment failures.
In addition heavy rains had reduced the supply of coal to some power stations. This meant the safety margin between consumption and supply had narrowed.
Eskom would face similar problems until 2013 when the new Medupi baseload plant is expected to come on line.
Dames outlined an energy conservation scheme (ECS), which is still a work in progress between the utility’s various stakeholders, such as the Department of Energy.
“The ECS would be mandatory and is aimed at the largest 500 electricity users,” Dames said. “The scheme would provide a certainty of demand for at least seven years for those customers that consume between 50 percent and 60 percent of the electricity.”
He added that the ECS would send strong signals to improve energy efficiency rather than face disruptive load shedding.
He warned that the country faced a risk to electricity supply unless steps were taken to address a possible shortfall of 6 terawatt-hours in 2011/12 and 9 terawatt-hours in 2013.
Dames said Eskom needed 2 000 megawatts of operating reserves and highlighted that there was enough capacity between now and the end of February, conceding there were inadequate reserves to go around.
He outlined various risks associated with the constraints of the system. These included unexpected heavy rains and an unplanned shutdown of two units at the Koeberg nuclear power station.
Dames said the loss of half of Koeberg’s generating capacity had significantly reduced the utility’s flexibility to conduct maintenance at its coal-fired power station. This has resulted in a postponement of maintenance and an increased risk of unplanned power outages at some of its stations.
“Most of our power stations are in their mid-life and require more maintenance. Due to the low reserve margin there is insufficient available time to carry out essential maintenance,” Dames said.
Andrew Etzinger, Eskom’s senior general manager of integrated demand management, said there would be no moratorium on new connections and where new customers were connected, there would be sufficient electricity to meet energy demands.
“We support growth and we will look at ways of ensuring efficient production.”
Eskom spokeswoman Hilary Joffe said she was confident the utility would complete its current R300 billion build programme in 2017 and that the utility had sufficient funding in place to complete the power stations and power lines.
She said the parastatal was using a mixture of its own cash and borrowed from a variety of sources and equities.
In contrast, Bloomberg said: “It sounds very similar to the last crisis with equipment failures, wet coal and the like, which begs the question: have they learnt the required lessons that time around?
“Investors need to be cautious that as the economy recovers the situation is only going to be worse next year before the next power station comes on line.” - Ayanda Mdluli
Users spanning such critical sectors as mining, transport and manufacturing might be discouraged from increasing employment should these cuts be effected, Tony Twine, a senior economist at Econometrix, said yesterday.
Other businesses such as ferrochrome and aluminium smelters would not be able to expand their businesses should mandatory cuts come into play, he added.
“This could lead to constraints on plans put forward by (Economic Development Minister) Ebrahim Patel to use labour-intensive industries to produce jobs,” Twine said, referring to the government’s New Growth Path, which aims to create 5 million jobs over the next decade.
“Even a threat of mandatory cuts could see a deterrence in industries and job creation.”
Eskom chief executive Brian Dames yesterday warned that South Africa could face critical shortfalls as early as March because almost a quarter of its generating capacity, including half of the Koeberg nuclear plant, was undergoing maintenance because of equipment failures.
In addition heavy rains had reduced the supply of coal to some power stations. This meant the safety margin between consumption and supply had narrowed.
Eskom would face similar problems until 2013 when the new Medupi baseload plant is expected to come on line.
Dames outlined an energy conservation scheme (ECS), which is still a work in progress between the utility’s various stakeholders, such as the Department of Energy.
“The ECS would be mandatory and is aimed at the largest 500 electricity users,” Dames said. “The scheme would provide a certainty of demand for at least seven years for those customers that consume between 50 percent and 60 percent of the electricity.”
He added that the ECS would send strong signals to improve energy efficiency rather than face disruptive load shedding.
He warned that the country faced a risk to electricity supply unless steps were taken to address a possible shortfall of 6 terawatt-hours in 2011/12 and 9 terawatt-hours in 2013.
Dames said Eskom needed 2 000 megawatts of operating reserves and highlighted that there was enough capacity between now and the end of February, conceding there were inadequate reserves to go around.
He outlined various risks associated with the constraints of the system. These included unexpected heavy rains and an unplanned shutdown of two units at the Koeberg nuclear power station.
Dames said the loss of half of Koeberg’s generating capacity had significantly reduced the utility’s flexibility to conduct maintenance at its coal-fired power station. This has resulted in a postponement of maintenance and an increased risk of unplanned power outages at some of its stations.
“Most of our power stations are in their mid-life and require more maintenance. Due to the low reserve margin there is insufficient available time to carry out essential maintenance,” Dames said.
Andrew Etzinger, Eskom’s senior general manager of integrated demand management, said there would be no moratorium on new connections and where new customers were connected, there would be sufficient electricity to meet energy demands.
“We support growth and we will look at ways of ensuring efficient production.”
Eskom spokeswoman Hilary Joffe said she was confident the utility would complete its current R300 billion build programme in 2017 and that the utility had sufficient funding in place to complete the power stations and power lines.
She said the parastatal was using a mixture of its own cash and borrowed from a variety of sources and equities.
In contrast, Bloomberg said: “It sounds very similar to the last crisis with equipment failures, wet coal and the like, which begs the question: have they learnt the required lessons that time around?
“Investors need to be cautious that as the economy recovers the situation is only going to be worse next year before the next power station comes on line.” - Ayanda Mdluli
SA equity returns shine
January 5 2011 at 06:02am By Ayanda Mdluli
Independent Newspapers
JSE CEO Russell Loubser. Photo: Leon Nicholas
Optimism about the prospects for South African corporations helped propel the JSE all share index to a 19 percent rise in 2010, but some analysts are cautious about this year if the economic recovery proves weak.
Although the Reserve Bank has cut interest rates to a 30-year low to foster growth, there remains a concern the recovery may be unsustainable, partly due to rand strength that has weighed on exporting sectors like manufacturing.
Even so, last year’s impressive increase on the all share index is a reflection that South African corporations fared better in 2010 than the rest of Africa. Excluding dividends, the all share index advanced 15.4 percent.
According to a report from JPMorgan on emerging market equities in 2010, South Africa was the eighth-best performing country out of 22 markets.
Michael Power, a strategist at Investec, said the South African economy had a strong resource component, which led to the market doing well.
He said the economy grew by 18 percent in normal dollar terms.
However, he warned that 2011 would not be an easy year and that South Africa would not experience another 11 percent appreciation of the rand against the dollar.
His views were based on an emerging market investor who got a 30 percent-plus return from the South African market in 2010.
He said there was no loss of value showing in the local market, but cautioned that returns would be a lot lower.
He also forecast that there would be no strong recovery for consumers and predicted that the chances of further rate cuts were slim.
“We may experience one more interest rate cut, however chances of more rate cuts are small and we must guard against rising input costs of food, oil and coal,” he said.
According to Russell Global Indexes, which covers 98 percent of investable international markets, the JSE was +35.4 percent in dollar returns in December, compared with other Bric nations such as Brazil, which stood at +11.2 percent.
India was at +20.1 percent, Russia at +25.6 percent and China at +9.3 percent.
The markets are almost back at levels seen prior to the global economic meltdown, a welcome development, according to JSE chief executive Russell Loubser.
Loubser said the run-up meant that South Africa was not a basket case and was punching well above its weight, suggesting this achievement had improved the image and perception of the country among investors.
“If we were a basket case as a country then we would be a basket case as a stock exchange, generally speaking we made a good impression and the image and perception of the country has improved.”
He said a significant factor which enticed foreign investment towards the local market was the country’s rating in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report.
According to the report, South Africa was rated first in the category of the regulation of security exchanges.
This rating, according to Loubser, ensured that investors were comfortable with the South African market and resulted in foreigners becoming net buyers of local equities.
He noted that the financial markets formed a small part of the economy.
“There are tens of thousands of companies that are not listed and the 400 in the JSE are not a true representation of the total economy.”
Coronation Fund Managers portfolio manager Gavin Joubert said there was no clear answer on how the strong rand, which was bid at R6.702 to the dollar at 5pm yesterday, had impacted on the all share index because it varied depending on the individual stock concerned.
“Some companies benefit from a strong rand whilst others are negatively impacted,” Joubert said.
He added that individual share prices might have no relationship to the rand’s movements and how it affected the earnings of a particular firm.
“For example, a strong rand is negative for the earnings of resources companies, but most resource share prices were up in 2010. This was partly due to the fact that commodity prices had been very strong, which could have partly offset the negative impact of the strong rand,” Joubert said.
He said over the next five years it could be expected that the returns from local equities would be much lower than in the past five years.
He said he could not say which sectors would underpin the market in 2011 because Coronation bought individual stocks that the company believed were undervalued and that over a period of time would reflect that value.
“Our largest holdings at the moment are MTN, Naspers, SABMiller, BAT, Standard Bank, Sasol and Anglo American. While there are two resource stocks among our largest positions, there are a number of resource stocks that we think are expensive and hold none of.” - Business Report
Independent Newspapers
JSE CEO Russell Loubser. Photo: Leon Nicholas
Optimism about the prospects for South African corporations helped propel the JSE all share index to a 19 percent rise in 2010, but some analysts are cautious about this year if the economic recovery proves weak.
Although the Reserve Bank has cut interest rates to a 30-year low to foster growth, there remains a concern the recovery may be unsustainable, partly due to rand strength that has weighed on exporting sectors like manufacturing.
Even so, last year’s impressive increase on the all share index is a reflection that South African corporations fared better in 2010 than the rest of Africa. Excluding dividends, the all share index advanced 15.4 percent.
According to a report from JPMorgan on emerging market equities in 2010, South Africa was the eighth-best performing country out of 22 markets.
Michael Power, a strategist at Investec, said the South African economy had a strong resource component, which led to the market doing well.
He said the economy grew by 18 percent in normal dollar terms.
However, he warned that 2011 would not be an easy year and that South Africa would not experience another 11 percent appreciation of the rand against the dollar.
His views were based on an emerging market investor who got a 30 percent-plus return from the South African market in 2010.
He said there was no loss of value showing in the local market, but cautioned that returns would be a lot lower.
He also forecast that there would be no strong recovery for consumers and predicted that the chances of further rate cuts were slim.
“We may experience one more interest rate cut, however chances of more rate cuts are small and we must guard against rising input costs of food, oil and coal,” he said.
According to Russell Global Indexes, which covers 98 percent of investable international markets, the JSE was +35.4 percent in dollar returns in December, compared with other Bric nations such as Brazil, which stood at +11.2 percent.
India was at +20.1 percent, Russia at +25.6 percent and China at +9.3 percent.
The markets are almost back at levels seen prior to the global economic meltdown, a welcome development, according to JSE chief executive Russell Loubser.
Loubser said the run-up meant that South Africa was not a basket case and was punching well above its weight, suggesting this achievement had improved the image and perception of the country among investors.
“If we were a basket case as a country then we would be a basket case as a stock exchange, generally speaking we made a good impression and the image and perception of the country has improved.”
He said a significant factor which enticed foreign investment towards the local market was the country’s rating in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report.
According to the report, South Africa was rated first in the category of the regulation of security exchanges.
This rating, according to Loubser, ensured that investors were comfortable with the South African market and resulted in foreigners becoming net buyers of local equities.
He noted that the financial markets formed a small part of the economy.
“There are tens of thousands of companies that are not listed and the 400 in the JSE are not a true representation of the total economy.”
Coronation Fund Managers portfolio manager Gavin Joubert said there was no clear answer on how the strong rand, which was bid at R6.702 to the dollar at 5pm yesterday, had impacted on the all share index because it varied depending on the individual stock concerned.
“Some companies benefit from a strong rand whilst others are negatively impacted,” Joubert said.
He added that individual share prices might have no relationship to the rand’s movements and how it affected the earnings of a particular firm.
“For example, a strong rand is negative for the earnings of resources companies, but most resource share prices were up in 2010. This was partly due to the fact that commodity prices had been very strong, which could have partly offset the negative impact of the strong rand,” Joubert said.
He said over the next five years it could be expected that the returns from local equities would be much lower than in the past five years.
He said he could not say which sectors would underpin the market in 2011 because Coronation bought individual stocks that the company believed were undervalued and that over a period of time would reflect that value.
“Our largest holdings at the moment are MTN, Naspers, SABMiller, BAT, Standard Bank, Sasol and Anglo American. While there are two resource stocks among our largest positions, there are a number of resource stocks that we think are expensive and hold none of.” - Business Report
Struggling black farmers get help
Hundreds of black farmers who have received loans and land through the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform since 1994 have failed to pay back their start-up loans to the Land Bank.
This has prompted the department to take the land back as part of a multimillion-rand bailout programme.
A curatorship model has been developed which entails babysitting the farmers until they can farm profitably under the new Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (Plas).
The programme is the result of a team effort by the Land Bank, the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the National Treasury.
So far the scheme has reportedly forked out R232.4 million to bail out all 222 of the struggling black farmers but attempts to verify these figures from the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform have been unsuccessful.
Thirty-six of the farmers are from the Eastern Cape, 32 from the Free State, one from Gauteng, 23 from KwaZulu-Natal, 56 from Limpopo, 14 from Mpumalanga, 11 from the Northern Cape, 18 from North West and 31 from the Western Cape.
Under the scheme the department will take back the land and lease it out to the erstwhile owners, only giving it back when the farmers prove they can farm profitably.
The department will also no longer issue grants for the outright purchase of farms by land reform beneficiaries, but will lease the land out to them.
About R900 million has been set aside for a period of three years to recapitalise all the failed and ailing projects through Plas.
This would make it possible for the state to intervene should an emerging farmer experience financial troubles, Eddie Mohoebi, the head of communications at the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, said on Wednesday.
Mohoebi said the department had realised it was set to lose millions of rands as the Land Bank was going to repossess the farms of farmers who could not repay loans.
“The situation was that if we had bought the farm for R7 million, and the farmer took out a production loan of R250 000 from the Land Bank, due to the lengthy process of acquiring the farm it would be operational at a time when it was too late to grow crops and the farmer would have been burdened by operational costs.
“The Land Bank would then have to repossess the farm, which meant that the department was making a loss. That is why we had to bail them out and protect the interests of the department,” he explained.
The beneficiaries would pay 6 percent of the purchase price as a rental fee over three years as part of the loan agreement.
Musa Mchunu, the head of communications at the Land Bank, said the curatorship would ensure that the government provided guarantees and the Land Bank would provide production loans to the leasing farmers.
Mchunu said the farmers would be given a grace period of three to five years to turn things around and, if they succeeded, the lease would be extended as the farmer would be able to service the debt. However, if they failed, the government would look for alternative black farmers to take on the responsibility.
According to the department’s 2009/10 annual report, a further R250 million was allocated for the recapitalisation and development of the struggling Plas farms.
Mchunu said figures for farmers who qualified for the 2011/12 budget were still being calculated and the Land Bank would provide assistance in “negotiating an off-take agreement and resources for after care with the primary mandate being financial products”.
The president of AgriSA, Johannes Moller, said it was a positive sign that the government was bailing out struggling farmers but he stressed that it had to establish new farms if its initiative was to succeed.
He added that the current approach was treating the symptoms and not the problem because there was no proper plan to produce new farmers.
He said the government should encourage joint ventures where established commercial farmers with expertise worked closely with it and emergent farmers. - Ayanda Mdluli
This has prompted the department to take the land back as part of a multimillion-rand bailout programme.
A curatorship model has been developed which entails babysitting the farmers until they can farm profitably under the new Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (Plas).
The programme is the result of a team effort by the Land Bank, the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the National Treasury.
So far the scheme has reportedly forked out R232.4 million to bail out all 222 of the struggling black farmers but attempts to verify these figures from the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform have been unsuccessful.
Thirty-six of the farmers are from the Eastern Cape, 32 from the Free State, one from Gauteng, 23 from KwaZulu-Natal, 56 from Limpopo, 14 from Mpumalanga, 11 from the Northern Cape, 18 from North West and 31 from the Western Cape.
Under the scheme the department will take back the land and lease it out to the erstwhile owners, only giving it back when the farmers prove they can farm profitably.
The department will also no longer issue grants for the outright purchase of farms by land reform beneficiaries, but will lease the land out to them.
About R900 million has been set aside for a period of three years to recapitalise all the failed and ailing projects through Plas.
This would make it possible for the state to intervene should an emerging farmer experience financial troubles, Eddie Mohoebi, the head of communications at the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, said on Wednesday.
Mohoebi said the department had realised it was set to lose millions of rands as the Land Bank was going to repossess the farms of farmers who could not repay loans.
“The situation was that if we had bought the farm for R7 million, and the farmer took out a production loan of R250 000 from the Land Bank, due to the lengthy process of acquiring the farm it would be operational at a time when it was too late to grow crops and the farmer would have been burdened by operational costs.
“The Land Bank would then have to repossess the farm, which meant that the department was making a loss. That is why we had to bail them out and protect the interests of the department,” he explained.
The beneficiaries would pay 6 percent of the purchase price as a rental fee over three years as part of the loan agreement.
Musa Mchunu, the head of communications at the Land Bank, said the curatorship would ensure that the government provided guarantees and the Land Bank would provide production loans to the leasing farmers.
Mchunu said the farmers would be given a grace period of three to five years to turn things around and, if they succeeded, the lease would be extended as the farmer would be able to service the debt. However, if they failed, the government would look for alternative black farmers to take on the responsibility.
According to the department’s 2009/10 annual report, a further R250 million was allocated for the recapitalisation and development of the struggling Plas farms.
Mchunu said figures for farmers who qualified for the 2011/12 budget were still being calculated and the Land Bank would provide assistance in “negotiating an off-take agreement and resources for after care with the primary mandate being financial products”.
The president of AgriSA, Johannes Moller, said it was a positive sign that the government was bailing out struggling farmers but he stressed that it had to establish new farms if its initiative was to succeed.
He added that the current approach was treating the symptoms and not the problem because there was no proper plan to produce new farmers.
He said the government should encourage joint ventures where established commercial farmers with expertise worked closely with it and emergent farmers. - Ayanda Mdluli
Monday, January 3, 2011
Child Soldiers (Liberia as a case Study)
Introduction
The use of child soldiers in armed conflict has met much international criticism and condemnation across the globe. The use of child soldiers, particularly in Africa, has received much attention from many individuals, scholars and academics that have made attempts to shed some light and enlighten on this critical, emotional and morally complex issue.
When examining the role of the child soldier in the Liberian civil war, one must take into account the causal factors that play a major role in understanding the relationship between children and warfare in Africa. The causal factors that need to be taken into account when examining why the use of child soldiers was so prevalent in the Liberian conflict, are that of poverty, greed and the changing nature of wars and light weaponry that was used by children as young as twelve years old. The purpose of this essay is to identify the role that the child soldier played in the conflict; by role we mean the activities and actions required or expected of a person in a group. In order to identify that particular role and responsibility required of a child soldier, causal factors need to be taken into consideration. The use of child soldiers has inspired the emergence of important and interesting questions such as: What is a child and what is a child soldier? Why do some children decide or volunteer to become child soldiers? Why do rebel movements and organizations abduct and recruit child soldiers? And how are they recruited?
The traditional African and the European social and cultural perceptions of Childhood play a major role in helping one understand the definition of childhood. This essay will look at the two world views and will aim to criticize and digest the relevant literature and ultimately give a logical and consistent definition of child soldiers and childhood. The literature written by authors knowledgeable on the subject, such as Alcinda Honwana’s Child Soldiers in Africa and T. W Bennet’s Using Children in Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African Tradition? The above mentioned books will help discuss the arguments of how we define a child soldier. One argument is that conventional definitions contend that child soldiers are combatants or military recruits under the age 18. The Geneva Convention upholds this age qualification, so does the United Nations General Assembly and the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court. Alternatively, the opposing argument is that the definition of childhood in African cultures has little to do with age, although people sometimes refer to age limits. Rather, the positions of children are defined through social roles, expectations and responsibilities.
The literature on the subject provides interesting and helpful information on defining the child soldier but tends to be repetitive on other issues such as recruitment and the role child soldiers play within the military movement. However, information on casual factors and the treatment of female soldiers in conflict is much to be admired. The only problem is that one cannot pin point exactly where the root cause of why the use of child soldiers is so prevalent in Africa. Therefore, in order for one to try and have a clear understanding, the essay will begin by presenting the definition of the term child soldier. Additionally, this essay will provide examples and cases from the Liberian civil war from 1989 to 2003.
Background on the Liberian Civil War
From December 1989 to 2003, Liberia had been devastated by a civil war that has killed tens of thousands of Liberians and caused an estimated one-third of its population to flee the country as refugees.[1] The war had been marked by mass killings along ethnic lines and horrifying atrocities. Indeed, a characteristic of the Liberian civil war was that civilians suffered the most, they were deliberately targeted by all the warring factions often because of their ethnicity and that as a consequence far more civilians than combatants were killed.[2] The lack of protection and respect for the lives of civilians by all sides and the profound distrust among the warring factions were obstacles in achieving peace.[3] The roots of Liberia's civil war go far back in Liberian history. However, the immediate precursor dates from 1985: after President Samuel Doe, an ethnic Krahn who came to power in a 1980 coup, stole the presidential elections, he brutally suppressed a coup attempt led by Thomas Qwiwonkpa, an ethnic Gio. Doe's soldiers, the Krahn-dominated AFL, engaged in bloody reprisals against real and suspected opponents and their home communities as well targeting mostly Gios and Manos; hundreds were killed and hundreds more were detained without charge or trial.[4] This violence and the subsequent repression set the stage for the country's ethnic conflict and civil war.
On December 24, 1989, Charles Taylor and his NPFL launched an incursion from the Ivory Coast into Nimba County.[5] The AFL responded with a ruthless counterinsurgency campaign, indiscriminately killing civilians, burning villages, raping women and looting.[6] The brutality served to swell the ranks of NPFL recruits, many of whom were Gio and Mano boys orphaned by the fighting and the random and reprisal killings that accompanied it, or enraged by the AFL's conduct. The AFL went on the rampage outside Nimba as well. In one of the most egregious abuses of the war, on the night of July 29-30, 1990, AFL soldiers massacred some 600 people mostly Gios and Manos, many of them women with children who had taken refuge at St. Peter's Church in Monrovia.[7] Civilians also suffered at the hands of the NPFL. The NPFL targeted suspected supporters of the Doe regime, particularly members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups. Throughout NPFL territory, civilians suffered the capricious actions of an occupying army, arbitrary arrest, physical abuse, confiscation and destruction of property and restrictions on freedom of movement and freedom of expression.[8]
In August 1990, without any prospect for intervention by the United Nations or the United States, a peacekeeping force under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ecowas) arrived in Monrovia to separate the warring factions and to stop the bloodshed.[9] The role assigned to the force, known as the Economic Community Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), was to impose a cease-fire and to help form an interim government that would hold elections within twelve months.[10] With NPFL attacks continuing, there was no peace to keep, and ECOMOG itself engaged in combat to push the NPFL out of Monrovia. This situation was aggravated in October 1992, when the NPFL attacked Monrovia.[11] ECOMOG then accepted the assistance of other Liberian factions in fighting the NPFL, and in so doing dropped much of its appearance of neutrality. The human rights records of these factions ULIMO and the AFL ranged from suspect to abysmal.[12] The AFL was thoroughly discredited by its horrific abuses during the 1980s and especially during the war in 1990, when it massacred civilians and devastated Monrovia.[13]
ULIMO is an offshoot of the AFL, and its conduct in the areas it captured in 1992 included extensive human rights abuses.[14] Because of its conduct in the conflict, questions have been raised about ECOMOG's commitment to human rights and its ability to act as a neutral arbiter of the conflict.[15] The chief warring factions currently involved in the conflict are Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which controls about 60 percent of the country; and the United Liberian Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), made up primarily of soldiers from former President Samuel K. Doe's army, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), which controls at least two western counties.[16] ULIMO split along ethnic lines, pitting Krahns against Mandingos, causing serious casualties. Since late 1993, the NPFL had also been challenged by the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), a new armed faction made up largely of former AFL soldiers, most of whom are members of the Krahn ethnic group.[17] The LPC claims to control significant territory in the southeast. The remaining troops of the Armed Forces of Liberia do not control territory per se, but are armed and deployed around Monrovia. In addition, the Lofa Defense Force (LDF) is fighting ULIMO in Lofa County. In June 1993, in one of the worst atrocities to be documented during the war, 547 civilians, mostly women and children, were massacred in a displaced persons camp outside of Harbel.[18]
The victims were shot, beaten or hacked to death. A United Nations investigation concluded that the massacre had been carried out by the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). U.N. Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali condemned the Harbel massacre, and a new round of peace talks was initiated. The U.N. joined with ecowas and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to sponsor peace negotiations in Geneva that included representatives of all factions.[19] On July 25, 1993, a peace agreement was signed in Cotonou, Benin, by the NPFL, ULIMO, and the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU).[20] The peace accord stipulated that concomitant with disarmament, a five-person Council of State elected by all the factions would take power from the interim government until elections were held.[21] A thirty-five-member transitional parliament would include thirteen members from the NPFL and the interim government, and nine from ULIMO.[22] Between August 1993 and February 1994, political wrangling prevented the lntg from being seated. In February 1994, it was agreed that David Kpomakpor, a lawyer representing IGNU, would chair the lntg; with Dexter Tahyor of ULIMO, and Issac Mussah of the NPFL as vice chairs.[23]
Finally, in mid-May, Dorothy Musuleng Cooper was named Foreign Minister. An important element of the plan involved the creation of a U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to help supervise and monitor the agreement, in conjunction with ECOMOG.[24] The plan also provided for an expanded ECOMOG force, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to be composed of African troops from outside the West African region. By early 1994, some 800 Tanzanians were deployed in Kakata, and 900 Ugandans were in Buchanan.[25]
Defining the Child Soldier and Childhood
As Honwana claims, the term child soldier is an oxymoron that signifies the violence that this position does to establish.[26] A clarification of the specific meaning of the term soldier in theses civil wars, especially when preceded by the term child is necessary.[27] The soldier in theses contexts was often not a regular soldier of the sort who serves in state – sponsored, centrally controlled, and well – disciplined armed forces. Rather, the term refers to the type of fighter who often fills the ranks of guerrilla and rebel groups, inadequately trained and outfitted, often operating under the influence of drugs. Such soldiers harass loot and kill defenceless civilians indiscriminately.[28] The child soldier is characterized by its intrinsic aspect, minor, someone who needs to be looked after and nurtured in the right way, which explains the reckless behaviour once the guardian and the values have been removed and the status of soldier is given to the child. The child soldier is therefore considered to have an undeveloped sense of morality which is worsened by the horrid values indoctrinated by wicked warlords.
According to Honwana, the boundaries between adulthood and childhood in African societies have traditionally been more fluid than in European societies.[29] Of necessity children are actively involved in economic activities. The transition to adulthood is gradual, variable, and responsive to the particular situations of young people, their families and communities. Universalizing definitions are not applicable in many African conditions.[30] The problems that are facing the African continent, particularly poverty stricken Liberia indicate that what is considered a child or childhood behaviour in Liberia will not necessarily be considered childhood behaviour in England. There are cases of fourteen year old bread winners in African house holds, while that situation in European states is almost non existent. Unlike the western view point, childhood in the African context is not necessarily a stage of incompetence.[31]
It is an undisputable fact that there are more children participating as combatants today than there was in the past. The question posed by Bennet of did or did not African traditions involve children being conscripted into military service?[32] Provides one with a stepping stone in ensuring a clear and logical understanding of whether child conscription was as prevalent in the past as it is today. Many of those currently bearing arms in Africa are ten years old and some are even younger.[33] Were children as young as this conscripted in the pre – colonial age set? Bennet answers this question by claiming that we first need to understand what is meant by child. Children were never conscripted into the military service in African societies.[34] They were not recruited into regiments, nor did they bear arms, men were drafted into regiments three or four years after puberty.[35] The warrior was a mature and able bodied man. Armies needed men who could fight more effectively.[36] An example of this would be the Zulu society in the pre – colonial period during the peak of their military prowess. Children played non – military roles in society, before and even during puberty. Marriage was delayed because men had to participate in combat, which created a generation gap within the Zulu society.
The African traditional rules for regulating attainment of childhood have been transformed as a result of the socio – economic changes that came in the wake of colonialism.[37] Throughout Africa, urbanisation has fragmented extended families. Breakdown of the family has in turn, resulted in an ever increasing number of illegitimate births, runaway children and single parent families.[38] Every society withholds some, if not all, powers and responsibilities from the young until they behave in a mature and fully rational manner.[39] Bennet claims that in literate societies, adulthood is usually ascribed to individuals when they reach certain predetermined ages.[40] The transition from childhood is therefore fixed at an age when it is presumed that individuals will be capable of conducting themselves as adults. In preliterate societies on the other hand, where it is not possible to keep exact records, movement from one category to another is related to physical processes such as puberty and to social events such as initiation.[41]
Casual Factors
An abundance of light weapons and small arms
The wide availability, accumulation and proliferation of light weapons and small escalates conflicts, undermines peace agreements, intensifies violence, impacts on crime in a negative way, impedes economic and social development and hinder the development of social stability democracy and good governance.[42] The large supply of small arms and light weapons turn the children into soldiers as they are easy to carry and are able to be used effectively. Contemporary warfare is indeed shaped by least costly and simple weapons. These small arms and light weapons include rifles, grenades, light machine guns, light mortars, land mines, and other weapons that are “man portable”.[43] Even though they represent less than two percent of the entire global arms trade in terms of cost, small arms are perhaps the most deadly of all weapons to society. They are weapons most often used in battle and in attacks on civilians and have produced almost ninety percent of casualties in recent wars.[44]
Although no two conflicts are ever exactly alike, it can be said that the wars of the post cold war have generally taken a particular form: one in which the forces involved are predominantly of a paramilitary or irregular nature and the fighting is largely confined to the national territory of the state in question.[45] The conflicts that fit this pattern have for the most part, entailed a struggle over the ethnic composition of a disputed area or the possession of valuable resources. Such conflicts by their very nature tend to be conducted primarily with small arms and light weapons. This is so because the belligerents involved – state security forces, insurgents, organisations, ethnic militias, warlords, death squads, and so on – are normally bared from access to major weapons systems and lack the training and logistical capacity to operate such systems.[46]
As singer states, there has been many improvements in manufacturing, such as the incorporation of plastics. This means that modern weapons, particularly assault rifles, are so light that small children can use them as easily and effectively as adults. They are no longer just man portable, but are child portable as well.[47] Most of theses weapons have been simplified in their use to the extent that they can be stripped, reassembled and, and fired by a child below the age of ten.[48] An example of this would be the Kalashnikov A. K – 47. These weapons are more deadly and have become very easy to use; they have also proliferated, to the extent that there is almost a glut on the market. There are an estimated five hundred million small arms on the global scene, one for every twelve persons on the planet.[49] The consequence, as Singer states, is that the primary weapons of war have also steeply fallen in price over the last few decades. This has made it easier for any willing organisation to obtain them and then turn children into soldiers.[50]
Poverty and the lack of social development
Where development succeeds, states become safer and are less likely to engage in violent intrastate conflicts. Social Development is more commonly know as desirable social progress within a society. It ensures well being of the whole population with the participation of others.
There are various factors that affect social development, such as disease and corruption in government to name but two. Others again define social development as a sustainable process of change in thinking and behavior which embraces all strata of society, the course of which determines the economic, political and social goals just as much as the ways and means of achieving them. When we use the term “social development in the context of our engagement, then we mean precisely this multidimensional process[51] Different ideologies also lead to different policy choices as to what should constitute the primary engine of development[52]
The desperate situation in which poverty stricken Liberia found herself, provided a huge pool of disgruntled and displaced children prior to and during the civil war. Singer states that these children constitute to the labor for the illegal economy, organized crime, and armed conflicts.[53] Poverty is a casual factor because armed conflicts lead to food shortages because they destroy a countries productive capacities and infrastructure. A lack of food or the destruction of productive resources often forces families to volunteer their children to either rebel or government forces as potential combatants.[54] Because both sides characteristically participate in looting of civilian populations, theses children may have the opportunity to reap the benefits for themselves and their families.[55] Armed factions are often motivated by greed and will avoid direct confrontations so that they can concentrate on the lucrative process of looting and undefended and unarmed victims. Children assume the role of bread winners, whether they volunteer or are coerced.[56] The HIV / AIDS pandemic were also contributing factors to social impediment during the Liberian Civil War.
Young men, who are considered psychologically more aggressive, naturally compete for social and material resources in all societies.[57] When outnumbering other generations, however, there are inevitably more losers than winners among the youth in this process.[58] Warlords find it easier to recruit when a large population of angry, listless young men fills the streets.[59]
Greed, Armed Forces that lack support and the changing nature of civil wars
In the majority of conflicts carried out in the developing world, warfare has become messier and criminalized. In many cases the private profit motive has become a central motivator, equal or greater to that of political, ideological or religious inspiration.[60] Actors and groups who lack popular support are the driving force behind the bloody civil wars that plagued Liberia in the early nineties. The reason for this is that the primary driving force behind Africa’s conflict is greed rather than grievance. Collier and Hoeffler define civil war as an internal conflict with at least 1,000 combat-related deaths per year.[61] In order to distinguish wars from massacres, both government forces and an identifiable rebel organization must suffer at least 5% of these casualties. Conflicts in Africa are best explained through an economic perspective. The ability to finance a rebellion for economic and material gain supersedes the argument that civil wars are influenced by colonialism, ethnic and religious differences. Collier and Hoeffler investigate the causes of civil wars from 1966 to 1999, by using a new data set of wars.[62] They examine 161 countries and identify 78 civil wars. These economic accounts explain rebellion in terms of opportunity, it is an undisputable fact that insurgencies cannot survive without a strong financial backing. The only way that these means are achievable is through the availability of natural resources, which are the driving force in the maintenance of the rebel organization, in the form of paying for military equipment to continue the fight against their opponents.[63]
Singer states that the fighting in a number of conflicts around the globe lacks any sort of link to a broader political or religious cause. They are driven by a simple logic of appropriation, from seizing mineral assets and protecting the drug trade, to simple looting and pillaging.[64] He goes on to say that, while many of these wars are fuelled by new conflict entrepreneurs and local warlords that emerged in the 1990’s in their individual countries, the broader end of the cold war also played a part in this shift.[65] When outside superpower patronage ceased, the calculus of many ideological guerilla groups, including those once motivated by Marxism, took a more market orientated dimension, they realized that their economies had to change. The new rule of insurgency, as Singer puts it, is that if conflict groups want to survive, they have to find their own financial resources.[66]
The notion that conflicts throughout Africa are generated by popular support for the rebel movement is flawed and inconsistent, Collier and Hoeffler found that another source of finance for which there is good case study evidence is Diasporas. They have found that Diasporas substantially increase the risk of conflict renewal, and it is hard to find an alternative explanation for this result.[67] In addition, the less educated the young men are in a society, the more likely they are to engage in a conflict. Indra de Soysa also argues that countries with an abundance of mineral wealth are more likely to suffer greed motivated rebellion. There is little evidence to suggest that scarcity of renewable resources is a significant predicator of armed conflict.[68] Mineral wealth plays a major role in the formation of conflict in Africa. In most cases it the rich resource economies that are in heavy conflict. It is abundance that stimulates conflict.
De Soysa tests the competing hypothesis of scarcity versus abundance as a cause of civil war. The first hypothesis that is tested sees conflict as a result of scarce resources and the second hypothesis sees conflict as a result of resources in abundance. De Soysa’s study proves that an abundance of resources is a major catalyst for violence, driven by the desire for loot.[69] De Soysa also gives a good analogy on the discourse of grievance or scarcity arguments. He explains as follows: “Two drunks may come to fisticuffs with each other because they were drunk, but if asked why they fought them are liable to justify their drunken behavior with explanations of grievance about why each of them fought, such as he struck me first. The true cause of conflict, drunkenness, is therefore masked by the discourse of grievance”.[70]
The discourse of grievance in real life or real world politics, whether along economic, ethnic or political lines masks underlying realities about where the origins of conflicts lie.[71] It is only about resources that are exploitable, resources that can be turned into finance. In this regard, greed is conceptualized as the ability to finance a rebellion.
According to De Soysa, poor countries stay poor and suffer armed conflict because resource scarcity acts to prevent socio – economic innovation… To deal with scarcity, a society needs ingenuity – but the very scarcities demanding social ingenuity act as constraints on innovation.[72] Societies are unable to progress because there is nothing to help them progress. This leads to frustration and bitterness and consequently leads to conflict. The idea that conflict is affected by scarcity through perpetuating underdevelopment is a novel one, De Soysa notes that this offers a more clearly testable model than most other analysis of environmental conflict, which tends to be explained through rather complex causual mechanisms.[73] Scarcity motivated rebellion is thus motivated by the availability of renewable resources. Whether or not the resources are in abundance or scarcity, the main motivation behind the conflict is material or economic gain.
De Soysa’s study finds that rapacity encouraged by an abundance of natural resources tends to fuel civil conflict. Paucity of natural resources, on the other hand does not seem to be such a strong factor in determining the likelihood of civil strife.[74] Incentives for profit seekers are provided by mineral resources, these results in the engagement of violence. Rebels are provided by resources and other profit seeking groups and individuals, their activities are sustained through the financial support that they receive. A classic example of the above mentioned arguments is the case of Liberia. William Reno gives a clear account on greed as a motivating factor. He states that Charles Taylor had access from exploitation of natural resources in cooperation with foreigners. Taylor’s income far exceeded the Monrovia enclave’s minimal command of resources and revenues after 1989. This domination of the local economy gave
Recruitment
The recruitment of child soldiers is embedded in two aspects; it is either voluntary or forced. While some child soldiers volunteered to join armed forces, others were forcefully recruited during the capturing of new territory. According to Tony Tate, some children joined particular forces to avenge violations committed against their family members. Conversely, some children joined those same forces that committed abuses and atrocities in their communities to offer protection to themselves and their families.[76] Those who were forcefully recruited were usually street children. Some joined because they didn’t know what to do and had no one to take care of them. Many joined for survival and because of the promises of the warring factions.[77] The inducements to join armed groups often included promises of more than just the basic needs for survival – food, clothing and protection in a dangerous world. The groups depended upon foraging and looting, and the children too were promised a part of the spoils.[78] Children were promised money and whatever they could loot – including houses, cars, clothes and food. This, in turn, encouraged children to abuse civilians in order to take their belongings.[79]
Singer cements the argument that children who are forcibly recruited are usually from special risk groups: street children, the rural poor, refugees, and others displaced. Theses are the most vulnerable to efficient recruiting sweeps. Those who enlist on their own are often from the very same groups, driven by poverty, propaganda and alienation.[80]
Alcinda Honwana claims that there is an intricate connection between voluntary and forced recruitment.[81] Although some young people volunteered for ideological reasons and were aware of the strategic objectives of the war they were waging, many were responding to the more immediate conditions that civil war had created in their communities.[82] However, it also seems that indirect yet coercive mechanisms were used to persuade young people to join the military. Intimidation and social pressure pushed some boys to join.[83]
The recruitment of children was correlated with a dehumanization process. Honwana states that the instruments used in the dehumanizing process of recruitment were that of terror and fear evoked by horrific acts of violence during military training. [84] Often new recruits were both agents and victims of such violence simultaneously. Boys in training received their weapons, not when they had learned simply how to use them, but when they demonstrated their willingness to kill. Singer also corroborates Hanwana’s claim by stating that, recruitment is rapidly followed by cruel but straight forward methods of training and conversion. Brutality and abuses of the worst kind underscore each stage, but these lie in part behind the overall program’s usual effectiveness. The main aim of the process is to forster a child’s dependency on an armed organization and inhibit escape.[85] People under the age of eighteen are deemed to be unable or have little ability to judge for themselves, therefore the issue of voluntary means or consent plays a major role in perceiving the atrocities of child recruitment.
The two aspects of voluntary and forceful recruitment contain more than what meets the eye. The social circumstances can lead the child astray to armed forces but greed itself also comes into play. The promise of money and cars can be very enticing, especially in a time of complete mayhem chaos, where hope is gone and there is no light shining at the end of the tunnel. Understanding why children volunteer to take up arms needs a clear understanding of each casual factor. Some may join because they need the A. K – 47 to protect themselves, while others are just plain trouble makers or are in search of food and shelter. Either way, it would be very difficult to hold the guilty accountable using the African view of defining child because the African view contends that childhood is not necessarily a stage of incompetence.
Roles and Duties of Child Soldiers
The roles and responsibilities of child soldiers within both the opposition and former government ranks were very similar. After completing often arduous training, sometimes for a few days, other times for a month of longer, most children were armed and many served on the front lines. They were often the first to be sent out to fight, occupying dangerous, forward positions.[86] They were also charged with manning road blocks and armed guard duty. Some children interviewed for this report spoke of their fear of death, the killing of other children in fighting, and of those they killed themselves. Others bragged about the killings, proud of their advancement to commander status for their ferocity. Children were also beaten and abused by their superiors and forced to witness abuse and killing.[87]
Lois Whitman also gives a clear account on the roles the child soldier played in the Liberian conflict. She states that children played many roles, ranging from carrying ammunition and cooking to serving at the front in major battles.[88] Other duties included running errands such as acting as spies, carrying out reconnaissance and acting as informants. They were also used as body guards, manning checkpoints, checking documents and packages.[89] Children were also responsible for carrying out ambushes and serving as executioners of suspected enemies. Some children were assigned to individual commanders as bodyguards and personal assistants. In general, younger children served as helpers while older ones fought, but there were exceptions—some boys and girls as young as nine and ten years old bore arms.[90] The intensity of combat might also determine what role a child played, carrying goods one day and needed for the fighting the next. Finally, children spent some of their time stealing from civilians in part because they were either never paid or paid infrequently.[91]
Female Soldiers
The question "Where are the girls?" is seldom raised in discussions about children in armed forces and armed opposition groups, both as combatants and noncombatants.[92] Just as the use of child soldiers had been a largely invisible and unacknowledged international phenomenon, scant attention has been given to girls in armed forces and armed opposition groups, their distinct experiences, the impacts, and gender-specific human rights violations.[93] With the exception of some data compiled by the International Coalition, the majority of reports, international campaigns, and initiatives continue to use the generic term "child soldiers" or "children," almost always meaning boys, and do not identify differential impacts for boys and girls before, during, or after armed conflicts.[94]
Girls served with all three groups in the war as both fighters and helpers although in lesser numbers than boys.[95] Liberian nongovernmental organization employees who work with children believe that more girls were used in the last four years of warfare than in years past but that their exact numbers are unknown.[96] Typically older girls and young women were fighters who served in separate units, while younger girls served as cooks, domestics, porters and cleaners. However, there were cases where young girls fought as well. Some girls were attached to units for short periods and escaped or were released, while others fought for years with the groups.[97]
In addition to the many abuses committed against child soldiers, girls were routinely raped and sexually assaulted. Many were raped at the time of recruitment and continued to be sexually abused during their time with the forces.[98] Collectively known as “wives” whether or not they were attached to a soldier, young girls were often assigned to commanders and provided domestic services to them.[99] Older girls and young women were particularly fierce fighters, commanding respect from their male peers. Some of these women were able to eventually protect themselves from sexual assault but would capture other girls to provide sexual services to boys and men.[100]One of the more severe cases, the plight of Clementine is nevertheless shared by the thousands of girls and women who are survivors of brutal rape and sexual assault by the fighting forces.[101]
Conclusion
The role of the child soldier in the Liberian civil war was examined in this essay. Casual factors such as poverty, greed, the changing nature of civil wars and the high availability of light weapons and small arms were assessed. Two arguments were proposed, the first argument was that conventional definitions contend that child soldiers are combatants or military recruits under the age 18. The Geneva Convention upholds this age qualification, so does the United Nations General Assembly and the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court. The second argument which was the opposing argument stated that the definition of childhood in African cultures has little to do with age, although people sometimes refer to age limits. Rather, the positions of children are defined through social roles, expectations and responsibilities.
The first argument perceived childhood as a matter of age and incompetence, this view can be regarded as inconsistent, in the sense that the definition of childhood cannot be universalized. Individuals who have not suffered under some of the atrocious conditions faced by many African children cannot claim that they are the same as those who are privileged. Singer states that it is important to note that, when growing up in a war zone, children will often experience an essential militarization of their daily life.[102] The prominence of innocence as one of the primary markers childhood is distinctly modern. An understanding of children as sinful beings in need of discipline has been a dominant force in European thought.[103] Eric Greitens states that the reason why this seems preposterous to us today, is because the Romantic Movement fundamentally altered Western perceptions of childhood. Childhood nowadays, is often understood as a time of innocence, purity and naturalness, and is frequently juxtaposed against a view of adulthood as a process, not only of maturation, but also of engagement with a corrupt society.[104] The threat of death becomes a normal occurrence and their regular experiences will be shaped by the omnipresence of combatants around them. It is in this “amoral vacuum” that groups seeking child soldiers offer a voice that can appeal to lost children.[105] In this sense, children are defined by their societies. In some societies, children are required to grow up early and become head of house holds at a very young age.
Most of the literature has claimed that child soldiers joined armed factions voluntarily, because of social pressures, the promise of material gain and the need for protection in a war – zone.
This essay has also tried to give a clear graphic description of the child soldier. The paper has tried to explain why universalizing childhood is a form of unrealistic utopian thinking, by examining the two different world views on the concept of childhood. The use of female soldiers in has also been examined, which is also a prevalent problem because women are subject to some of the most shocking conditions in the military. Issues such as re – integration and demobilisation have been left out because the main purpose of this essay was to examine the role of the child soldier in an African conflict and identify the underlying causes of why children are recruited. The questions proposed in the introduction have been answered based on the literature available on the subject.
References:
1.) Eric Greitens, The treatment of children During conflict in Frances Stewart, Valpy Fitzgerald and Associates (eds.), War and Underdevelopment Volume 1 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001].p. 154
2.) P. W Singer, Children at war, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005.
3.) Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004
4.) Susan McKay, Girls in militaries, Paramilitaries and armed opposition groups
5.) Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
6.) Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia,
7.) William Reno, Liberia and Sierra Leone: The Competition for patronage in resource rich economies
8.) Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and David M Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,2000):113
9.) Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War
10.) Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich, Why do children “fight”? Explaining the rise of child soldiers
11.) Shraeder, Peter.J, African politics and society (Bedford / St. Martin, Boston, 2000),
12.) http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/0,,contentMDK:20692151~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:244363,00.html
13.) Jeffery Boutwell and Michael. T Klare, Light weapons and civil conflict: Controlling the tools of Violence, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999
14.) T. W Bennet, using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African Tradition? Institute for Security Studies, 1998
15.) Light weapons and small arms OAU report, 1999
[1] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[2] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[3] ibid
[4] ibid
[5] ibid
[6] ibid
[7] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[8] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[9] ibid
[10] ibid
[11] ibid
[12] ibid
[13] ibid
[14] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[15] ibid
[16] ibid
[17] ibid
[18] ibid
[19] ibid
[20] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[21] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[22] ibid
[23] ibid
[24] ibid
[25] ibid
[26] Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006
[27] Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006
[28] ibid
[29] ibid
[30] ibid
[31] ibid
[32] T. W Bennet, using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African Tradition? Institute for Security Studies, 1998.
[33] T. W Bennet, using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African Tradition? Institute for Security Studies, 1998.
[34] ibid
[35] ibid
[36] ibid
[37] ibid
[38] T. W Bennet, using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African Tradition? Institute for Security Studies,
[39] Ibid.
[40] ibid
[41] ibid
[42] Light weapons and small arms OAU report
[43] P. W Singer, children at war, New York, Pantheon books, 2005
[44] ibid
[45] Jeffery Boutwell and Michael. T Klare, Light weapons and civil conflict: Controlling the tools of Violence, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999
[46] Jeffery Boutwell and Michael. T Klare, Light weapons and civil conflict: Controlling the tools of Violence, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999
[47] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[48] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[49] ibid
[50] ibid
[51] http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/0,,contentMDK:20692151~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:244363,00.html
[52] Shraeder, Peter.J, African politics and society (Bedford / St. Martin, Boston, 2000), p. 175.
[53] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[54] Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich, Why do children “fight”? Explaining the rise of child soldiers
[55] ibid
[56] ibid
[57] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[58] ibid
[59] ibid
[60] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon books, 2005
[61] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War
[62] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War
[63] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War
[64] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon books, 2005
[65] ibid
[66] ibid
[67] Ibid.
[68] Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and David M Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,2000):113
[69] Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and David M Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,2000):113
[70] Ibid.p.115
[71] Ibid.p.116
[72] Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and
[73] Ibid. p. 118
[74] Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and
[75] William Reno, Liberia and Sierra Leone: The Competition for patronage in resource rich economies
[76] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights watch. Vol 16, No 2. New York. 2004
[77] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[78] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[79] ibid
[80] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[81] Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006
[82] ibid
[83] ibid
[84] ibid
[85] PW Singer 2005 How Children Are recruited into War in Children at War New York: Pantheon Books
[86] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.
[87] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.
[88] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[89] ibid
[90] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.
[91] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.
[92] Susan McKay, Girls in militaries, Paramilitaries and armed opposition groups
[93] ibid
[94] ibid
[95] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.
[96] ibid
[97] ibid
[98] ibid
[99] ibid
[100] ibid
[101] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004
[102] P. W Singer, Children at war, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005.
[103] Eric Greitens, The treatment of children During conflict in Frances Stewart, Valpy Fitzgerald and Associates (eds.), War and Underdevelopment Volume 1 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001].p. 154
[104] Eric Greitens, The treatment of children During conflict in Frances Stewart, Valpy Fitzgerald and Associates (eds.), War and Underdevelopment Volume 1 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001].p. 154
[105] P. W Singer, Children at war, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005.
The use of child soldiers in armed conflict has met much international criticism and condemnation across the globe. The use of child soldiers, particularly in Africa, has received much attention from many individuals, scholars and academics that have made attempts to shed some light and enlighten on this critical, emotional and morally complex issue.
When examining the role of the child soldier in the Liberian civil war, one must take into account the causal factors that play a major role in understanding the relationship between children and warfare in Africa. The causal factors that need to be taken into account when examining why the use of child soldiers was so prevalent in the Liberian conflict, are that of poverty, greed and the changing nature of wars and light weaponry that was used by children as young as twelve years old. The purpose of this essay is to identify the role that the child soldier played in the conflict; by role we mean the activities and actions required or expected of a person in a group. In order to identify that particular role and responsibility required of a child soldier, causal factors need to be taken into consideration. The use of child soldiers has inspired the emergence of important and interesting questions such as: What is a child and what is a child soldier? Why do some children decide or volunteer to become child soldiers? Why do rebel movements and organizations abduct and recruit child soldiers? And how are they recruited?
The traditional African and the European social and cultural perceptions of Childhood play a major role in helping one understand the definition of childhood. This essay will look at the two world views and will aim to criticize and digest the relevant literature and ultimately give a logical and consistent definition of child soldiers and childhood. The literature written by authors knowledgeable on the subject, such as Alcinda Honwana’s Child Soldiers in Africa and T. W Bennet’s Using Children in Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African Tradition? The above mentioned books will help discuss the arguments of how we define a child soldier. One argument is that conventional definitions contend that child soldiers are combatants or military recruits under the age 18. The Geneva Convention upholds this age qualification, so does the United Nations General Assembly and the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court. Alternatively, the opposing argument is that the definition of childhood in African cultures has little to do with age, although people sometimes refer to age limits. Rather, the positions of children are defined through social roles, expectations and responsibilities.
The literature on the subject provides interesting and helpful information on defining the child soldier but tends to be repetitive on other issues such as recruitment and the role child soldiers play within the military movement. However, information on casual factors and the treatment of female soldiers in conflict is much to be admired. The only problem is that one cannot pin point exactly where the root cause of why the use of child soldiers is so prevalent in Africa. Therefore, in order for one to try and have a clear understanding, the essay will begin by presenting the definition of the term child soldier. Additionally, this essay will provide examples and cases from the Liberian civil war from 1989 to 2003.
Background on the Liberian Civil War
From December 1989 to 2003, Liberia had been devastated by a civil war that has killed tens of thousands of Liberians and caused an estimated one-third of its population to flee the country as refugees.[1] The war had been marked by mass killings along ethnic lines and horrifying atrocities. Indeed, a characteristic of the Liberian civil war was that civilians suffered the most, they were deliberately targeted by all the warring factions often because of their ethnicity and that as a consequence far more civilians than combatants were killed.[2] The lack of protection and respect for the lives of civilians by all sides and the profound distrust among the warring factions were obstacles in achieving peace.[3] The roots of Liberia's civil war go far back in Liberian history. However, the immediate precursor dates from 1985: after President Samuel Doe, an ethnic Krahn who came to power in a 1980 coup, stole the presidential elections, he brutally suppressed a coup attempt led by Thomas Qwiwonkpa, an ethnic Gio. Doe's soldiers, the Krahn-dominated AFL, engaged in bloody reprisals against real and suspected opponents and their home communities as well targeting mostly Gios and Manos; hundreds were killed and hundreds more were detained without charge or trial.[4] This violence and the subsequent repression set the stage for the country's ethnic conflict and civil war.
On December 24, 1989, Charles Taylor and his NPFL launched an incursion from the Ivory Coast into Nimba County.[5] The AFL responded with a ruthless counterinsurgency campaign, indiscriminately killing civilians, burning villages, raping women and looting.[6] The brutality served to swell the ranks of NPFL recruits, many of whom were Gio and Mano boys orphaned by the fighting and the random and reprisal killings that accompanied it, or enraged by the AFL's conduct. The AFL went on the rampage outside Nimba as well. In one of the most egregious abuses of the war, on the night of July 29-30, 1990, AFL soldiers massacred some 600 people mostly Gios and Manos, many of them women with children who had taken refuge at St. Peter's Church in Monrovia.[7] Civilians also suffered at the hands of the NPFL. The NPFL targeted suspected supporters of the Doe regime, particularly members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups. Throughout NPFL territory, civilians suffered the capricious actions of an occupying army, arbitrary arrest, physical abuse, confiscation and destruction of property and restrictions on freedom of movement and freedom of expression.[8]
In August 1990, without any prospect for intervention by the United Nations or the United States, a peacekeeping force under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ecowas) arrived in Monrovia to separate the warring factions and to stop the bloodshed.[9] The role assigned to the force, known as the Economic Community Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), was to impose a cease-fire and to help form an interim government that would hold elections within twelve months.[10] With NPFL attacks continuing, there was no peace to keep, and ECOMOG itself engaged in combat to push the NPFL out of Monrovia. This situation was aggravated in October 1992, when the NPFL attacked Monrovia.[11] ECOMOG then accepted the assistance of other Liberian factions in fighting the NPFL, and in so doing dropped much of its appearance of neutrality. The human rights records of these factions ULIMO and the AFL ranged from suspect to abysmal.[12] The AFL was thoroughly discredited by its horrific abuses during the 1980s and especially during the war in 1990, when it massacred civilians and devastated Monrovia.[13]
ULIMO is an offshoot of the AFL, and its conduct in the areas it captured in 1992 included extensive human rights abuses.[14] Because of its conduct in the conflict, questions have been raised about ECOMOG's commitment to human rights and its ability to act as a neutral arbiter of the conflict.[15] The chief warring factions currently involved in the conflict are Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which controls about 60 percent of the country; and the United Liberian Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), made up primarily of soldiers from former President Samuel K. Doe's army, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), which controls at least two western counties.[16] ULIMO split along ethnic lines, pitting Krahns against Mandingos, causing serious casualties. Since late 1993, the NPFL had also been challenged by the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), a new armed faction made up largely of former AFL soldiers, most of whom are members of the Krahn ethnic group.[17] The LPC claims to control significant territory in the southeast. The remaining troops of the Armed Forces of Liberia do not control territory per se, but are armed and deployed around Monrovia. In addition, the Lofa Defense Force (LDF) is fighting ULIMO in Lofa County. In June 1993, in one of the worst atrocities to be documented during the war, 547 civilians, mostly women and children, were massacred in a displaced persons camp outside of Harbel.[18]
The victims were shot, beaten or hacked to death. A United Nations investigation concluded that the massacre had been carried out by the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). U.N. Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali condemned the Harbel massacre, and a new round of peace talks was initiated. The U.N. joined with ecowas and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to sponsor peace negotiations in Geneva that included representatives of all factions.[19] On July 25, 1993, a peace agreement was signed in Cotonou, Benin, by the NPFL, ULIMO, and the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU).[20] The peace accord stipulated that concomitant with disarmament, a five-person Council of State elected by all the factions would take power from the interim government until elections were held.[21] A thirty-five-member transitional parliament would include thirteen members from the NPFL and the interim government, and nine from ULIMO.[22] Between August 1993 and February 1994, political wrangling prevented the lntg from being seated. In February 1994, it was agreed that David Kpomakpor, a lawyer representing IGNU, would chair the lntg; with Dexter Tahyor of ULIMO, and Issac Mussah of the NPFL as vice chairs.[23]
Finally, in mid-May, Dorothy Musuleng Cooper was named Foreign Minister. An important element of the plan involved the creation of a U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to help supervise and monitor the agreement, in conjunction with ECOMOG.[24] The plan also provided for an expanded ECOMOG force, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to be composed of African troops from outside the West African region. By early 1994, some 800 Tanzanians were deployed in Kakata, and 900 Ugandans were in Buchanan.[25]
Defining the Child Soldier and Childhood
As Honwana claims, the term child soldier is an oxymoron that signifies the violence that this position does to establish.[26] A clarification of the specific meaning of the term soldier in theses civil wars, especially when preceded by the term child is necessary.[27] The soldier in theses contexts was often not a regular soldier of the sort who serves in state – sponsored, centrally controlled, and well – disciplined armed forces. Rather, the term refers to the type of fighter who often fills the ranks of guerrilla and rebel groups, inadequately trained and outfitted, often operating under the influence of drugs. Such soldiers harass loot and kill defenceless civilians indiscriminately.[28] The child soldier is characterized by its intrinsic aspect, minor, someone who needs to be looked after and nurtured in the right way, which explains the reckless behaviour once the guardian and the values have been removed and the status of soldier is given to the child. The child soldier is therefore considered to have an undeveloped sense of morality which is worsened by the horrid values indoctrinated by wicked warlords.
According to Honwana, the boundaries between adulthood and childhood in African societies have traditionally been more fluid than in European societies.[29] Of necessity children are actively involved in economic activities. The transition to adulthood is gradual, variable, and responsive to the particular situations of young people, their families and communities. Universalizing definitions are not applicable in many African conditions.[30] The problems that are facing the African continent, particularly poverty stricken Liberia indicate that what is considered a child or childhood behaviour in Liberia will not necessarily be considered childhood behaviour in England. There are cases of fourteen year old bread winners in African house holds, while that situation in European states is almost non existent. Unlike the western view point, childhood in the African context is not necessarily a stage of incompetence.[31]
It is an undisputable fact that there are more children participating as combatants today than there was in the past. The question posed by Bennet of did or did not African traditions involve children being conscripted into military service?[32] Provides one with a stepping stone in ensuring a clear and logical understanding of whether child conscription was as prevalent in the past as it is today. Many of those currently bearing arms in Africa are ten years old and some are even younger.[33] Were children as young as this conscripted in the pre – colonial age set? Bennet answers this question by claiming that we first need to understand what is meant by child. Children were never conscripted into the military service in African societies.[34] They were not recruited into regiments, nor did they bear arms, men were drafted into regiments three or four years after puberty.[35] The warrior was a mature and able bodied man. Armies needed men who could fight more effectively.[36] An example of this would be the Zulu society in the pre – colonial period during the peak of their military prowess. Children played non – military roles in society, before and even during puberty. Marriage was delayed because men had to participate in combat, which created a generation gap within the Zulu society.
The African traditional rules for regulating attainment of childhood have been transformed as a result of the socio – economic changes that came in the wake of colonialism.[37] Throughout Africa, urbanisation has fragmented extended families. Breakdown of the family has in turn, resulted in an ever increasing number of illegitimate births, runaway children and single parent families.[38] Every society withholds some, if not all, powers and responsibilities from the young until they behave in a mature and fully rational manner.[39] Bennet claims that in literate societies, adulthood is usually ascribed to individuals when they reach certain predetermined ages.[40] The transition from childhood is therefore fixed at an age when it is presumed that individuals will be capable of conducting themselves as adults. In preliterate societies on the other hand, where it is not possible to keep exact records, movement from one category to another is related to physical processes such as puberty and to social events such as initiation.[41]
Casual Factors
An abundance of light weapons and small arms
The wide availability, accumulation and proliferation of light weapons and small escalates conflicts, undermines peace agreements, intensifies violence, impacts on crime in a negative way, impedes economic and social development and hinder the development of social stability democracy and good governance.[42] The large supply of small arms and light weapons turn the children into soldiers as they are easy to carry and are able to be used effectively. Contemporary warfare is indeed shaped by least costly and simple weapons. These small arms and light weapons include rifles, grenades, light machine guns, light mortars, land mines, and other weapons that are “man portable”.[43] Even though they represent less than two percent of the entire global arms trade in terms of cost, small arms are perhaps the most deadly of all weapons to society. They are weapons most often used in battle and in attacks on civilians and have produced almost ninety percent of casualties in recent wars.[44]
Although no two conflicts are ever exactly alike, it can be said that the wars of the post cold war have generally taken a particular form: one in which the forces involved are predominantly of a paramilitary or irregular nature and the fighting is largely confined to the national territory of the state in question.[45] The conflicts that fit this pattern have for the most part, entailed a struggle over the ethnic composition of a disputed area or the possession of valuable resources. Such conflicts by their very nature tend to be conducted primarily with small arms and light weapons. This is so because the belligerents involved – state security forces, insurgents, organisations, ethnic militias, warlords, death squads, and so on – are normally bared from access to major weapons systems and lack the training and logistical capacity to operate such systems.[46]
As singer states, there has been many improvements in manufacturing, such as the incorporation of plastics. This means that modern weapons, particularly assault rifles, are so light that small children can use them as easily and effectively as adults. They are no longer just man portable, but are child portable as well.[47] Most of theses weapons have been simplified in their use to the extent that they can be stripped, reassembled and, and fired by a child below the age of ten.[48] An example of this would be the Kalashnikov A. K – 47. These weapons are more deadly and have become very easy to use; they have also proliferated, to the extent that there is almost a glut on the market. There are an estimated five hundred million small arms on the global scene, one for every twelve persons on the planet.[49] The consequence, as Singer states, is that the primary weapons of war have also steeply fallen in price over the last few decades. This has made it easier for any willing organisation to obtain them and then turn children into soldiers.[50]
Poverty and the lack of social development
Where development succeeds, states become safer and are less likely to engage in violent intrastate conflicts. Social Development is more commonly know as desirable social progress within a society. It ensures well being of the whole population with the participation of others.
There are various factors that affect social development, such as disease and corruption in government to name but two. Others again define social development as a sustainable process of change in thinking and behavior which embraces all strata of society, the course of which determines the economic, political and social goals just as much as the ways and means of achieving them. When we use the term “social development in the context of our engagement, then we mean precisely this multidimensional process[51] Different ideologies also lead to different policy choices as to what should constitute the primary engine of development[52]
The desperate situation in which poverty stricken Liberia found herself, provided a huge pool of disgruntled and displaced children prior to and during the civil war. Singer states that these children constitute to the labor for the illegal economy, organized crime, and armed conflicts.[53] Poverty is a casual factor because armed conflicts lead to food shortages because they destroy a countries productive capacities and infrastructure. A lack of food or the destruction of productive resources often forces families to volunteer their children to either rebel or government forces as potential combatants.[54] Because both sides characteristically participate in looting of civilian populations, theses children may have the opportunity to reap the benefits for themselves and their families.[55] Armed factions are often motivated by greed and will avoid direct confrontations so that they can concentrate on the lucrative process of looting and undefended and unarmed victims. Children assume the role of bread winners, whether they volunteer or are coerced.[56] The HIV / AIDS pandemic were also contributing factors to social impediment during the Liberian Civil War.
Young men, who are considered psychologically more aggressive, naturally compete for social and material resources in all societies.[57] When outnumbering other generations, however, there are inevitably more losers than winners among the youth in this process.[58] Warlords find it easier to recruit when a large population of angry, listless young men fills the streets.[59]
Greed, Armed Forces that lack support and the changing nature of civil wars
In the majority of conflicts carried out in the developing world, warfare has become messier and criminalized. In many cases the private profit motive has become a central motivator, equal or greater to that of political, ideological or religious inspiration.[60] Actors and groups who lack popular support are the driving force behind the bloody civil wars that plagued Liberia in the early nineties. The reason for this is that the primary driving force behind Africa’s conflict is greed rather than grievance. Collier and Hoeffler define civil war as an internal conflict with at least 1,000 combat-related deaths per year.[61] In order to distinguish wars from massacres, both government forces and an identifiable rebel organization must suffer at least 5% of these casualties. Conflicts in Africa are best explained through an economic perspective. The ability to finance a rebellion for economic and material gain supersedes the argument that civil wars are influenced by colonialism, ethnic and religious differences. Collier and Hoeffler investigate the causes of civil wars from 1966 to 1999, by using a new data set of wars.[62] They examine 161 countries and identify 78 civil wars. These economic accounts explain rebellion in terms of opportunity, it is an undisputable fact that insurgencies cannot survive without a strong financial backing. The only way that these means are achievable is through the availability of natural resources, which are the driving force in the maintenance of the rebel organization, in the form of paying for military equipment to continue the fight against their opponents.[63]
Singer states that the fighting in a number of conflicts around the globe lacks any sort of link to a broader political or religious cause. They are driven by a simple logic of appropriation, from seizing mineral assets and protecting the drug trade, to simple looting and pillaging.[64] He goes on to say that, while many of these wars are fuelled by new conflict entrepreneurs and local warlords that emerged in the 1990’s in their individual countries, the broader end of the cold war also played a part in this shift.[65] When outside superpower patronage ceased, the calculus of many ideological guerilla groups, including those once motivated by Marxism, took a more market orientated dimension, they realized that their economies had to change. The new rule of insurgency, as Singer puts it, is that if conflict groups want to survive, they have to find their own financial resources.[66]
The notion that conflicts throughout Africa are generated by popular support for the rebel movement is flawed and inconsistent, Collier and Hoeffler found that another source of finance for which there is good case study evidence is Diasporas. They have found that Diasporas substantially increase the risk of conflict renewal, and it is hard to find an alternative explanation for this result.[67] In addition, the less educated the young men are in a society, the more likely they are to engage in a conflict. Indra de Soysa also argues that countries with an abundance of mineral wealth are more likely to suffer greed motivated rebellion. There is little evidence to suggest that scarcity of renewable resources is a significant predicator of armed conflict.[68] Mineral wealth plays a major role in the formation of conflict in Africa. In most cases it the rich resource economies that are in heavy conflict. It is abundance that stimulates conflict.
De Soysa tests the competing hypothesis of scarcity versus abundance as a cause of civil war. The first hypothesis that is tested sees conflict as a result of scarce resources and the second hypothesis sees conflict as a result of resources in abundance. De Soysa’s study proves that an abundance of resources is a major catalyst for violence, driven by the desire for loot.[69] De Soysa also gives a good analogy on the discourse of grievance or scarcity arguments. He explains as follows: “Two drunks may come to fisticuffs with each other because they were drunk, but if asked why they fought them are liable to justify their drunken behavior with explanations of grievance about why each of them fought, such as he struck me first. The true cause of conflict, drunkenness, is therefore masked by the discourse of grievance”.[70]
The discourse of grievance in real life or real world politics, whether along economic, ethnic or political lines masks underlying realities about where the origins of conflicts lie.[71] It is only about resources that are exploitable, resources that can be turned into finance. In this regard, greed is conceptualized as the ability to finance a rebellion.
According to De Soysa, poor countries stay poor and suffer armed conflict because resource scarcity acts to prevent socio – economic innovation… To deal with scarcity, a society needs ingenuity – but the very scarcities demanding social ingenuity act as constraints on innovation.[72] Societies are unable to progress because there is nothing to help them progress. This leads to frustration and bitterness and consequently leads to conflict. The idea that conflict is affected by scarcity through perpetuating underdevelopment is a novel one, De Soysa notes that this offers a more clearly testable model than most other analysis of environmental conflict, which tends to be explained through rather complex causual mechanisms.[73] Scarcity motivated rebellion is thus motivated by the availability of renewable resources. Whether or not the resources are in abundance or scarcity, the main motivation behind the conflict is material or economic gain.
De Soysa’s study finds that rapacity encouraged by an abundance of natural resources tends to fuel civil conflict. Paucity of natural resources, on the other hand does not seem to be such a strong factor in determining the likelihood of civil strife.[74] Incentives for profit seekers are provided by mineral resources, these results in the engagement of violence. Rebels are provided by resources and other profit seeking groups and individuals, their activities are sustained through the financial support that they receive. A classic example of the above mentioned arguments is the case of Liberia. William Reno gives a clear account on greed as a motivating factor. He states that Charles Taylor had access from exploitation of natural resources in cooperation with foreigners. Taylor’s income far exceeded the Monrovia enclave’s minimal command of resources and revenues after 1989. This domination of the local economy gave
Recruitment
The recruitment of child soldiers is embedded in two aspects; it is either voluntary or forced. While some child soldiers volunteered to join armed forces, others were forcefully recruited during the capturing of new territory. According to Tony Tate, some children joined particular forces to avenge violations committed against their family members. Conversely, some children joined those same forces that committed abuses and atrocities in their communities to offer protection to themselves and their families.[76] Those who were forcefully recruited were usually street children. Some joined because they didn’t know what to do and had no one to take care of them. Many joined for survival and because of the promises of the warring factions.[77] The inducements to join armed groups often included promises of more than just the basic needs for survival – food, clothing and protection in a dangerous world. The groups depended upon foraging and looting, and the children too were promised a part of the spoils.[78] Children were promised money and whatever they could loot – including houses, cars, clothes and food. This, in turn, encouraged children to abuse civilians in order to take their belongings.[79]
Singer cements the argument that children who are forcibly recruited are usually from special risk groups: street children, the rural poor, refugees, and others displaced. Theses are the most vulnerable to efficient recruiting sweeps. Those who enlist on their own are often from the very same groups, driven by poverty, propaganda and alienation.[80]
Alcinda Honwana claims that there is an intricate connection between voluntary and forced recruitment.[81] Although some young people volunteered for ideological reasons and were aware of the strategic objectives of the war they were waging, many were responding to the more immediate conditions that civil war had created in their communities.[82] However, it also seems that indirect yet coercive mechanisms were used to persuade young people to join the military. Intimidation and social pressure pushed some boys to join.[83]
The recruitment of children was correlated with a dehumanization process. Honwana states that the instruments used in the dehumanizing process of recruitment were that of terror and fear evoked by horrific acts of violence during military training. [84] Often new recruits were both agents and victims of such violence simultaneously. Boys in training received their weapons, not when they had learned simply how to use them, but when they demonstrated their willingness to kill. Singer also corroborates Hanwana’s claim by stating that, recruitment is rapidly followed by cruel but straight forward methods of training and conversion. Brutality and abuses of the worst kind underscore each stage, but these lie in part behind the overall program’s usual effectiveness. The main aim of the process is to forster a child’s dependency on an armed organization and inhibit escape.[85] People under the age of eighteen are deemed to be unable or have little ability to judge for themselves, therefore the issue of voluntary means or consent plays a major role in perceiving the atrocities of child recruitment.
The two aspects of voluntary and forceful recruitment contain more than what meets the eye. The social circumstances can lead the child astray to armed forces but greed itself also comes into play. The promise of money and cars can be very enticing, especially in a time of complete mayhem chaos, where hope is gone and there is no light shining at the end of the tunnel. Understanding why children volunteer to take up arms needs a clear understanding of each casual factor. Some may join because they need the A. K – 47 to protect themselves, while others are just plain trouble makers or are in search of food and shelter. Either way, it would be very difficult to hold the guilty accountable using the African view of defining child because the African view contends that childhood is not necessarily a stage of incompetence.
Roles and Duties of Child Soldiers
The roles and responsibilities of child soldiers within both the opposition and former government ranks were very similar. After completing often arduous training, sometimes for a few days, other times for a month of longer, most children were armed and many served on the front lines. They were often the first to be sent out to fight, occupying dangerous, forward positions.[86] They were also charged with manning road blocks and armed guard duty. Some children interviewed for this report spoke of their fear of death, the killing of other children in fighting, and of those they killed themselves. Others bragged about the killings, proud of their advancement to commander status for their ferocity. Children were also beaten and abused by their superiors and forced to witness abuse and killing.[87]
Lois Whitman also gives a clear account on the roles the child soldier played in the Liberian conflict. She states that children played many roles, ranging from carrying ammunition and cooking to serving at the front in major battles.[88] Other duties included running errands such as acting as spies, carrying out reconnaissance and acting as informants. They were also used as body guards, manning checkpoints, checking documents and packages.[89] Children were also responsible for carrying out ambushes and serving as executioners of suspected enemies. Some children were assigned to individual commanders as bodyguards and personal assistants. In general, younger children served as helpers while older ones fought, but there were exceptions—some boys and girls as young as nine and ten years old bore arms.[90] The intensity of combat might also determine what role a child played, carrying goods one day and needed for the fighting the next. Finally, children spent some of their time stealing from civilians in part because they were either never paid or paid infrequently.[91]
Female Soldiers
The question "Where are the girls?" is seldom raised in discussions about children in armed forces and armed opposition groups, both as combatants and noncombatants.[92] Just as the use of child soldiers had been a largely invisible and unacknowledged international phenomenon, scant attention has been given to girls in armed forces and armed opposition groups, their distinct experiences, the impacts, and gender-specific human rights violations.[93] With the exception of some data compiled by the International Coalition, the majority of reports, international campaigns, and initiatives continue to use the generic term "child soldiers" or "children," almost always meaning boys, and do not identify differential impacts for boys and girls before, during, or after armed conflicts.[94]
Girls served with all three groups in the war as both fighters and helpers although in lesser numbers than boys.[95] Liberian nongovernmental organization employees who work with children believe that more girls were used in the last four years of warfare than in years past but that their exact numbers are unknown.[96] Typically older girls and young women were fighters who served in separate units, while younger girls served as cooks, domestics, porters and cleaners. However, there were cases where young girls fought as well. Some girls were attached to units for short periods and escaped or were released, while others fought for years with the groups.[97]
In addition to the many abuses committed against child soldiers, girls were routinely raped and sexually assaulted. Many were raped at the time of recruitment and continued to be sexually abused during their time with the forces.[98] Collectively known as “wives” whether or not they were attached to a soldier, young girls were often assigned to commanders and provided domestic services to them.[99] Older girls and young women were particularly fierce fighters, commanding respect from their male peers. Some of these women were able to eventually protect themselves from sexual assault but would capture other girls to provide sexual services to boys and men.[100]One of the more severe cases, the plight of Clementine is nevertheless shared by the thousands of girls and women who are survivors of brutal rape and sexual assault by the fighting forces.[101]
Conclusion
The role of the child soldier in the Liberian civil war was examined in this essay. Casual factors such as poverty, greed, the changing nature of civil wars and the high availability of light weapons and small arms were assessed. Two arguments were proposed, the first argument was that conventional definitions contend that child soldiers are combatants or military recruits under the age 18. The Geneva Convention upholds this age qualification, so does the United Nations General Assembly and the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court. The second argument which was the opposing argument stated that the definition of childhood in African cultures has little to do with age, although people sometimes refer to age limits. Rather, the positions of children are defined through social roles, expectations and responsibilities.
The first argument perceived childhood as a matter of age and incompetence, this view can be regarded as inconsistent, in the sense that the definition of childhood cannot be universalized. Individuals who have not suffered under some of the atrocious conditions faced by many African children cannot claim that they are the same as those who are privileged. Singer states that it is important to note that, when growing up in a war zone, children will often experience an essential militarization of their daily life.[102] The prominence of innocence as one of the primary markers childhood is distinctly modern. An understanding of children as sinful beings in need of discipline has been a dominant force in European thought.[103] Eric Greitens states that the reason why this seems preposterous to us today, is because the Romantic Movement fundamentally altered Western perceptions of childhood. Childhood nowadays, is often understood as a time of innocence, purity and naturalness, and is frequently juxtaposed against a view of adulthood as a process, not only of maturation, but also of engagement with a corrupt society.[104] The threat of death becomes a normal occurrence and their regular experiences will be shaped by the omnipresence of combatants around them. It is in this “amoral vacuum” that groups seeking child soldiers offer a voice that can appeal to lost children.[105] In this sense, children are defined by their societies. In some societies, children are required to grow up early and become head of house holds at a very young age.
Most of the literature has claimed that child soldiers joined armed factions voluntarily, because of social pressures, the promise of material gain and the need for protection in a war – zone.
This essay has also tried to give a clear graphic description of the child soldier. The paper has tried to explain why universalizing childhood is a form of unrealistic utopian thinking, by examining the two different world views on the concept of childhood. The use of female soldiers in has also been examined, which is also a prevalent problem because women are subject to some of the most shocking conditions in the military. Issues such as re – integration and demobilisation have been left out because the main purpose of this essay was to examine the role of the child soldier in an African conflict and identify the underlying causes of why children are recruited. The questions proposed in the introduction have been answered based on the literature available on the subject.
References:
1.) Eric Greitens, The treatment of children During conflict in Frances Stewart, Valpy Fitzgerald and Associates (eds.), War and Underdevelopment Volume 1 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001].p. 154
2.) P. W Singer, Children at war, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005.
3.) Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004
4.) Susan McKay, Girls in militaries, Paramilitaries and armed opposition groups
5.) Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
6.) Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia,
7.) William Reno, Liberia and Sierra Leone: The Competition for patronage in resource rich economies
8.) Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and David M Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,2000):113
9.) Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War
10.) Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich, Why do children “fight”? Explaining the rise of child soldiers
11.) Shraeder, Peter.J, African politics and society (Bedford / St. Martin, Boston, 2000),
12.) http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/0,,contentMDK:20692151~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:244363,00.html
13.) Jeffery Boutwell and Michael. T Klare, Light weapons and civil conflict: Controlling the tools of Violence, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999
14.) T. W Bennet, using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African Tradition? Institute for Security Studies, 1998
15.) Light weapons and small arms OAU report, 1999
[1] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[2] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[3] ibid
[4] ibid
[5] ibid
[6] ibid
[7] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[8] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[9] ibid
[10] ibid
[11] ibid
[12] ibid
[13] ibid
[14] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[15] ibid
[16] ibid
[17] ibid
[18] ibid
[19] ibid
[20] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[21] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[22] ibid
[23] ibid
[24] ibid
[25] ibid
[26] Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006
[27] Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006
[28] ibid
[29] ibid
[30] ibid
[31] ibid
[32] T. W Bennet, using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African Tradition? Institute for Security Studies, 1998.
[33] T. W Bennet, using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African Tradition? Institute for Security Studies, 1998.
[34] ibid
[35] ibid
[36] ibid
[37] ibid
[38] T. W Bennet, using children in armed conflict: A legitimate African Tradition? Institute for Security Studies,
[39] Ibid.
[40] ibid
[41] ibid
[42] Light weapons and small arms OAU report
[43] P. W Singer, children at war, New York, Pantheon books, 2005
[44] ibid
[45] Jeffery Boutwell and Michael. T Klare, Light weapons and civil conflict: Controlling the tools of Violence, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999
[46] Jeffery Boutwell and Michael. T Klare, Light weapons and civil conflict: Controlling the tools of Violence, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999
[47] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[48] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[49] ibid
[50] ibid
[51] http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/0,,contentMDK:20692151~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:244363,00.html
[52] Shraeder, Peter.J, African politics and society (Bedford / St. Martin, Boston, 2000), p. 175.
[53] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[54] Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich, Why do children “fight”? Explaining the rise of child soldiers
[55] ibid
[56] ibid
[57] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[58] ibid
[59] ibid
[60] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon books, 2005
[61] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War
[62] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War
[63] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War
[64] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon books, 2005
[65] ibid
[66] ibid
[67] Ibid.
[68] Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and David M Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,2000):113
[69] Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and David M Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,2000):113
[70] Ibid.p.115
[71] Ibid.p.116
[72] Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and
[73] Ibid. p. 118
[74] Indra de Soysa, “The resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paupacity?” in Mads Berdal and
[75] William Reno, Liberia and Sierra Leone: The Competition for patronage in resource rich economies
[76] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights watch. Vol 16, No 2. New York. 2004
[77] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[78] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[79] ibid
[80] P. W Singer, Children at War, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005
[81] Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006
[82] ibid
[83] ibid
[84] ibid
[85] PW Singer 2005 How Children Are recruited into War in Children at War New York: Pantheon Books
[86] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.
[87] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.
[88] Lois Whitman, Easy Prey, Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch / Africa, New York. 1994
[89] ibid
[90] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.
[91] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.
[92] Susan McKay, Girls in militaries, Paramilitaries and armed opposition groups
[93] ibid
[94] ibid
[95] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004.
[96] ibid
[97] ibid
[98] ibid
[99] ibid
[100] ibid
[101] Tony Tate, How to Fight, How to Kill. Child Soldiers in Liberia, Human Rights Watch. Vol 16, No2, New York, 2004
[102] P. W Singer, Children at war, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005.
[103] Eric Greitens, The treatment of children During conflict in Frances Stewart, Valpy Fitzgerald and Associates (eds.), War and Underdevelopment Volume 1 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001].p. 154
[104] Eric Greitens, The treatment of children During conflict in Frances Stewart, Valpy Fitzgerald and Associates (eds.), War and Underdevelopment Volume 1 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001].p. 154
[105] P. W Singer, Children at war, New York, Pantheon Books, 2005.
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